Cavalry Tactics

as Illustrated by the

War of the Rebellion

PART I.


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CAVALRY TACTICS

—AS—

Illustrated by the War of the Rebellion

TOGETHER WITH

MANY INTERESTING FACTS IMPORTANT FOR CAVALRY TO KNOW.

By Captain ALONZO GRAY,
Fourteenth U. S. Cavalry.

PART I.

U. S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

1910.

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PREFACE.

In pursuing the subject of cavalry tactics I found that, while certain principles were accepted as correct, I was not familiar with the battles in which these principles were applied. I believe it to be true that there is no modern principle of cavalry tactics, which is accepted today as correct by any first-class military power, which was not fully illustrated during the War of the Rebellion. No war which has occured since that time has, in any respect, added to the cavalry tactics which were in daily use during that great struggle.

I give it as my humble opinion that increased range of firearms and the addition of machine guns, increase the sphere of action of, and necessity for, well-organized cavalry; that bicycles, motorcycles and automobiles will prove to be only valuable auxiliaries to cavalry in transporting information back to the rear, and thus saving an unnecessary expenditure of horse flesh; and that while flying machines may bring information, by so doing they will widen the sphere of action of good cavalry; and, more than ever before, as a result of such information, it will be necessary to have good cavalry ready to move on extremely short notice.

In looking for examples to illustrate the tactical principles of cavalry operations, I have drawn mostly from the Records of the Rebellion (indicated in references by R. R.), but have not endeavored to give exact quotations; instead I have quoted only so much as is necessary to illustrate the point involved. The illustrations are taken mostly after the opening campaign of 1863, at which time the Federal cavalry

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reached and efficient condition. At this time the Confederate cavalry was at its best. (Life and campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 257.)

The reason why more Federal than Confederate reports are quoted is because the former are much more numerous.

Whenever a report states what happens to the enemy or the enemy's losses, be the report Federal or Confederate, that portion of it should be accepted with great caution.

While the work principally treats of tactics, I have incorporated reports of such facts and expedients as are useful for every cavalryman to know.

It is my intention to follow this work, Part I, with a work on "Troop Leading of Cavalry," wherein the decisions are based on the principles herein illustrated.

This work is undertaken in the hope that the lessons learned during our great war will not be forgotten.

ALONZO GRAY.

Camp Stotsenburg,
Pampanga, P. I.
March 31, 1910.

INTRODUCTION.

A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND ARMAMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CAVALRY.

The first mounted force, consisting of one squadron, was authorized by Act of Congress March 5, 1792. March 5, 1792.

The Act of March 2, 1799, authorized three regiments of cavalry, to be composed of five squadrons of two companies each. They were not all raised, and those which were raised were mustered out March 16, 1802. March 2, 1799 to March 16, 1802.

The Act of April 12, 1808, authorized a regiment of light dragoons. April 12, 1808.

By Act of January 11, 1812, Congress ordered another regiment of light dragoons. January 11, 1812

By Act of March 30, 1814, these light dragoon regiments were consolidated. The consolidated regiment was composed of eight troops, each consisting of five officers and 116 enlisted men. March 30, 1814.

By Act of Congress, June 15, 1815, this regiment was disbanded. June 15, 1815.

Congress, by Act of March 2, 1833, authorized the raising of the 1st Dragoons. This was the beginning of our present cavalry organization. The regiment was composed of ten companies to serve on horse or foot as might be directed. March 2, 1833.

On May 23, 1836, Congress authorized the raising of another dragoon regiment which was to be just like the first. It became the 2d Dragoons. May 23, 1836.

By an Act known as the "Ten Regiment Bill" Congress, on February 11, 1847, authorized ten regiments, one of which was the 3d Dragoons and another the Mounted Rifles. Each of these regiments was to have two majors, the others having only one. Feb. 11, 1847.

1884. At the close of the Mexican War, in the summer of 1848, the 3d Dragoons were disbanded and the Mounted Rifles mustered out, but immediately recruited and sent to Oregon.

March 3, 1855. By Act of March 3, 1855, Congress authorized two regular regiments of cavalry. They became the First and Second Cavalry.

May 4, 1861. By presidential order, G. O. 16, A. G. O., 1861, the 3d Cavalry was added to the regular army. It consisted of three battalions, each composed of two squadrons of two companies each. This order was confirmed by Act of Congress July 29, 1861.

August 3, 1861. All mounted troops were organized into one arm, called cavalry, by Act of August 3, 1861. By this act

The 1st Dragoons became the 1st Cavalry;
The 2d Dragoons became the 2d Cavalry;
The Mounted Rifles became the 3d Cavalry;
The 1st Cavalry became the 4th Cavalry;
The 2d Cavalry became the 5th Cavalry;
The 3d Cavalry became the 6th Cavalry.

Definition of squadron. The Act of July 29, 1861, defines a squadron as consisting of two troops or companies.

Number of troops per regiment. At the beginning of the war all regiments had ten troops or five squadrons. The 6th Cavalry, formerly the 3d, was, by Act of Congress, to have twelve troops at the time of its organization. (See G .O. 16, A. G. O., May 4, 1861.)

War organization of all regular cavalry. By Act of Congress July 17, 1862, promulgated in G. O. 91, A. G. O., July 29, 1862, all United States cavalry was organized as follows: Each regiment to have 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant colonel, 3 majors, 1 surgeon, 1 assistant surgeon, 1 regimental adjutant, 1 regimental quartermaster, 1 regimental commissary, 1 sergeant major, 1 quartermaster sergeant, 1 commissary sergeant, 2 hospital stewards, 1 saddler sergeant, 1 chief trumpeter, 1 chief farrier or blacksmith, 12 companies or troops.

Each company or troop to have 1 captain, 1 first lieutenant, 1 second lieutenant, 1 supernumerary second lieutenant, 1 1st sergeant, 1 quartermaster sergeant, 1 commissary sergeant, 5 sergeants, 8 corporals, 2 teamsters, 2 farriers or blacksmiths, 1 saddler, 1 wagoner, and 78 privates. Total 100 enlisted.

G. O. No. 7, A. G. O., January 7, 1863, provides that each troop or company of United States cavalry shall have from 60 to 78 privates.

Volunteer cavalry.

The volunteer cavalry went out with 10 troops per regiment. G. O. No. 126, A. G. O., September 6, 1862, directed that each regiment of volunteer cavalry should have the same organization as that prescribed for the regular service. (See G. O. 91, A. G. O., 1862, above.) This order directed that this organization should be strictly adhered to by all concerned.

G. O. No. 110, A. G. O., April 29, 1863, gave the organization of the volunteer cavalry and but slightly changed the above. It provided for 2 trumpeters per troop and fixed the enlisted strength at the minimum of 82 and the maximum at 100 per troop.

July 28, 1866.

By Act of July 28, 1866, Congress provided for the organization of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th regiments of cavalry, and by Act of February 2, 1901, it provided for the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th regiments.

Feb. 2, 1901.

ARMAMENT.

During the Mexican War the dragoons were armed with musketoons, which were carried on sling belts, except when marching the sling belt was unsnapped. They also carried dragoon sabers of Prussian pattern and horse pistols.

The Mounted Rifles were armed with percussion rifles and Colt's army revolvers, but no sabers.

The cavalry regiments were armed with sabers, rifle-carbines and Colt's navy revolvers.

(Brackett's History of U. S. Cavalry, p. 160.)

Armament during the Civil War.

During the Civil War the U. S. Cavalry was generally armed with rifles or carbines, sabers and revolvers.

The rifles carried at the commencement of the war were changed for carbines, and the single loading carbines were, in the latter part of the war, changed for repeating ones. See Exts. Nos. 74, 133, 151, 141.

At the beginning of the war the sabers were the Prussian pattern, with a long straight blade. These were replaced later by the light cavalry saber with a curved blade, which was regarded with much more favor than the Prussian saber.

The Colt's revolver was generally carried. It was loaded with powder and ball and fired with percussion caps.

The lance.

Only one lancer regiment went out, the 6th Penn., and it changed the lance for the saber in April, 1863.

DRILL REGULATIONS.

Previous to 1896 Drill Regulations were called Tactics.

1811.

In 1811 Anthony Finley of Philadelphia published "Colonel Harries' Instructions for a Volunteer Corps of Cavalry."

1814.

In 1814 Colonel Wm. Duane, Adjutant General, U. S. Army, published "Hand Book for Cavalry." It was a system of drill regulations.

1826.

In 1826 a Board of Officers was convened to report "A Complete System of Cavalry Tactics."

Scott Tactics.

Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott was president and Lieut. Col. Z. Taylor was a member of the board These tactics were published in 1834 and were known as the "Scott Tactics."

The system was a double rank system where two troops, side by side, each in double rank, constituted a squadron, and four squadrons a regiment. The squadron was commanded by the senior captain. While the drill differs from that of the present time, the principles are essentially the same. Much of the phraseology of our present drill regulations is a repetition of that of the "Scott Tactics."

In 1841 the War Department published what were called the "'41 Tactics," or "Poinsett Tactics." They differed from the "Scott Tactics" in providing for a regiment of 10 companies, or 5 squadrons. Poinsett or '41 Tactics.

The "History of the U. S. Cavalry," by Brackett, on page 48 states: "The system of cavalry tactics adapted to the organization of the dragoon regiments was authorized by the Hon. J. R. Poinsett, Secretary of War, on the 10th of February, 1841. It is mainly a translation of the tactics of the French service, and has not yet (June 1, 1863) been improved upon, though several attempts have been made, but they have all proved failures. I believe almost every cavalry officer of experience considers the tactics of 1841 as far superior to anything which has yet been introduced into our service."

The '41 tactics were used by the eastern cavalry during the entire war and by the regular cavalry after the war. The western cavalry used the '41 tactics till the fall of 1864, when they began to use the Cooke tactics, which prescribed a single rank formation.

Whenever, in a report, the term "squadron" is used, it will mean a unit of two troops; while the term "battalion" will mean four troops either in single or double rank.

Because of the almost universal use of the '41 tactics, it will be necessary to describe some of their important features.

"The squadrons of a regiment in order of battle are distinguished by the denominations first, second, third, fourth and fifth; they are formed on the same line, in order of these numbers, commencing on the right with an interval of 12 paces. This is the primitive and habitual order of the squadrons in regiments. Each squadron is composed of four platoons, distinguished by the denominations first, second, third and fourth, commencing on the right. The first and second platoons form the first division, the third and fourth form the second division," Battle order.

The "Column of Squadrons" was a column where each squadron was in line with full distance. In a "Close Column of Squadrons" the squadrons were closed to 12 paces distance.

Cooke's Tactics 1862.

November 1, 1861, the War Department officially adopted the tactics written by Colonel Philip St. George Cooke. They were published in 1862 and known as the "Cooke Tactics."

While it was ordered that "All additions or departures from the exercises and maneuvers laid down are positively forbidden," as previously stated, they were not used by the eastern cavalry at all, and not by the western cavalry till 1864. I make this statement on information obtained from veterans of the war and believe it to be correct.

Principles of the Cooke Tactics

The principles of the Cooke Tactics differ materially from any preceding them. The single rank formation is here introduced. A troop is called a squadron and is composed of four platoons.

In 1857 the War Department published the report on foreign armies made by Captain Geo. B. McClellan. On p. 278 he recommends that the word company be changed to squadron and that the single rank formation be adopted.

Cooke acknowledges getting his ideas from conversations with McClellan.

The introduction of the Cooke tactics states that the single rank formation was tested by the British in Portugal in 1833 and 1834, and it was found that it greatly simplified all cavalry movements.

Battle order.

The battle order for a regiment of ten troops is four troops in line; four in line of troops in column of platoons at full distance, 300 paces in the rear of the first line; one troop 50 paces behind each flank of the first line, each in column of platoons at full distance. In case the regiment had only eight troops, the two center troops of the second line were the missing troops.

An "Open Column" is formed of subdivisions, hav-

ing between them the necessary distance to form line in every way. The "Close Column" is formed of troops with distance of platoon front one from the other. The "Double Column" is formed by advance from the center of the line, by platoons at wheeling distance.

Other than mentioned, these tactics are much the same as the drill regulations of the present time. The double column of fours does not seem to have been used during the Civil War. After his war experience General Cooke rewrote his tactics in 1883. The double column of fours is then introduced. Of this movement General Cooke says: "A new system with two lines and double column of fours as the greatest novelties was devised and was, in fact, approved by a board of experienced officers as early as 1868." (Upton Board.)

Double column of fours.

General Wesley Merritt reviewed these tactics and highly commended these movements as "Valuable changes in the interest of rapidity of maneuver and celerity of formation, which are so important for the effective action of cavalry under the changed conditions for its uses in modern warfare."

Merritt reviews Cooke's tactics.

When Cooke, Merritt and Upton agree that the double column of fours is invaluable in the interests of celerity, I conclude that:—

Any organization which will not admit of the application of double column of fours is incorrect.

Upton's Assimilated Tactics were adopted by G. O. No. 6, A. G. O., 1873. The cavalry service never took kindly to the effort to unite them with infantry.

1873. Upton's Tactics.

The Drill Regulations of 1896 seem to be a combination of Cooke and Upton. They differ from the Assimilated Tactics chiefly in that they broke the tie that bound the cavalry to the infantry.

Drill Regulations, 1896

THE CONFEDERATE CAVALRY.

The Confederate cavalry under Stuart in the east early obtained a superiority over that of the Federal Government. After the Gettysburg campaign the Confederate cavalry began to deteriorate because the fine

Stuart's cavalry.

quality of horses which they had when the war began could no longer be obtained. Stuart's cavalry was organized and armed the same as the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac.

Wheeler's cavalry.

In the western armies of the Confederacy the single rank formation began to be used early in the war. Morgan began to use it from the start. Forrest soon began to use it, and Wheeler found that it was necessary to the conditions under which they were laboring.

Wheeler's Tactics.

Wheeler wrote a set of cavalry tactics which were officially adopted by the following order:

Headquarters Army of the Tennessee,
Dalton, Ga.
February 17, 1864.

General Orders
No. 22.

The system of cavalry tactics prepared by Major General Joseph Wheeler is adopted for the use of the cavalry of the Army of the Tennessee.

By command of General Johnston.

K. Falconer, A. A. G.

These tactics were used by Wheeler in 1863. (See Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 375.)

Wheeler's Armament.

At the battle of Murfreesboro Wheeler's cavalry was armed with the rifle or carbine, sabers and revolvers. (Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 62.)

The following report of an inspection of Wheeler's cavalry is of great importance since it makes statements regarding the use of the saber which cannot be controverted and which are agreed to by all men who saw that weapon extensively used during the war.

Inspectors report on Wheeler's cavalry.

Ext. No. 1.—At least one regiment of each brigade should be armed with pistols and sabers. This might be held in reserve, under ordinary circumstances, as the charging regiment; as at present constituted, this command is virtually little else than mounted infantry. A change in this respect is deemed very important, and I

earnestly and respectfully recommend the adoption of this suggestion at the earliest practicable moment. A light carbine might be carried in addition. It is a matter of regret that the saber has been so much overlooked; its moral influence is great. The "fannade, the glitter of the keen blades in the air in the event of a charge, produce in themselves a most terrifying effect." In a hand to hand conflict the necessity of the saber is most apparent.

(February, 1865, Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 408.)

Wheeler was, without doubt, the ablest Confederate cavalry leader in the west. He was always ready to work in the team and play a subordinate part to his commanding general.

Pen picture of the cavalry fight of Shelbyville. Shelbyville, Tenn., June 27, 1863.

Ext. No. 2.—The carbines and rifles were flashing and banging away at times, and scattering shots, when the game was at long range, and then, when a change came on and the work grew hot, the spiteful sharp explosions swelled into a crackling roar like that of a cane-brake on fire, when, in a single minute, hundreds of boiler-like joints have burst asunder. Add to all the whizzing, angry whirl of countless leaden missiles which split the air about you; the hoarse, unnatural shouts of command—for in battle all sounds of the human voice seem out of pitch and tone; the wild, defiant yell and the answering huzzas of the opposing line; the plunging and rearing of frightened horses; the charges here and there of companies or squadrons which seem to be shot out of the main body as flames shot out of a house on fire; here and there the sharp, quick cry from some unfortunate trooper who did not hear one leaden messenger—for only those are heard which have passed by; the heavy, soggy striking of the helpless body against the ground; the scurrying away of the frightened horse, as often into danger as out of it, whose empty saddle tells the foe that there is one rifle less to fear. All these sights and sounds go to make up the confusing medley of a battle-field.

(Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 101.)

Forrest.

Forrest was a very able man, but, like Stonewall Jackson, was at his best when operating alone. He could not bear restraint and did not work well to the central idea.

In Nov. 1864 Forrest habitually fought on foot.

Rally Hill, Tenn, Nov. 29, 1864.

Ext. No. 2A.—The country, rocky and rugged, was thickly clad with cedars, and difficult, of course, for cavalry movements, so that, for the most part, the fighting was on foot, which, however, was now Forrest's habitual tactics.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 621. November 29, 1864.)

COMMENT.

Forrest always had an escort, but he and his escort always participated in the thickest of the fighting.

It would seem that if a general does not personally enter the heavy fighting, under the changed conditions of warfare, a large escort would be a nuisance.

Armament of Forrest's cavalry.

Forrest's cavalry generally carried sabers, but seldom used them. His cavalry may be considered the highest type of mounted infantry.

Morgan was essentially a raider; although a hard fighter when the occasion demanded, he preferred a loose sort of warfare to working in conjunction with other troops.

Morgan's cav'y.

Ext. No. 3.—We were, in fact, not cavalry, but mounted riflemen. A small body of mounted men was usually kept in reserve to act on the flanks, but otherwise we fought very little on horseback except on scouting expeditions. We never used sabers, and long guns were not exactly the weapons for cavalry evolutions.

Morgan rarely fought with the army; he had to make his command a self-sustaining one. Nearly every man had a pistol and some had two. The pistol preferred and usually worn was the Army Colt.

(Morgan's Cavalry, by Duke.)

Mosby.

Mosby was a partisan and fought whenever everything seemed to be in his favor. His force seldom ex-

ceeded 300 men, mounted on the best horses the state of Virginia could produce. His men were all picked men who knew the country where they were operating. With this class of horses he could always fight on his own terms. When not raiding or harassing trains, they scattered in the surrounding country and came together again on call. They were armed with the revolver only, except that most men had two, besides carrying extra cylinders to slip loaded into the weapon when all loads were exhausted.

CHAPTER I.

ARMS AND THEIR USES—REVOLVER vs. SABER.

EMBRACING A DISCUSSION OF THE RELATIVE MERITS OF THE REVOLVER AND SABER AND SHOWING WHEN EACH SHOULD BE USED. THE TERM PISTOL, IN ANY REPORT, MEANS REVOLVER.

Bowie knives.

Ext. No. 4.—But while a few of the Confederate soldiers were efficiently armed, almost every man of them had a bowie knife and revolver. The Arkansas and Texas troops, especially, carried enormous knives, that might have made a Malay's blood run cold, but in the end these huge knives did duty far oftener as cleavers than as bayonets.

(Morgan's Cavalry, by Duke.)

Use of Pistol. Stevensburg, Va. June 9, 1863.

Ext. No. 5.—Colonel Wickham and a few of his men threw themselves into a field on the roadside, and by the fire of their pistols checked further pursuit.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 289.)

Forrest's men fights with revolvers, dismounted Okolona, Miss., Feb. 22, '64.

Ext. No. 6.—Forrest placed his men dismounted immediately behind a gully. The first Federal charge was checked at 60 yards. The second Federal charge was checked at 40 yards. The third Federal charge was not checked till it reached 20 yards. The fourth Federal charge went through. The Confederate rifle ammunition was exhausted and they fought with revolvers.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 399.)

Use of revolver, dismounted. Tishomingo Creek, (Guntown) June 10, 1864.

Ext. No. 7.—Two strong lines of Federal infantry pressed upon Rucker, Bell and Duff, through an open field. Their front line came within 30 paces of the Confederates, who then drew their revolvers and drove the enemy back with great slaughter.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 473.)

Federals use revolvers dismounted. Mossy Creek, Tenn., Dec. 29, '63.

Ext. No. 8.—The 9th Penn. Cavalry had been withdrawn from the battery and placed in position by the side of the road, and by close pistol fighting, held the large columns of the enemy in check.

(Col. E. M. McCook, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 654.)

Texans use revolvers. Liverpool, Miss., Feb. 3, 1864.

Ext. No. 9.—The enemy charged in gallant style, and were repulsed twice, the second time the Texans using their six-shooters at 20 paces.

(Maj. Genl. S. D. Lee, C. S., R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 365.)

2d U. S. Cavalry use revolvers dismounted. Old Church to Cold Harbor, May 30, 1864.

Ext. No. 10.—In one instance the 2d U. S. Cavalry drove the enemy before them with their pistols (dismounted) after the carbine ammunition had given out.

(Brig. Genl. A. T. A. Torbert, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 805.)

Charge with sabers and revolvers against carbines does not succeed. Noonday Creek, Ga., June 20, 1864.

Ext. No. 11.—Anderson advanced in good style, the Confederates with sabers, supported by the 5th Georgia with pistols. Three times these two regiments charged the 4th Michigan, but each time they were driven back in confusion.

(Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 821.)

Saber against revolver and carbine. Opequan Creek, Va., Sept. 19, '64.

Ext. No. 12.—The enemy relied wholly upon the carbine and the pistol; my men preferred the saber. A short but closely contested struggle ensued, which resulted in the repulse of the enemy. Many prisoners were taken and quite a number of both sides were left on the field.

(Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 456.)

In the mêlée the carbine is useless against the revolver. Ashby's Gap, Feb. 19, 1865.

Ext. No. 13.—The charge was met by one from the enemy and the command was broken. The men had no weapons but their carbines, and these were extremely difficult to load and inefficient in the mêlée that ensued. The rebels (Mosby's men) had very few sabers but were well supplied with revolvers and rode up to our men and shot them down without meeting more resistance than men could make with carbines. I ascribe the dis-

aster to * * * fourth, to the men having neither sabers nor revolvers, and consequently being unable to engage in a mêlée successfully with an enemy armed with at least two revolvers to the man.

(Maj. Thos. Gibson, 14th Pa. Cav., R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, p. 465.)

Sabers necessary in open country. Fisher's Hill, Oct. 9, 1864.

Ext. No. 14.—Lomax's cavalry are armed entirely with rifles and have no sabers, and the consequence is that they cannot fight on horseback, and in this open country they cannot successfully fight on foot against large bodies of cavalry.

(Lieut. Genl. Jubal A. Early, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 559.)

Individual combat with an Indian, revolver wins against saber cut. Solomon's Fork, July 29, 1857.

Ext. No. 15.—I could not stand that; but, drawing my saber, rushed upon the monster and inflicted a severe wound on his head. At the same moment he fired his last barrel within a foot of me, the ball taking effect in the center of the breast, glancing to the left and lodging near my left nipple.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 21.)

Saber used as a cutting weapon. Manassas, July 30, 1862.

Ext. No. 16.—Colonel Munford was dismounted by a saber stroke and his horse was killed.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 107.)

Individual combat, revolver against saber, former wins. Fleetwood,* Va., June 9, 1863.

Ext. No. 17.—Perceiving his danger, Colonel Davis turned upon Allen with a cut of his saber, which Allen avoided by throwing himself on the side of his horse; at the same moment he fired and Colonel Davis fell.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 265.)

Revolver wins against the saber in mêlée. Stevensburg, Va., June 9, 1863.

Ext. No. 18.—Colonel Hampton, while engaging one of the enemy with his saber, was shot through the body by another, and mortally wounded.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 289.)

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*In the reports of Southern Officers the engagement at Brandy Station is given as "Fleetwood" or "Fleetwood Hill."

Ext. No. 19.—Captain Latanè and Captain Royall met hand to hand, one with the saber and the other with the pistol, and Latanè received instant death. Royall was severely wounded by Latanè's saber and by the men who charged close at Latanè's side.

Individual combat, revolver wins against saber.

Chickahominy Raid, June 13, 1682.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 56.)

Ext. No. 20.—Corporal Caroll and Private Jett of Co. "C," after the hand to hand fight in the field, showed me their sabers cut off close to the hilt, and Caroll's forehead was gashed with a saber.

In the mêlèe, the saber is used mostly as a cutting weapon.

Gettysburg, July 3, 1863.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 344, Gettysburg campaign.)

Ext. No. 21.—And the road was soon, and for several miles, thickly dotted with the wounded and slain—a number of whom had been cut down by the sabers of the untrained but heavy-handed Confederates who followed Forrest that winter afternoon.

Forrest's cavalry uses saber as a cutting weapon

Sacremento, Ky., Dec. 28, 1861.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 52.)

Ext. No. 22.—Forrest was assaulted simultaneously by two officers with their sabers; but, eluding the full force of their thrusts by bending his body suddenly forward, their sword points only touched his shoulder. Carried a few paces ahead by the impetus of his horse, checking and drawing which aside in time to shoot one of his opponents as he came up, he thrust his saber point into the other. * * * obliging him to run his saber through one, and disable the other by a blow on the sword arm.

Pistol wins against saber thrust. Officers use the thrust.

Sacremento, Ky., Dec. 28, 1861.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 53.)

Ext. No. 23.—Private W. H. Terry, while engaged single-handed with a Federal trooper whom he was hammering with his exhausted rifle, was run through the heart by Captain Davis.

Officer uses thrusts.

Sacremento, Ky., Dec. 28, '61.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 54.)

Charge in column of squadrons.
Forrest's cavalry charges artillery as foragers, with sabers, pistols and carbines, using '41 tactics.
Fort Donelson, Feb. 15, 1862.

Ext. No. 24.—He drew his men up for the work in an open space, in a column of squadrons. The order to charge up the ravine was given, with instructions for the first and second companies of the squadrons severally to deploy to the right and left as they advanced. About the battery a hand to hand struggle ensued. Sabers, pistols and carbines were lavishly used, with much cost of lives on both sides.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 82.)

Forrest uses shot-guns during the early part of the war.
Shiloh, April 7 1862.

Ext. No. 25.—Forrest resolved to charge. At twenty paces the Confederates gave a volley with their shot-guns, a formidable weapon at that distance, and rushed in with pistols and sabers.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 146. Battle of Shiloh.)

Saber used as shock weapon.
Upperville, Va., June 21, 1863.

Ext. No. 26.—Very many charges were made and the saber used freely.

(Genl. A. Pleasonton, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 912.)

Saber used as shock weapon.
Brandy Station, Va., Aug 1, 1863.

Ext. No. 27.—There were several charges and the saber was used with success.

(Genl. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 932.)

Sturdy men of Maine use saber as cutting weapon.
Beverly Ford, Va., June 9, 1863.

Ext. No. 28.—They outnumbered us three to one, but could not withstand the heavy saber blows of the sturdy men of Maine who rode through them and over them.

(Genl. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 986.)

Stuart's cavalry use the cut.
Boonsborough, Md., July 8, 1863.

Ext. No. 29.—The charge was spiritedly made and sabers freely used, as the heads of my men will attest.

(Lieut. Col. Preston, 1st Vt. Cav., R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 1015.)

Kilpatrick's cavalry use saber during Savannah campaign.
Waynesborough Ga., Dec. 4. '64.

Ext. No. 30.—Upwards of 200 left in our hands were wounded by the saber alone.

(General Kilpatrick, Savannah Campaign, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 365.)

Stuart's cavalry charge battery with sabers.

Ext. No. 31.—Jones brigade, with drawn sabers, charged down the turnpike under a fearful artillery fire.

(General Stuart, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 702.)

Hagerstown, Md., July 6, 1863.

Ext. No. 32.—With an abiding faith in the god of battles, and a firm reliance on the saber, your success will continue.

Stuart's opinion of the saber.

(Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 720.)

Ext. No. 33.—After driving the whole cavalry force of the enemy steadily all day long, our troops went in about 4 o'clock with the saber and a yell and routed them.

Saber used to finish the fight. Seriersville, Tenn., Jan. 26, 1864.

(Brig. Genl. S. D. Sturgis, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 134.)

Ext. No. 34.—This great disaster would have at once been retrieved but for the insufficient armament of the command. Besides the 1st and 2d Md. and a squadron of the 8th Va., there was not a saber in the command.

Charge must be met by charge.

In that open country, perfectly level, the only mode of fighting charging cavalry was by charging, and this the men were unable to do.

Cavalry is outclassed because they have no sabers. New Creek, W Va., Aug. 4, 1864.

(Brig. Genl. Bradley T. Johnson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 6.)

Ext. No. 35.—The cavalry made some handsome saber charges, in which most of the prisoners were captured.

Prisoners captured with the saber. Cedarville, Va., Aug. 16, 1864.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 19.)

Ext. No. 36.—Forrest was charged by a Federal officer who lunged at him with his saber; Forrest parried the thrust with his pistol, and, firing, killed his resolute adversary.

Personal combat, revolver wins over saber thrust. Near Maplesville, Ala., Apr. 1, 1865.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 668.)

The following is another account of the same affair:

Ext. No. 37.—While charging, Captain Taylor ran up to Forrest and hit him over the head with his saber,

Same as above.

and ordered him to surrender. Forrest then drew his revolver and shot him dead. Another of our boys ran after him, striking at him with his saber as he ran.

Soldier uses the cut.

(The Last Campaign, by E. N. Gilpin, published in the Cavalry Journal.)

In the thick woods the revolver is superior to the saber.

Near Maplesville, Ala., Apr. 1, 1865.

Ext. No. 38.—The enemy had used the saber almost exclusively. Forrest and his staff were armed, each with two navy revolvers, and the men with Spencer rifles as well as pistols. It was a contest of sabers with firearms, with the odds of four to one against the Confederates. Forrest, Lieut. Boon and five of his men only were wounded, while some thirty of the enemy were killed and as many as sixty were left in the hospital, near by, badly wounded.

(Campaigns of Forest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 669.)

Saber dismounted.

Bear Creek, Station, Ga., Nov. 16, 1864.

Ext. No. 39.—The 10th Ohio made a most gallant saber charge against the enemy posted behind rail barricades; dismounted, they drove the enemy in confusion, killing and wounding many with the saber.

(Col. Atkins, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 389.)

Saber used as a cutting weapon.

Wilson's Raid, Apr. 1, 1865.

Ext. No. 40.—The captain had command of the advance company and did not hear the order to turn off the road, so he charged on past the artillery, cutting right and left among the enemy until shot down by them.

(Col. J. G. Vail, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 455.)

The following discussion is taken from "Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade," written by Captain Frederick Whittaker, 6th N. Y. Cavalry:

Ext. No. 41.—So far as the author's observation goes, he never remembers an instance in which the saber charge, resolutely pushed, failed to drive the pistols. But the individual fancy of the colonel seemed to regulate the matter for his regiment. If he were an enthusiastic swordsman he always managed to infuse the same spirit into his men, and such men depended on their sabers with just confidence. The saber is a weapon that requires

constant practice to keep one's hand in, and our cavalry officers as a class are entirely deficient in the practice.

In all the instances during the war in which the saber proved ineffective it may be safely asserted that it was owing to two things—want of fencing practice and blunt sabers. (Pp. 6 and 7.)

Now, the moral effect of the charge is tremendous. The fierce charging yell, rising and swelling higher and higher till it overtops the sound of musketry, frightens more men than bullets. Very, very few troops will stand up against a charge unsupported by works; we might say none. One side or the other is sure to give way, not from the force of the weapons, but simply because they are afraid. Anything which encourages men to charge home doubles their morale, and morale is everything. (P. 11. See also Exts. Nos. 1, 2, 480.)

The true use of the revolver lies in irregular warfare, where single combats and sudden encounters of small parties take place, on horseback, in narrow lanes, among woods and fences, where the saber cannot be used. In such places, and wherever regular order is broken up, the revolver is invaluable. In pursuits, patrols and surprises it is superior to the saber. In line charges in the field, the latter is always conqueror if it is sharp. But one thing should be impressed upon every man—never to try long shots when on horseback. The revolver on the right hip should have a cord fastened to it a yard long. The men should be practiced in firing at a target while passing at speed, and then dropping the pistol on the opposite side, to use the cord while they handle the saber. (P. 14.)

The men should be taught never to fire before the word. The moral effect of a reserved volley is tremendous. Irregular firing during an advance is both useless and demoralizing. Thirty or forty feet from the enemy's line is the time to fire, all together aiming low. (P. 15.)

The saber is not adapted to loose or partisan warfare.

Ext. No. 42.—We overtook about 300 Cheyenne warriors drawn up in line of battle, and marching boldly and steadily towards us. It was my intention and that

Solomon's Fork, Kansas, June 29, 1857.

of most company commanders to give a carbine volley and then charge with drawn pistols, and use our sabers as a *dernier ressort;* but, much to my surprise, the colonel ordered "Draw sabers, Charge." We set up a terrific yell, which scattered the Cheyennes in disorderly flight, and we kept up the charge in pursuit. Very few of the company horses were fleet enough after the march to keep up with Indians on fresh ponies.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 20.)

In the Gettysburg cavalry fight both saber and revolver were used in the mêlée.

Gettysburg, Pa., July 3, 1863.

Ext. No. 43.—Just then Hampton arrived with the 1st N. C. and the Jeff Davis Legion, and the battle was renewed back and forth across the plain until all of Hampton's brigade except the Cobb Legion, and all of Fitz Lee's brigade except the 4th Va. Cav. were engaged in the fierce hand to hand mêlée which followed. For many minutes the fight with saber and pistol raged most furiously.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 340. Battle of Gettysburg.)

Wooded country not suitable for the use of the saber by large bodies of cavalry.

Ext. No. 44.—There was little chance for mounted fighting in eastern Virginia, the dense woods, the armament of both parties, and the practice of barricading making it impracticable to use the saber with anything like a large force; and so, with the exception of Yellow Tavern, the dismounted method prevailed in almost every engagement.

(Sheridan's Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 424.)

COMMENTS ON THE SABER AND REVOLVER.

It will be seen from the next chapter that during the War of the Rebellion, the same as for centuries past, the saber was essentially a weapon for shock action. During the thick of the mêlée it was still to be preferred; but when the mêlée began to dissolve into individual combats the saber was or should have been exchanged for the revolver. This exchange can be effected by throwing away the saber, returning it to the scabbard or by dropping it and letting it hang attached to the wrist by a sword

knot. The second method of getting rid of it is quite impossible when in motion, while the third will be accompanied by some danger to the trooper if the weapon is as sharp as it should be. Up to the present time, therefore, there is no satisfactory way to exchange the saber for the revolver while in action.

In the individual combat the revolver will be the winner in almost every case. If the trooper is expert in its use, he has nothing to fear from an individual enemy armed with a saber. (Exts. 15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 36, 37, 38, 41.)

The revolver was, at times, used for collective fire dismounted, but only under exceptional circumstances, such as from behind a stone wall, or for defensive purposes after the carbine ammunition had become exhausted. (Exts. 5 to 10 and 90.)

The revolver should, then, be used whenever regular order is broken up. (Ext. 41.) That is, in individual combat, charging as foragers on wagon trains or artillery (Ext. 24), in the woods (Exts. 38, 44), on patrol duty, when on mounted skirmish line in close country, in irregular or partisan warfare where sudden encounters of small parties are to be expected. (Ext. 41.)

In the mêlée the carbine is useless against the revolver. (Ext. 13.)

As to the type of revolver or pistol needed the conclusions that can be reached are that there is needed for the cavalry a weapon of large caliber or great stopping power, quick firing, and accurate not to exceed fifty yards. Since the change from the saber to the revolver will be made during the fight, it is evident that the trooper should be able to get his weapon into action with the greatest degree of rapidity. Such a contrivance as a holster with a button flap and carrying the butt to the front should be discontinued at the earliest moment.

All references to the saber as a thrusting weapon, which were observed, have been extracted. (Exts. 22, 23, 36, 37.) It will be noticed that it was so used by officers, who are presumably better instructed in its use

than are enlisted men. Only a small portion of the references to the saber as a cutting weapon have been extracted. (Exts. 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 28, 29, 37, 40, 55, 83.) Not only these references, but conversations with veterans of the Civil war lead to the conclusion that the enlisted man is going to use his saber almost entirely as a cutting weapon. At the close of the war it was no different than at the beginning. It is believed that the cavalry at the close of the war was as well trained in swordsmanship as any troops that the United States will ever put in the field. If, then, our best trained cavalry is going to use the saber chiefly as a cutting weapon, it is better to give it a weapon adapted to the manner in which it will be used rather than one adapted to the use of a trained fencer. The above statements deal with historical facts and not with abstract theories. It is not to be inferred that the cut is to be preferred to the thrust, since the contrary is the case, but it is reiterated that the cut has been and will be used to the almost entire exclusion of the thrust.

There has been a great deal of discussion in the U. S. cavalry service in years past regarding the relative merits of the revolver and saber. Such discussion is time wasted. Each weapon has its distinct and proper uses, and neither can replace the other; neither can either of them be discontinued as a necessary part of modern cavalry armament.

It is often asserted that the horse is the real weapon in the shock (Ext. 67), and that it makes no difference whether a trooper has a revolver or saber in his hand. (See Exts. 29, 30, 35, 43, and Chapter II.) The moral effect of the flash and glitter of a "three-foot razor" is not to be ignored.

The '41 tactics prescribed that the charge should be at a "raise saber" and it was so used all through the war.

Upton, after his war experience as a successful cavalry commander, retained the "raise saber" for the charge in his tactics of '73, probably because he found that his

men used it no matter what was prescribed. Untrained men instinctively use the saber as they would use a club.

The Cooke tactics of '61 prescribes the "tierce point" as the charging position, and Cooke, after his Civil war experience, still prescribed the "tierce point" in his tactics of '83.

The "tierce point" was officially adopted as the charging position of the saber in the Cavalry Drill Regulations of 1896.

In the effect of the saber previous to and at the instant of contact is largely a moral one (see Exts. 1, 2, 41), then it would seem that this effect may be materially increased by carrying the saber during the charge at a "raise saber" rather than at the position of "charge saber" as now used, since in the former position its flash and glitter, and therefore its moral effect, will be much greater than if carried at the latter.

THE LANCE.

As a defensive weapon the lance is no better than the saber.

At Vionville, Aug. 16, 1870, Bredow's brigade was composed of two regiments. One was armed with the saber and the other with the lance. With equal numbers they charged in the same line under identical conditions and suffered equal losses. This would indicate that as a defensive weapon the lance is not superior to the saber.

In our service we know very little about the lance. In the Mexican war we had lancers for opponents, as will be seen from the following:

Sabers against Mexican lancers. Buena Vista, Feb. 23, 1847.

Ext. No. 45.—The cavalry made one most gallant charge against the enemy on the 23d of February, and cut their way through them; but the Mexican lancers were far from being a contemptible enemy, and many of them were admirable horsemen. Our people had the advantage of larger horses and heavier men as a general thing, but the Mexicans were much more agile, and could handle their horses as well as any people on earth, while with the lance they were greatly our superiors, and used that weapon with great effect both at Buena Vista and at San Pascual.

Americans do not take kindly to the lance.

We have yet to make good lancers in the United States, as experiments, even on a small scale, have proved failures among the Americans.

(History of the U. S. Cavalry, by Brackett, p. 83.)

Rush's lancers.

The 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, known as Rush's Lancers, went out at the beginning of the war with lances which they carried through all the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac till April, 1863. They never used that weapon in any shock action, and after Stoneman's raid in April, 1863, they abandoned it as unsuited to the service, and were thereafter armed with sabers and carbines. At the battle of Beverly Ford we find them charging with sabers, June 9, 1863.

(See Annals of the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, p. 167.)

COMMENTS ON THE LANCE.

The lance cannot be used to advantage in a close wooded country such as is found everywhere along the Atlantic coast. The greatest use of the lance is in the shock. In the mêlée the saber possesses a decided advantage. In meeting an enemy armed with the lance it would be necessary to first break the continuity of his lines before the saber could gain a superiority. In these extracts there can be found many examples where cavalry charges have been broken by magazine fire by holding it till the charging line is within very close range. The traditions of our cavalry and its training are such that we can dismount and fight on foot in a very short time. This dismounted fire should be supported by mounted troops, which should deliver the charge as soon as the lancer line is broken. If it were necessary to meet lancers, whose lines were unbroken by fire action, with shock action of troops armed with the saber, I would endeavor to strike the weakest point of their line with a mass formation of some kind, either by squadrons in column of troops or in line of troops in columns of fours. Thin lines fleeing in front of lancers would soon cause their lines to become so broken that other troops held in reserve could meet them with a fair chance of success.

CHAPTER II.

SHOCK ACTION AND THE USE OF SABER.

Federal cavalry has battalion organization.

Saber used as the shock weapon.

Wilson's Raid, Apr. 1, 1865.

Ext. No. 46.—About 4:00 p. m. the enemy came up and resolutely assailed the right of Roddy's position with a mounted battalion, with drawn sabers. It was handsomely done, and the Confederates were thrown into a great deal of confusion, giving way in disorder.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 666.)

Momentum of the charge.

Wilson's Raid, Apr. 1, 1865.

Ext. No. 47.—On came the Federal cavalry with their sabers drawn. * * * Such was the momentum of the Federal charge that one of their horses, striking squarely against the wheel of a piece, broke every spoke, and split his own breast open.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 667.)

Sudden onset succeeds where timid action would probably fail.

Saber used as a shock weapon.

Sugar Creek, Tenn., Oct. 9, 1863.

Ext. No. 48.—The enemy left some two or three regiments at Sugar Creek, a strong position, to oppose my advance; but instead of fighting them at long range, as they expected, I ordered a saber charge. The 5th Iowa made a most gallant charge, breaking through their lines, etc.

(Brig. Genl. George Crook, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 687.)

Pursuit should be vigorous.

Calhoun, Tenn., Dec. 28, 1863.

Ext. No. 49.—Our rapid pursuit and vigorous use of the saber completely demoralized this force, which was thrown into great confusion, and scattered in every direction, their men throwing away large numbers of arms, accoutrements, etc.

(Col. Eli Long, Comg. 2d Brig., R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 643.)

Rapid movements result in small loses.
Saber is charging weapon.
Fair Garden, Tenn., Jan. 27, 1864.

Ext. No. 50.—I can only account for our small loss by the rapidity of our movements and the consternation produced by the saber charges.

(Col. E. M. McCook, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 141.)

Sudden and well conducted saber charge destroys the accuracy of the enemies fire.
Okolona, Miss., Feb. 22, 1864.

Ext. No. 51.—It will be observed that we lost but little, which shows that the enemy, by the courageous and coolly executed saber charge, was so struck and taken by surprise that he lost the balance of power to give a well-aimed fire, and this explains the many horses shot in the legs and head.

(Maj. Gust. Heinricks, 4th Mo. Cav., R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 280.)

Saber used as a shock weapon by western armies.
Noonday Creek, Ga., June 20, 1864.

Ext. No. 52.—The 7th Pa. and the 4th Mich. each made one saber charge, and two battalions of the 4th Mich. repulsed three saber charges made by Anderson's brigade of regular cavalry.

(Col. R. G. H. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 812.)

Driving cavalry through infantry lines results in capture of an infantry regiment.
Near Berryville, Va. Sept. 13, 1864.

Ext. No. 53.—At the same time General Wilson, with McIntosh's brigade, dashed up the Winchester pike, drove the rebel cavalry at a run, came in contact with Kershaw's division, charged it, and captured the 8th So. Carolina regiment (16 officers and 145 men) and its battle flag, with a loss of only two men killed and two wounded.

(Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 24.)

Saber is used extensively at Brandy Station, June 9, 1863.

Ext. No. 54.—Fresh columns of the enemy arriving, under the heavy blows of our sabers were driven back. For an hour and a half the contest continued in determined charges.

(Genl. D. McM. Gregg, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 951.)

Infantry may be safely charged if struck when changing front.

Ext. No. 55.—A six-gun battery of the enemy was playing away rapidly toward our left front. This was ordered to be charged, but before the order could be executed it withdrew, and the charge was directed against the enemy's infantry, which was attempting to change

front and meet us; they were in confusion; no time was lost; the intrepid Devin, with his gallant brigade, burst like a storm of case shot in their midst, showering saber blows on their heads and shoulders, trampling them under his horses' feet, and routing them in droves in every direction. The brigade emerged from the fray with three stand of colors and over 300 prisoners.

The cut seems to be used more than the thrust when attacking infantry.

Opequan Creek, Va., Sept. 19, 1864.

(Brig. Genl. W. Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 444.)

Ext. No. 56.—On July 3, engagement two or three miles to the right of Two Taverns, in which this regiment (1st Mich. Cav.) charged in close column upon Hampton's brigade, using the saber only, and driving the enemy from the field, with a loss to this regiment of 6 officers and 80 men.

Custer's cavalry charge in close column using saber.

Two Taverns, Md., July 3, 1863.

(Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 899.)

Ext. No. 57.—A second, third and fourth charge was made by the enemy, each of which was repulsed or met and driven back by counter charges. During all the enemy's charges the loss of men and horses must have been severe.

Charge should be met by counter charge.

Waynesboro, Ga., Dec. 4, 1864.

(Genl. Jos. Wheeler, C. S., R. R., Vol. 44, p. 410.)

Ext. No. 58.—He occasionally attacked us by charging with his cavalry, which was invariably met by counter charges.

Charge invariably met by counter charge.

Waynesboro, Ga., Dec. 4, 1864.

(Genl. Jos. Wheeler, C. S., R. R., Vol. 44, p. 410.)

Ext. No. 59.—I immediately ordered the charge in close columns of squadrons and swept the hill clear of the enemy.

Cobb's Legion use'41 tactics and charge in close column of squadrons.

Brandy Station, June 9, 1863.

(Col. P. M. B. Young, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 732.)

Ext. No. 60.—Colonel Owen, with his gallant little regiment, took the center of the road supported by the 2d Va. on his right and the 5th on his left, dashed in with the most spirited charge of the day, driving the regiment before him, using the saber with terrible effect, capturing and killing nearly the whole regiment.

Saber is used with terrible effect.

Middleburg, Va. June 17, 1863.

(Genl. Munford, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 741.)

Reserves use saber.

Anderson Gap, Tenn., Oct. 1, 1863.

Ext. No. 61.—At the proper moment our reserve charged. Thirty-seven of the enemy were killed or wounded and 42 made prisoners. Nearly all the wounds were inflicted with the saber.

(Col. O. H. LaGrange, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 683.)

Revolver is substituted for the saber when the nature of the ground does not favor the latter.

Okolona, Miss., Feb. 22, 1864.

Ext. No. 62.—General Smith ordered a charge. Six troops rode forward upon the enemy's lines with drawn sabers. The nature of the ground prevented the effective use of the saber, but the pistol was substituted for it and did most excellent service. The enemy was driven from his position and lost fearfully in killed and wounded.

(Lieut. Col. Thos. M. Browne R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 276.)

Regiment makes six charges in one day.

Brandy Station, June 9, 1863.

Ext. No. 63.—In one day six distinct regimental charges were made besides a number of smaller ones.

(Col. Wyndham, 1st N. J. Cav., R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 966.)

Brigade makes five charges.

Brandy Station, Oct 11, 1863.

Ext. No. 64.—Soon commenced a series of charges and counter charges by the 5th, 6th and 15th Va. Cavalry. There were five distinct charges made at this point, which resulted in leaving us in possession of the railroad and station.

(Brig. Genl. Lomax, C. S., R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 465.)

Charges made by a division in battle.

Opequan Creek, Va., Sept. 19, 1864.

Ext. No. 65.—Thus it will be seen that six distinct charges were made by parts of the division after the general advance toward Winchester—two by the 2d Brigade and one by the 1st Brigade against the enemy's cavalry, one by the 2d Brigade and one by the reserve against the enemy's infantry and artillery, and one, the final charge, in which all three of the brigades were concerned.

(Brig. Genl. Wesley Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 445.)

Charges and counter charges. Upperville, Va., June 21, 1863.

Ext. No. 66.—Baker was charged by a fresh regiment. Then I put in the Cobb Legion and broke the attacking party. The Cobb Legion was again attacked, and again with the Jeff Davis Legion I turned the flank; and this series of charges went on until all my regiments named had charged three times and I had gained ground to the right and front of more than half a mile.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 311, Upperville.)

The horse as a weapon. Jonesborough, Ga., Aug. 19, 1864.

Ext. No. 67.—The order was given to charge. The most terrific, yet magnificent, charge ever witnessed was made. The saber and the horses' hoofs were about our only weapons.

(Col. E. H. Murray, Comg. Cav. Div., R. R. Vol. 38, Part II, p. 864.)

Charge is very effective if enemy can be caught in the act of maneuvering. Cavalry seizes the exact moment to deliver its blow. Fleetwood Hill, Va., (Brandy Station), June 9, 1863.

Ext. No. 68.—The order "By fours, right about wheel" was heard. The result was most unfortunate. The enemy saw the wheel and instantly ordered the charge. Colonel Hampton again ordered the "Right about wheel" and placed himself at the head of his men; but it was of no avail. In a moment they were swept to the side of the road, and the full force of the charge fell upon the 4th Virginia.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 289.)

Two brigades cross sabers in a single charge. Fleetwood Hill, (Brandy Station), Va., June 9, 1863.

Ext. No. 69.—This charge was gallantly made and gallantly met as any the writer ever witnessed during four years of active service on the outposts. Taking into estimation the number of men that crossed sabers in this single charge (being nearly a brigade on each side), it was by far the most important hand-to-hand contest between the two armies.

As the blue and gray riders mixed in the smoke and dust of that eventful charge, minutes seemed to elapse before the effect was determined. At last the intermingled and disorganized mass began to recede; we saw that the field was won to the Confederates.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 277. Battle of Brandy Station.)

Ext. No. 70.—Observing a small portion of Federal cavalry, Lieut. Col. Watts was sent forward with one squadron. His charge developed the fact that he had attacked the advance guard of a brigade, which was advancing to battle in column of regiments. Munford formed the second regiment in line and was retiring to gain the advantage of a better position, when he heard the order given to the enemy's column, "Forward, trot, march." He instantly wheeled by fours and charged at full gallop. The impetuosity of the charge carried his regiment entirely through the first line of the enemy, with whom his men were thoroughly intermingled in hand to hand fight.

Quick decision essential to a cavalry leader.
Groveton, Va., Aug. 29, 1862.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 106.)

Ext. No. 71.—Nothing but the impetuosity of the charges, whereby the enemy was not given time to defend himself, can account for the small list of casualties.

Small losses due to impetuosity of the charges.
Wilson's Raid, Mar. 19,-Apr. 21, 1865.

(Maj. Genl. E. Upton, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 475.)

Ext. No. 72.—The fruits of our victories have been materially increased by having mounted columns always ready to take advantage of opportunities offering.

Mounted columns should be ready to strike when the enemy breaks.
Wilson's Raid, Mar. 19-Apr. 21, 1865.

(Bvt. Brig. Genl. E. F. Winslow, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 482.)

COMMENTS.

It will be noticed that the saber was the only weapon used for shock action except when the ground was unfavorable, such as a close or wooded country. Under such conditions the revolver was substituted for the saber. (Ext. 62.) To secure favorable and decisive results a cavalry commander must make a quick decision and quickly take the initiative. (Exts. 48, 50, 51, 68, 70, 71, 72.) A timid cavalry leader will usually fail where a bold one will succeed. In many cases a bold and sudden attack will result in small losses (Exts. 50,

51), and boldness will take the place of numbers. (Ext. 79.)

The pursuit should be vigorous as long as it is kept up. The time when it should be stopped is discussed under the head of "Pursuit."

Cavalry in falling back should be careful to move to the flanks of supporting infantry, otherwise their confusion is communicated to the infantry with serious consequences to the latter. (Ext. 53 and 471.)

A charge should always be met by a charge. (Exts. 57, 58, 66, 92, 230.)

A regiment can make as many as six charges in one day. (Exts. 63, 64.)

Tactical organizations launched in a charge are usually not greater than a regiment at any one time (Exts. 63, 64, 66), but an entire brigade may be charged as such. (Exts. 65, 69.) In one case the charge of an entire division is recorded. (Ext. 65.)

The charge will be most destructive if the enemy can be caught in the act of maneuvering. (Ext. 68.)

A mounted column should always be held in readiness to take the initiative when opportunity is offered. There will at rare intervals be a golden moment, and the commander who would seize it must be found ready. (Exts. 68, 72.)

Ground scouts should always be sent in advance of attacking troops. (Ext. 68.)

Reserves should have sabers drawn. (Ext. 61.)

Care must be exercised that cavalry does not arrive at the charging point in a distressed or blown condition. (Ext. 95, 411, 418.) The distance over which cavalry can travel at an increased gait and still be fit to deliver a shock will depend upon their training. Frederick the Great required that his cavalry should be able to pass over 4,000 yards at a trot, 1,800 yards at a gallop, and still be able to finish 300 to 400 yards at full speed. Modern conditions with long range fire arms, more than ever, make it necessary that cavalry be able to pass over great distances at high speed.

Extract 418 speaks of charging five miles, but it is likely that the language exaggerates to some extent. See also Extracts 411, 418.

CHARGING ARTILLERY.

Charge battery using only the saber.
Culpeper, Va., Sept. 13, 1863.

Ext. No. 73.—They made a charge across a deep ravine and a creek, up a steep hill, the road rough and stony, and through a heavy shell fire, right up to the muzzle of the guns, two of which they brought off without firing a shot, using nothing but the saber.

(Col. Davies, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 120.)

Attack with mounted men in the center and dismounted men on the flanks.
This is an illustration of bad tactics.
Defense holds their fire.
Howitzers attached to cavalry.
Federal cavalry use rapid fire carbines during the war.
Collierville, Tenn., Nov. 3, 1863.

Ext. No. 74.—The enemy moved a brigade to engage the 2d Iowa Cavalry, one regiment dismounted as skirmishers on both flanks of a regiment mounted. Mounted and dismounted men of the enemy came forward in fine style, the howitzers of the 2d Iowa firing rapidly. The regiment lying on the ground waited until the enemy's cavalry were within 50 yards (Confederate report says 60 yards), sprang to their feet, and, with cheers, poured in a severe fire from revolving rifles. A few men reached the guns, the repulse was thorough.

(Col. Edward Hatch, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 245.)

Attack artillery with sabers.
Fair Garden, Tenn., Jan. 27, 1864.

Ext. No. 75.—Colonel LeGrange, by a magnificent and gallant saber charge upon the Fair Garden road, captured two pieces of artillery, sabered the cannoneers and supports and captured a large number of prisoners.

(Col. E. M. McCook, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 140.)

Cavalry form in column of squadrons to charge a battery.
Yellow Tavern, Va., May 11, 1864.

Ext. No. 76.—From a personal examination of the ground, I discovered that a successful charge might be made upon the battery of the enemy, keeping well to the right. With this intention, I formed the 1st Mich. Cav. in column of squadrons under cover of the woods. As soon as the 1st Mich. moved from the cover of the woods the enemy divined our intention and opened a brisk fire with shell and canister. Before the battery could be reached there were five fences to be opened and a bridge to cross, over which it was impossible to pass more than three at one time. Yet notwithstanding these obstacles, the 1st Mich. advanced boldly, and when with-

in 200 yards of the battery, charged it with a yell which spread terror before them. Two pieces of cannon, two limbers and a large number of prisoners were among the results of this charge.

(Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 818.)

Note.—During this charge two regiments engaged the attention of the enemy in front while the 1st Mich. executed its charge.

Artillery without support repulses cavalry charge, using revolvers. Brandy Station, Va., June 9, 1863.

Ext. No. 77.—A part of the 1st N. J. cavalry came thundering down the narrow ridge, striking McGregor's and Hart's unsupported batteries in the flank, and riding through and between guns and caissons from right to left, but met by a determined hand-to-hand contest from the cannoneers with pistols, sponge staffs and whatever else came handy to fight with. The charge was repulsed by artillerists alone, not a solitary friendly trooper being within reach of us.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 278.)

There ain't no good way to charge a battery.

Ext. No. 78.—"Now, don't express any opinion, but answer my question, 'what's the best way to charge a battery?' He looked me squarely in the eye for a few seconds and then said very earnestly, 'Lieutenant, to tell you the God's truth, thar ain't no good way to charge a battery.' "

(Morgan's Cavalry, by Duke.)

COMMENTS.

Against artillery the saber was frequently used as the charging weapon (Exts. 73, 75.) The best results will, however, be obtained by using the revolver, since the gunners will take refuge behind their pieces and can do good execution with the revolvers with which they are armed. (Ext. 77.)

A frontal charge against artillery is not apt to succeed unless the distance is very short (Ext. 68); the greater the distance charged the less the chance of success. The flank attack offers a fair chance of success

unless the artillery is well supported by foot troops. (Ext. 76.) The frontal attack on artillery with mounted troops in the center and dismounted troops on the flanks is an example of the poorest kind of tactics. (Ext. 74.)

The best time to strike artillery is when it is in the act of limbering or unlimbering.

CHARGING FOOT TROOPS.

Charging infantry in flank.

Ext. No. 79.—At 4:00 p. m. the enemy pressed warmly along our entire line. The troops on my left gave way and an entire corps of the enemy rushed in pushing in on our rear till they gained our hospitals, and were resting directly upon the only line of retreat of our army. I immediately charged his left flank, feeling certain that the boldness and rapidity of a charge was all that could in any manner check a force so vastly our superiors in numbers. The rangers broke through the line of skirmishers without breaking their impetus and pushed on, striking the main line almost at the same time with Allen's gallant Alabamians, which threw the entire force of the enemy in a most rapid and disorderly retreat.

Boldness and rapidity takes the place of numbers.

Bentonsville, S. C., Mar. 21, 1865.

(Lieut. Genl. Jos. Wheeler, C. S., R. R., Vol. 47, Part I, p. 1131.)

Cavalry catches infantry in a cañon where it cannot deploy and charges it successfully.

Ext. No. 80.—Wilson, with McIntosh's brigade leading, made a gallant charge through the long cañon, and meeting the advance of Ramsen's rebel infantry division, drove it back and captured the earthworks at the mouth of the cañon.

Opequon Creek, Va., Sept. 19, 1864.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 47.)

Against shaken infantry.

Charge boot to boot.

Ext. No. 81.—The charge of the left column was ordered; the gallant Custer led it; boot to boot these brave horsemen rode in. The enemy's line broke into a thousand fragments under the shock. The reserve brigade followed the blow, and all was lost to the enemy.

Opequon Creek, Va., Sept. 19, 1864.

(Brig. Genl. W. Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 445.)

Ext. No. 82.—The enemy now threw a heavy force of infantry across the river on the left of the position. The 4th and part of the 6th N. Y. were ordered to charge them before they could succeed in forming. This was successfully accomplished. While the 4th and the 6th were charging the rebel infantry, the cavalry again advanced to turn our right. As soon as their column was fully exposed, two squadrons of the 6th N. Y. were ordered to charge, and again broke and routed them.

Infantry successfully charged while forming.
Front Boyal, Va., Aug. 16, 1864.

(Brig. Genl. Thos. C. Devin, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 474.)

Ext. No. 83.—At this time a line of infantry emerged from the woods in our front. They were in some disorder. General Merritt at once ordered me to charge, which I did by changing front obliquely to the left, the evolution being splendidly executed by both regiments at the gallop, when, like a whirlwind, they dashed on the unfortunate infantry, who were vainly endeavoring to form. It was a terrible scene. Right on, over and through the rebel lines, dashed the wild troopers, slashing right and left, pistoling those who had again seized their guns after surrender and taking prisoners by the score.

Infantry charged while in the act of emerging from the woods.

The cut seems to be preferred when the saber is used on foot troops.

Winchester, Va., Sept. 19, 1864.

(Brig. Genl. Thos. C. Devin, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 482.)

Ext. No. 84.—The enemy, mounted, three times charged our dismounted men in an open field, and were as often repulsed, but not until, mingling in our ranks, some of his men were brought to the ground with clubbed guns.

Charge delivered by successive blows.
New Market, Tenn., Dec. 24, '63.

(Maj. Genl. W. T. Martin, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 547.)

Ext. No. 85.—As we moved up, the whole force (of the enemy) charged down at a gallop, and I am proud to say my men did not disappoint me. Standing firm, they repulsed the grandest cavalry charge I ever witnessed. The 2d and 7th Tenn. drove back the advance

The time to take toll is when charging cavalry retire.
Okolona, Miss., Feb. 22, 1864.

line, and as it wheeled in retreat, poured upon them a destructive fire. Each successive line of the enemy shared the same fate, etc.

(Maj. Genl. N. B. Forrest, C. S., R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 354.)

Ext. No. 86.—The column being attacked in rear, General Kilpatrick ordered me to withdraw my command and form for a charge on the attacking force. I formed my brigade (now reduced to a little over 700 of all ranks) in line of regimental column of fours (three regiments). I sent a few men from each of my columns to charge as foragers, and remove portions of the first fence, and moved forward at a trot until I arrived on top of the rising ground behind which we had formed, when we rushed forward at a gallop. One fence still intervened between us and the rail barricades, from behind which the rebels were firing. The leading horses, in trying to leap the fence, knocked off some of the top rails, and gaps were soon made through which the columns poured. The rebels held their position until we were within about ten rods, when they broke from their cover and scattered in the wildest confusion.

Three regiments form in line, each in column of fours.

Ground scouts are sent out.

Charging cavalry knock down a fence, and pass on to the attack.

Lovejoy Station, Ga., Aug. 20, 1864.

(Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 814.)

COMMENTS.

It is now generally accepted that unshaken infantry cannot be successfully charged in front by cavalry. This is not necessarily true. The infantry of Frederick the Great in solid lines, three deep, delivered a fire of 50-caliber balls as rapidly as our thin lines, with two yards intervals, can now deliver a fire of 30-caliber bullets. Then every ball that hit a horse stopped him. Unless hit in a vital spot by a 30-caliber bullet, a horse with many wounds will now finish the charge and still be able to leave the field. There will be many opportunities offered for a successful charge against infantry other than directly against its front. It can be charged in flank (Ext. 79); when changing front (Ext. 55); while

forming (Ext. 82); while in column emerging from a defile or from the woods (Ext. 83); when shaken by fire (Ext. 81); in a cañon where it cannot deploy (Ext. 80).

If infantry can be surprised by a well executed charge, it is likely that its fire will be very inaccurate. (Ext. 51.)

It will often be possible to support a mounted charge by dismounted fire or the fire of artillery delivered from a flank position; this will keep down the enemy's fire or divert it from the charging troops.

When dismounted toops break through a firing line their advance may be checked by a mounted charge. (Exts. 79, 219.)

CHARGING FIELD WORKS.

Cavalry charge earthwork.

Ext. No. 87.—A portion of the 6th Mich. Cav., seeing that only a portion of the enemy were behind earthworks, charged. At a trot they passed up the hill, receiving the fire of the whole line, and the next moment rode through and over the earthworks, passed to the right and left, sabering the rebels along the entire line, and returned with a loss of 30 men.

Saber used when revolver would seem to have been more effective.

(Reference omitted.)

Charging rifle pits.

Ext. No. 88.—They had constructed barricades and rifle pits, which we charged and captured.

Todd's Tavern, Va., May 7, 1864.

(Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 776.)

Field works charged in flank after being turned.

Ext. No. 89.—Four mounted companies from the same regiment followed in rear of Captain Abraham, and, after crossing the bridge, turned to the right and charged in flank the works at the lower bridge, capturing (500) prisoners and three guns at that point.

Columbus, Ga., Apr. 16, 1865.

(Maj. Genl. E. Upton, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 475.)

Defense of stone wall by carbine and pistol fire.

Ext. No. 90.—The enemy's cavalry emerged from the woods and a hand-to-hand conflict ensued. The enemy outnumbering us three to one, we retired behind a stone wall and maintained our position, repulsing the

Upperville, Va., June 21, 1863.

repeated charges of the enemy by well-directed carbine and pistol firing.

(Col. Wm. Gamble, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 933.)

Mounted attack of stone fences defended by infantry.

Gettysburg, July 3, 1863.

Ext. No. 91.—Brigadier General Farnsworth moved with the 1st W. Va. and 18th Pa., followed by the 1st Vt. and 5th N. Y., and drove the enemy from one position to another until a heavy stone wall was reached, behind which the rebel infantry was gathered in great numbers. The 1st Vt. and the 1st W. Va., led by the gallant Farnsworth, cleared the fence and sabered the rebels in rear.

Same as above.

(Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 993.)

Anyone not cognizant of the minutiæ of this charge upon infantry under cover of heavy timber and stone fences will fail to form a just conception of its magnitude.

(Major Capehart, 1st W. Va. Cav., R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 1019.)

COMMENTS.

It will be seen that the mounted attack of field works was not unusual. The most persistent was the attack on the right of the Confederate lines at Gettysburg, on July 3d, where the Confederates were behind a succession of breast-high stone fences. In these attacks, the gallant Farnsworth lost his life. It is believed that these attacks were the cause of the suspension of the general attack against the Federal left.

More attention should be given in our service to the matter of jumping obstacles. Unless cavalry can pass ordinary obstacles, it will meet with defeat when otherwise there should be every reason to expect success.

FORMATION USED IN CHARGING.

Charge in column of fours.

Cavalry receiving a charge standing may expect defeat.

Totopotomy Creek, Va., June 14, 1862.

Ext. No. 92.—The charge was made in column of fours and with the saber. It was received by the enemy standing in line, drawn up in the road and on either side of it, and with an almost harmless discharge of their pistols.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 56.)

Ext. No. 93.—Not 50 yards below, Colonel Percy Windham was advancing the 1st N. J. Cav. in magnificent order, in column of squadrons, with flags and guidons flying. (p. 271 below.) Hampton had formed his four regiments in column of squadrons, and, with everything in hand for action, was moving forward briskly to attack.

At the battle of Fleetwood or Brandy Station both sides charge in column of squadrons. June 9, 1863.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 274.)

Ext. No. 94.—I immediately ordered the charge in close columns of squadrons, and swept the hill clear of the enemy, he being scattered and entirely routed.

Same at Brandy Station. June 9, 1863.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 277.)

Ext. No. 95.—At the fight at Cass Station, May 24, 1864, Stoneman's cavalry is reported to have charged in line over an open field for about 1,000 yards. Wheeler's cavalry, in two lines, one directly behind the other, supported by other troops in column, waited till the Federals had approached to within 200 yards. The Federal line was by this time disorganized by its long charge. At this time Wheeler's cavalry started forward at a walk, then trot and finally sounded the charge when about 30 yards from the enemy.

Charge over a long distance destroys cohesion, breaks up the formation and results in failure. Cass Station, Ga., May 25, 1864.

Troops which strike with the best intact formation will succeed.

Charge delivered at 30 yds.

(Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 186, reports Wheeler successful.)

Ext. No. 96.—They had rested to feed their animals, and were about to take the road thence to Newport. I immediately charged them in column of fours, routing their entire command.

Charge in column of fours. Cosby Creek, Tenn., Jan. 14, 1864.

(Col. Wm. J. Palmer, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 75.)

Ext. No. 97.—Six companies were now ordered up at a gallop, and charged in column of fours.

Same. Fair Garden, Tenn., Jan. 27, 1864.

(Col. LaGrange, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 144.)

Ext. No. 98.—The 1st Brigade moved to a position near the front, and, forming in column of squadrons, made ready to give the final stroke to the work of the day.

Brigade forms for charge in column of squadrons. Opequon Creek, Va., Sept. 19, 1864.

(Brig. Genl. W. Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 445.)

Brigade attacks in column of regiments in line. Middletown, Va., Oct. 19, 1864.

Ext. No. 99.—The 1st Brigade, in column of regiments in line, moved forward like an immense wave, slowly at first, but gathering strength and speed as it progressed, overwhelmed a battery and its supports, etc.

(Brig. Genl. W. Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 450.)

Division formed in three lines of equal strength. Middletown, Va., Oct. 19, 1864.

Ext. No. 100.—This division was formed in line of battle, with regiments in column of battalions.

(Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 523.)

Five brigades advance in line of battle, regiments in columns of squadrons. The whole preceed by a line of skirmishers, using the carbine mounted. Opequon Creek, Va., Sept. 19, 1864. Imposing scenes on the battle field inspire soldiers to perform brave deeds.

Ext. No. 101.—At this time five brigades of cavalry were moving on parallel lines; most, if not all, of the brigades moved by brigade front, regiments being in parallel columns of squadrons. One continuous and heavy line of skirmishers covered the advance, using only the carbine, while the line of brigades, as they advanced across the open country, the bands playing the national airs, presented in the sunlight one moving mass of glittering sabers. This, combined with the various and bright colored banners and battle flags, intermingled here and there with the plain blue uniforms of the troops, furnished one of the most inspiring as well as imposing scenes of martial grandeur ever witnessed upon a battle field.

(Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 456.)

COMMENTS.

In forming for the charge, almost every formation was used:

Column of fours (Exts. 92, 96, 97); column of squadrons (Exts. 76, 93, 98, 101); close column of squadrons (Exts. 56, 59, 94); line of regiments each in column of fours (Ext. 86); brigade in column of regiments each in line, making three lines of equal strength (Ext. 99); division formed in line of regiments each in column of battalions, also making three lines of equal

strength (Ext. 100). The formation depended altogether on the conditions. In a lane a column of fours was all that could be used. When there was room the column of squadrons or close column of squadrons seemed to be preferred. This gave a front of two troops and a depth of six lines. If at full distance the squadrons in rear could be diverted to other objectives, used for a flank attack or held in reserve to fulfill the principle that victory will lie with that side which can put in the last formed reserve. (Exts. 66, 95.)

As soon as the leading unit has delivered its shock, it should rally in rear of the column (Exts. 52, 54, 57, 64, 65, 66, 84, 233). This exercise should be practiced frequently.

The more solid the mass at the instant of impact, the greater will be the effect of the shock. The charge should, therefore, be made boot-to-boot. (Ext. 81.) Notwithstanding this well-known maxim, the tendency is to open out the rank at a time when the troopers' greatest safety lies in riding well closed toward the guide.

If the three line formation is used, the first line should usually be heavier than either the support or the reserve. If time is precious and success depends upon one cast of the die, the first line should be as strong as possible: if the enemy has reserves constantly arriving, then numerous lines should be used.

The lines should be far enough apart so that, if the advanced line is overthrown, it will not communicate its confusion to the lines in rear. For this reason it is better to hold the troops in rear of the second line in line of columns. The first line should be preceded by mounted skirmishers using mounted rifle fire. (Ext. 101, 239.) These same tactics were used by Frederick the Great. The mounted skirmishers amount to the same thing as ground scouts which would be sent out from troops in the front line.

After a line has been launched in a charge, the commander can only influence the fight by the use of troops held in reserve. The commander should not personally engage in the fight until after his last reserve is thrown in. The place for regimental bands should be not caring for the wounded, but in the battle, inspiring with stirring martial music those engaged in the combat. (Exts. 101, 223, 469.)

CHAPTER III.

FIRE ACTION.

MOUNTED FIRE ACTION—CARBINE.

Two squadrons use mounted carbine fire. Upperville, Va., June 21, 1863.

Ext. No. 102.—I ordered my first two squadrons to advance carbine and be ready to receive them. The enemy came dashing down the road. The fire of my regiment being too hot for him, the enemy wheeled and I ordered the charge.

(Lieut. Col. Doster, 4th Pa. Cav., R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 984.)

Mounted fire has not the precision or rapidity of dismounted fire. It exposes the men. Anderson's Cross Roads, Tenn., Oct. 2, 1863.

Ext. No. 103.—Being dismounted, our men were able to fire with much greater rapidity and precision than the enemy, who were exposed by remaining on horseback, and fired high above our heads.

(Col. O. H. LaGrange, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 683.)

Great havoc done with carbine mounted. Okolona, Miss., Feb. 21, 1864.

Ext. No. 104.—At this place the saber companies did great havoc with their carbines (mounted).

(Maj. D. E. Coon, 2d Ia. Cav., R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 300.)

Mounted skirmishers use carbine. Near Knoxville, Tenn., Feb. 20, 1864.

Ext. No. 105.—I soon met the enemy in considerable force and skirmished (both mounted and dismounted) with him.

(Lieut. Col. Robert Klein, 3d Ind. Cav., R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 410.)

Charge with carbines. Wilson's Raid, Apr. 1, 1865.

Ext. No. 106.—By immediate order of General Upton, I sent Co. I to the left in line over the open fields, over which they at once charged, mounted, with carbines, upon the plainly visible lines of the enemy.

(Col. John W. Noble, 3d Ia. Cav., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 491.)

See also Ext. 101.

Mosby, caught in a bad place, instantly takes the aggressive and wins a most complete victory.

Ext. No. 107.—When two panels of the fence were down, the men (enemy) trotted through for 75 yards, and gradually came down to a walk and almost halted. Major Forbes' first platoon (mounted and 225 yards from the fence) was ordered to fire with carbines. Here was the first mistake. It created confusion among the horses, and the squadron in the rear added to it by firing a few pistol shots. Had the order been given to draw saber and charge, the rebels would never have got their gun off.

Mounted carbine fire at 225 yards is not effective.

Pistol fire at 250 yards is foolish.

Major Forbes attempted to move the first squadron by the right flank. The rebels saw their chance, gave a yell, and our men, in the confusion of the moment, broke. The two rear squadrons went off in confusion. I have only to report a perfect rout and a chase for five to seven miles. More than 100 horses were taken. Men killed, 12; wounded, 37; taken prisoners by Mosby, 44. Mosby had about 200 men with him and used the revolver.

Broken cavalry run for seven miles.

Mount Zion Church, Va., July 6, 1864.

(Col. C. R. Lowell, 2d Mass. Cav., R. R., Vol. 37, Part I, p. 359.)

Mounted skirmishers advance at a trot with carbines.

Ext. No. 108.—I was now ordered to advance and press the enemy, which I did with success, my skirmishers advancing at the trot.

Near Tom's Run, Va., Oct. 9, 1864.

(Brig. Genl. Thos. C. Devin, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 483.)

Forrest's men use rifle mounted in the streets of a town.

Ext. No. 109.—The Confederates, advancing with spirit through the town, mounted, began to fire with their long rifles as they came within 100 yards of the enemy.

Okolona, Miss., Apr. 22, 1863.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 393.)

A strong line of mounted skirmishers is evidence of a contemplated attack.

Ext. No. 110.—This change having been made, a strong line of skirmishers displayed by the enemy was evidence that the enemy's cavalry had gained our right, and were about to attack with a view of gaining the rear of our line of battle. * * * The First New Jersey Cavalry was posted as mounted skirmishers to the right and front in a wood.

Gettysburg, July 3, 1863.

(Brig. D. McM. Gregg, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 956.)

Enemy advancing on a road are received with carbine fire from two squadrons. Upperville, Va., June 21, 1863.

Ext. No. 111.—In a few minutes the enemy came dashing down the road, when I ordered my first two squadrons to advance carbines to be ready to receive them. The fire of my regiment being too hot for him, the enemy wheeled, and I ordered the charge.

(Lieut. Col. W. E. Doster, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 984.)

COMMENTS.

Mounted carbine fire was often used. Its use was confined mostly to mounted skirmishers which preceded the first line while forming for attack. (Exts. 108, 110, 239.) It can be used to advantage to accelerate the retreat of defeated infantry, but should not replace the saber, which is more effective. (157.) The fire of mounted men is very inaccurate, since one hand is always necessary to control the horse. (Ext. 103.)

Mounted carbine fire is not so accurate as revolver fire provided the force armed with the revolvers comes to close quarters. (Ext. 107.)

MOUNTED FIRE ACTION—REVOLVER.

Charge in column of fours using revolvers. Kelly's Ford, Va., Mar. 17, 1863.

Ext. No. 112.—From this point General Lee ordered the Third to charge. The order was executed in column of fours. The regiment swept down the line of stone fence which separated them from the enemy in the woods beyond, delivering the fire of their pistols.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 210.)

COMMENTS.

It seems strange that so little mention is made of mounted revolver fire when used collectively. The inference is that collective revolver fire was but little used. Captain Whittaker refers to it in Ext. 41. There is numerous mention of the revolver being used individually, and it is in this use that its chief value lies.

Badly defeated cavalry, if vigorously pursued with the revolver, will be assembled in the next county. (Ext. 107.)

DISMOUNTED FIRE ACTION—AGAINST CAVALRY.

Opinion as to value of horses as means of transportation on the battle field.

Ext. No. 113.—It may not, however, be amiss to say that one of the lessons of his operations will be in the demonstration of the great utility in war of horses in the rapid transportation of a body of men to the field of battle or operations, there to be employed as riflemen fighting on foot.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 683. The above expression of opinion was written in 1867.)

Shooting at moving targets close in does not occasion heavy losses.
Newman, Ga., July 30, 1864.

Ext. No. 114.—We moved at a brisk trot and so sudden was the movement that nearly one-half of the 8th Ind. got through the lines without receiving a shot, and although the remainder of the column ran the gauntlet of a heavy fire of musketry, yet, strange to say, but one man was wounded, although the enemy was in some places near enough to almost touch the horses.

(Lieut. Col. F. A. Jones, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 877.)

Ext. No. 115.—Throwing down the fence of the meadow, some 300 poured into it, formed a long line and dashed across with sabers drawn. Four companies had by this time dismounted and dropped on their knees behind a low fence. They held their fire until the enemy was within 30 yards, when they opened. Then was seen the effect of the volley from that long, thin line, which seemed so easy to break. Every man had elbow room and took dead aim at an individual foe. Two-thirds of the riders and horses seemed to go down. The cavalry was at once broken and recoiled.

Fire from behind a fence steadies the men.

Charge fails when fire is reserved till within 30 yards.
Hartsville, Tenn., Aug. 21, '62.

(Morgan's Cavalry, by Duke.)

Ext. No. 116.—The enemy charged upon my line twice, but were repulsed each time by my carbineers with heavy loss.

Dismounted men repulse a mounted charge. Brandy Station, Va., June 9, 1863.

(Col. Wyndham, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 966.)

Ext. No. 117.—Three successive charges were repulsed by dismounted men.

Same. Aldie, Va., June 17, 1863.

(Col. Thompson, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 1056.)

Ext. No. 118.—A part of the 92d dismounted and attacked the enemy on foot, when the enemy charged on horseback. The charge was received and repulsed, and the enemy charged in turn.

Same. Near Clinton, Ga. Nov. 20, 1864.

(Col. Atkins, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 390.)

Ext. No. 119.—I attribute the loss of the gun to the fact that the enemy could advance under excellent cover to within short rifle range of the position we occupied, to the killing of the two wheel horses, and the want of a regularly designated support.

Horse artillery needs a support. Artillery disabled by killing wheel horses. James River, Va., July 29, 1864.

(Capt. A. M. Randol, 1st U. S. Art., R. R., Vol. 40, Part I, p. 616.)

Ext. No. 120.—The enemy was compelled to retire before the terrific carbine fire.

Carbine fire. Upperville, Va., June 21, 1863.

(Genl. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 921.)

Ext. No. 121.—Early this morning the enemy advanced upon me in a pretty strong force. (Cav., Inf. & Art.) During the first part of the day they pressed me severely. * * * Towards night I turned the tables upon them and drove them across the Antietam. * * * All my fighting had to be on foot.

Dismounted cavalry successfully contend with all arms combined. Boonsborough, Md., July 8, 1863.

(Genl. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 925.)

Ext. No. 122.—An animated fight ensued, principally on foot, the ground being entirely too soft from recent rains to operate successfully with cavalry. The enemy's advance was handsomely repulsed, in which Witcher's cavalry, on foot behind a stone fence, performed a very gallant part, standing their ground with unflinching tenacity.

Dismounted cavalry fight from behind stone fence. Funkstown, Md. July 10, 1863.

(Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 704.)

Dismounted cavalry fight on foot for nine miles.
Okolona, Miss., Feb. 22, 1864.

Ext. No. 123.—They had every advantage in selecting position, and to drive and dislodge them I was compelled to dismount the most of my command and fought the last nine miles on foot.

(Maj. Genl. N. B. Forrest, C. S., R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 353.)

No rest for cavalry.

Ext. No. 124.—It was nearly daylight, June 3d, before my command, worn and jaded from its exhausting labors, bivouacked at Linney's house. At 10:00 A. M. I received orders to cross to the west side of the Totopotomy, drive the rebel cavalry from Haw's Shop and then swing to the left again, recross the creek near its source, and attack the left of the rebel infantry line in rear.

Tactical use, to turn the flank of infantry and attack it in rear.
Totopotony River, June 3, 1864.

(Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 882.)

Formation is very much strengthened by placing regular troops on the flanks.
Lithonia, Ga., July 28, 1864.

Ext. No. 125.—The Third Brigade, dismounted, with one battalion 4th regulars on each flank, charged the rebels on the Lithona road and drove them in confusion.

(Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 813.)

Ext. No. 126.—We moved forward under a heavy fire of shot and shell until within 600 yards of the top of the hill, where the enemy were posted behind a breastwork of rails, and at this period a general charge was ordered, and the skirmish line, being reinforced by the reserve, dashed forward with a shout and a yell, carrying everything before them. As we gained the crest of the hill our ammunition failed and in some parts of the line the enemy were actually driven from their position with stones and clubs.

Reinforcement by the reserve carries the line forward.

It is convenient to find stones and clubs handy when ammunition fails.
Hanover, C. H. Va., May 31, 1864.

(Lieut. Col. G. A. Purington, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 894.)

Regiment fires dismounted each man holding his horse by the reins.
Jonesborough, Ga., Aug. 30, 1864.

Ext. No. 127.—The horses held by the reins, the men maintained the position, but finding it impracticable to charge the second works, they mounted, and being relieved by the infantry line, the 92d was withdrawn.

(Col. Eli H. Murray, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 890.)

COMMENTS.

The mobility of cavalry renders it extremely valuable as a reinforcement to weak points in the line of battle. (Ext. 113.)

A rapidly moving target does not suffer heavy losses. (Ext. 114.)

From behind a fence troops shoot with greater accuracy than when in the open. (Ext. 115.)

Dismounted men can often stop with their fire a mounted charge, even though it gets as close as 50 yards. (Exts. 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122.)

All references show that a very large part of the cavalry fighting was done on foot.

A formation for attack is strengthened by placing regular troops on the flanks. (Ext. 125.)

The time for a skirmish line to go forward is when it receives fresh troops from the reserves. (Ext. 126.)

Dismounted fire, when each man holds his horse by the reins, is very rare. (Ext. 127.)

The time to inflict severe losses on an enemy is when his attacking line breaks to the rear. (Exts. 85, 170.)

Dismounted fire action will be resorted to when the ground is unsuited to mounted action. (Ext. 123.)

DISMOUNTED FIRE ACTION—AGAINST INFANTRY.

Cavalry attacks infantry in flank.

Ext. No. 128.—As the enemy moved up, he exposed his flank to me. I at once ordered General Lee to attack, which he did with the 9th and 10th Va. regiments in the handsomest style, leading his men in person. These regiments went in in line of battle, dismounted and reserved their fire until very near the enemy. Delivering it regularly, they charged, routing the enemy completely, capturing 900 prisoners and 10 standards.

Fire not opened till very near to the enemy.

Vaughan Road, Va., Sept. 29, 1864.

(Maj. Genl. Wade Hampton, C. S., R. R., Vol. 42, Part I, p. 948.)

Ext. No. 129.—Although the main force remained without change of position from September 3 to 19,

No rest for cavalry, and they should permit no rest to the enemy.

Shenandoah Valley Campaign.

still the cavalry was employed every day in harassing the enemy, its opponents being principally infantry. In these skirmishes the cavalry was becoming educated to attack infantry lines.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 46.)

Five brigades of cavalry attack infantry, dismounted.

Leetown, W.Va., Aug. 25, 1864.

Ext. No. 130..—About a mile from Leetown a small cavalry force was met in a heavy woods, and from all the information that could be obtained, all went to show that nothing but cavalry was in our front, and disposition was immediately made to attack. A brigade was sent on each flank, two to attack in front and one held in reserve. Soon after the attack was commenced, it was found that we were fighting infantry.

(Maj. Genl. A. T. A. Torbert, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 425.)

Opinion that dismounted cavalry is as good as infantry.

New Market Road, Va., July 28, 1864.

Ext. No. 131.—This short but brilliant engagement reflected great credit on the regiments engaged, and established the fact that our cavalry can dismount and with their carbines successfully repulse their own front of veteran infantry.

(Brig. Genl. T. C. Devin, R. R., Vol 43, Part I, p. 471.)

In rough country, cavalry have to fight on foot.

Cavalry fight on foot all day.

Hillsborough Tenn., Dec. 15, '64.,

Ext. No. 132.—It was now almost dark; the cavalrymen having been fighting all day on foot, owing to the roughness of the country, were very much fatigued. General Hatch was ordered to bring up his horses, collect his men and bivouac on the Hillsborough pike.

(Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 563.)

Ext. No. 133.—A dispatch was received directing that Cold Harbor be held at all hazards, and I therefore immediately ordered its reoccupation, changed the temporary breastworks so as to make them available for our troops, dismounted the cavalry, placing them behind these works, and distributing ammunition in boxes along the line. While this was being done the enemy could be heard giving commands and making preparations to

Cavalry construct breastworks for infantry to occupy.

Ammunition in boxes is distributed along the line.

attack in the morning. Just after daylight, June 1st, he marched to the attack, and was permitted to come close to our little works, when he received the fire of our batteries and our repeating carbines, which were used with terrible effect, and he was driven back in confusion.

Magazine fire arms are used and the fire effect of modern arms is no different at short range.

Cold Harbor, Va., May 31, 1864.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 794.)

Ext. No. 134.—July 9th, dismounted and waded the Chattahoochee in rear of the Third Brigade; threw up breastworks and held the ground till dark, when General Newton's division of the 4th Corps relieved us.

Cavalry constructs breast works for infantry to subsequently occupy.

Chattahoochee River, Ga., July 9, 1864.

(Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 813.)

Ext. No. 135.—During these combats, which were mostly on foot (the enemy's infantry being engaged), there were some telling charges made mounted. * * * The men of the brigade, from long and constant practice, are becoming perfect in the art of foot fighting and skirmishing. They drove infantry from strong positions.

Brigade become expert in foot fighting.

Funkstown, Md. July 10, 1863.

(Brig. Genl. W. Merritt, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 944.)

Ext. No. 136.—To check this advance, four regiments were dismounted and moved to the front. This strong line of dismounted cavalry rushed upon the enemy, firing volleys from their carbines, and drove the infantry line to the cover of advance woods, and there held it at bay.

Cavalry attack infantry.

New Hope Ch., Va., Nov. 27, 1863.

(Genl. D. McM. Gregg, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 807.)

Ext. No. 137.—My dismounted men were ordered to charge the Yankee skirmishers, which was done in handsome style, driving them out of their camps and through the woods.

Parker's Store, Va., Nov. 29, 1863.

(Brig. Genl. J. B. Gordon, C. S., R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 903.)

Cavalry fight with infantry. Chickamauga, Ga., Sept. 20, 1863.

Ext. No. 138. — General Armstrong's division fought almost entirely on foot, always up and frequently in advance of the infantry.

(Genl. Forrest, Battle of Chickamauga, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 525.)

Cavalry charge dismounted. Anderson's Cross Roads, Tenn., Oct. 2, 1863.

Ext. No. 139.—The 2d Indiana were dismounted and charged upon the right at double quick. This movement was entirely successful.

(Col. E. M. McCook, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 676.)

Same. Sevierville, Tenn., Jan. 26, '64.

Ext. No. 140.—At 4:00 P. M. Colonel Campbell's brigade charged dismounted.

(Brig. Genl. S. D. Sturgis, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 136.)

Cavalry use repeating weapons whose fire was as rapid as our modern arms.

Ext. No. 141.—When the enemy's line reached the crest, a fire from our repeating carbines was opened upon it, whereupon it gave way in disorder. * * * This counter attack against the infantry was made by the 1st and 2d cavalry divisions simultaneously, and our own line re-established.

Cavalry turns the tide of battle. Darbytown, Va., July 27, 1864.

(Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 800.)

Barricades.

Ext. No. 142.—During Sherman's march to the sea, it was the regular custom for cavalry to protect themselves every night by throwing up log barricades.

(See all cavalry reports, R. R., Vol. 44, and particularly Report 148.)

Cavalry attacks infantry behind breast works.

A careful reconnaissance will sometimes fail while a sudden attack will succeed.

Attack by mounted and dismounted troops in front while mounted troops turn the flank.

Charge in column of fours when enemy breaks.

Ext. No. 143.—Custer found Early as he (Early) had promised, at Waynesborough, in a well-chosen position, with two brigades of infantry and some cavalry under Rosser, the infantry occupying the breastworks. Custer, without waiting for the enemy to get up his courage over the delay of a careful reconnaissance, made his dispositions for the attack at once. Sending three regiments around the left flank of the enemy, he, with the other two brigades, partly mounted and partly dismounted, at a given signal, boldly attacked and carried the works, while the 8th N. Y. and 1st Conn., which

were formed in column of fours, charged over the breastworks and continued the charge through the town.

Cavalry should gather all the fruits of victory. Waynsborough, Va., Mar. 2, 1865.

He captured 11 pieces of artillery, 200 loaded wagons with teams, 17 battle flags and 1,600 officers and men.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, p. 476.)

Ext. No. 144.—The most determined effort was made on both sides and neither would give way until late in the evening, when Custer's brigade was dismounted, forming in close column of attack, and charged with Gregg's division, when the enemy was driven back, leaving all his dead and his line of temporary works in our possession.

Cavalry, dismounted, in close column attacks infantry. Haw's Shop, Va., May 28, 1864.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 793.)

Ext. No. 145.—On reaching that place on July 1st, General Reynolds found Buford's cavalry warmly engaged with the enemy, who had debouched his infantry through the mountains on the Cashtown road, but was being held in check in the most gallant manner by Buford's cavalry.

Cavalry selects battle field and holds it against infantry until infantry support arrives. Gettysburg, Pa., July 1, 1863.

(Maj. Genl. Meade, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 114.)

Ext. No. 146.—On arriving within one mile of West Point, I was ordered to dismount to fight on foot. I dismounted and formed the regiment in line with as much alacrity as possible, and was directed to move on rapidly across the fields towards the fort and engage the enemy on the right. While crossing the fields toward the fort the enemy threw shells at my lines in rapid succession, the most of which passed over without effect. When we got within fifty yards of the fort I ordered the men to commence firing, which was done with effect.

Troops should not open fire until compelled to do so. West Point, Ga., Apr. 16, 1865.

(Maj. A. S. Bloom, 7th Ky. Cav., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 435.)

COMMENTS.

Successful turning movements may be made for the purpose of attacking the flank or rear of an infantry line. (Exts. 124, 128, 153, 171, 180.)

The fire of an attacking line should not be opened till the enemy's fire compels it. (Exts. 128, 146.)

Cavalry can attack infantry, and during the war often did, but, if it comes to a hand-to-hand fight, cavalry should at least be supplied with the rod bayonet. (Exts. 130, 131, 135, 136, 137, 141, 144.)

At times cavalry will be called upon to fight for long periods on foot. (Exts. 123, 129, 132.)

Breastworks will often be constructed by cavalry with a view of their being occupied later by infantry. (Exts. 133, 134.)

Ammunition in boxes can be conveniently distributed along the line from pack mules before the action begins. (Ext. 133.)

It will rarely be possible for cavalry to select a battlefield and hold it till occupied by infantry. (Ext. 145.)

It will often be possible for cavalry to hold important tactical positions until relieved by infantry. Exts. 133, 127, 175, 184.) Under such conditions the commander should see that the cavalry be not kept to do infantry work, but returned to its own legitimate sphere of usefulness. (Ext. 187.)

DISMOUNTED FIRE ACTION—AGAINST FIELD WORKS.

Attack of field works. Big Shanty, Ga., June 9, 1864.

Ext. No. 147.—Drove Martin's division of cavalry and one brigade of infantry from their line of breastworks at and near Big Shanty.

(Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 812.)

Cavalry assault the field works of Selma, Ala.

Ext. No. 148.—I regard the capture of Selma as the most remarkable achievement in the history of modern cavalry, the one illustrative of its new powers and tendencies.

Dimensions of the bastion line. Selma Ala., Apr. 2, 1865.

The fortifications assaulted and carried consisted of a bastion line on a radius of nearly three miles, extending from the Alabama river below to the same above the city. The part west of the city is covered by a miry, deep and almost impassable swamp, extending from the river almost to the Summerfield road, and entirely impracticable for mounted men at all times. The profile of that part of the line assaulted is as follows: Height of parapet, 6 to 8 ft.; depth of ditch, 5 ft.; width from 10 to 15 ft.; height of stockade on glacis, 5 ft.; sunk into the earth, 4 ft. The ground over which the troops advanced is an open field, sloping slightly towards the works, but intersected by one ravine with marshy soil, which both the right and left of Long's line experienced some difficulty in crossing. The distance over which the troops charged, exposed to the enemy's fire of musketry and artillery, was 600 yards. Number of men engaged in assault, 1,550 officers and men. The works were manned by Armstrong's brigade, regarded as the best in Forrest's corps, and reported by him at more than 1,500 men.

(Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 360. For map see Plate 70, Map 4, Atlas.)

Loss, 46 killed and 200 wounded. Fifteen per cent of all troops engaged.

(R. R., Vol. 47, Part I, p. 351.)

Cavalry assault a closed work, shooting down the enemys fire while bridges are made with which to cross the ditch.

Ext. No. 149.—Detachments dismounted and prepared to assault Fort Tyler, covering the bridge. Colonel LaGrange describes it as a remarkably strong bastioned earth-work, 35 yards square, surrounded by a ditch 12 feet wide and 10 feet deep, situated on a commanding eminence, protected by an imperfect abatis mounting two 32-pounder guns and two field guns.

It is easy to do anything if you can shoot down the enemys fire. West Point, Ga., Apr. 16, 1865.

At 1:30 P. M. the charge was sounded and the brave detachments rushed forward to the assault, drove the rebel skirmishers into the fort and followed under a withering fire of grape and musketry, to the edge of the ditch. This was found impassable, and Col. LaGrange

posted sharpshooters to keep down the enemy's fire and organized parties to gather material for bridges; as soon as this had been done, he sounded the charge again. The detachments sprang forward again, laid the bridges and rushed forward over the parapet into the work, capturing the entire garrison of 265 men.

(Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 364.)

Cavalry capture earthworks.

Hurricane Creek, Miss., Aug. 13, 1864.

Ext. No. 150.—Colonel Starr, with the 6th Ill. Cav., in three or four hours' severe skirmishing drove the force in front of him across the creek, and pressing it back on the main force, captured the enemy's earthworks.

(Brig. Genl. Edward Hatch, R. R., Vol. 39, Part I, p. 389.)

Attack does not open fire until compelled to do so.

Rapid fire carbines used during the war.

Salem, Ala., Apr. 2, 1865.

Ext. No. 151.—As soon as we uncovered the hill, about 600 yards from the earthworks, the enemy opened a destructive fire of musketry and artillery on the line, but we moved steadily forward until within short range, when a rapid fire was opened by our Spencers, and with a cheer the men started for the works on the run.

(Brig. Genl. Eli Long, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 438. Attack on Selma.)

COMMENTS.

The Civil War furnishes many cases of cavalry attacking field works. The most noted works were those of Selma, Ala. (Ext. 148), where an assault was made on a bastioned line. Other cases are cited (Exts. 149, 150) from which it will appear that it easily can be done if the attackers are able to shoot down the enemy's fire.

CHAPTER IV.

COMBINED ACTION—MOUNTED AND DISMOUNTED.

In combined action the reserve is kept mounted.

Ext. No. 152.—My command was posted one battalion mounted in reserve and two battalions dismounted in the center. The enemy charged in column.

(Reference omitted.)

Mounted force turns the enemys flank, which causes them to waver.

When enemy wavers, the attack charges both dismounted, and mounted in column on the road.

Enemy not given time to form line with reserves.

Chickamauga Campaign, 1863.

Ext. No. 153.—The enemy had deployed a considerable force in a strong position. I immediately deployed two regiments and commenced skirmishing. Finding their position strong, I detached a squadron to turn their right flank. This caused the enemy to waver, when we charged in line and also in column on the road, driving him in confusion. The enemy attempted to form a new line with his reserves, but we met him with such force as to disperse him each time.

(Maj. Genl. Jos. Wheeler, C. S., R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 521.)

Cavalry attack infantry behind stone wall.

Ext. No. 154.—We found the enemy in line of battle behind a stone wall and a rail fence which had been so fixed as to afford good protection to the men. The second brigade was immediately formed in line of battle in a corn field as follows: The 39th Ky., dismounted, on the right, with the 11th Mich. Cav., mounted, on the left. The 39th Ky. succeeded in reaching the enemy's position. As the regiment gained the wall and fence the enemy fled. The 11th Mich. Cav. repeatedly charged the rebel lines, driving them in great confusion.

When dismounted cavalry drive the enemy from cover, mounted cavalry charge repeatedly.

Cynthiana, Ky., June 12, 1864.

(Col. David A. Mims, R. R., Vol. 39, Part I, p. 37.)

Dismounted men in the center mounted men on the flanks.

Halcher's Run, Va., Oct. 27, 1864.

Ext. No. 155.—The dismounted line formed on the enemy's side of the stream, while a mounted regiment filed past their rear, half of it to either flank. The line thus formed, dismounted men in the center and

mounted men on the flanks, charged up the hill, routed the enemy and captured his works.

(Col. C. H. Smith, Comg. Brig., R. R., Vol. 42, Part I, p. 648.)

Mounted men to charge as soon as the enemy's line is broken.

Selma, Ala., Apr. 1, 1865.

Ext. No. 156.—The remainder of the 72d Ind. was brought forward, dismounted and formed on the left of the road, and at the same time I directed Colonel Vail, commanding the 17th Ind., to send forward four companies armed with sabers to charge the enemy as soon as his line was broken.

(Col. A. O. Miller, Comg. 1st Brig., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 446.)

Mounted men ready to charge with saber as soon as the enmey's line breaks.

Selma, Ala., Apr. 2, 1865.

Ext. No. 157.—I received orders directing me to move the command to the led horses and hold it in readiness to mount at a moment's notice and charge with the saber as soon as the enemy's line should be broken.

(Lieut. Col. B. D. Pritchard, Comg. 4th Mich. Cav., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 464.)

Dismounted attack followed by mounted charge.

Selma, Ala., Apr. 2, 1865.

Ext. No. 158.—The attack of Selma by Long's division, dismounted, which carried the works, was immediately followed with a mounted charge into the city by a part of Upton's division, which captured many prisoners.

(Maj. Genl. E. Upton, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 473.)

Combined mounted and dismounted action.

Mounted action best when enemy breaks.

Montevallo, Ala., Mar. 31, 1865.

Ext. No. 159.—Captain Abram, having failed to receive my order, formed his battalion, dismounted, on the right of the Third Battalion, and materially assisted in routing the enemy, though his efforts were not so effective as they would have been had he received my order and been on hand to charge mounted.

(Lieut. Col. J. H. Peters, 4th Ia. Cav., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 496.)

Aldie, Va., June 18, 1863.

Ext. No. 160.—The enemy, behind a stone wall, were attacked by dismounted cavalry, while mounted cavalry charged along the main road. The position was carried.

(General J. Irving Gregg, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 975.)

Ext. No. 161.—Dismounted men moved forward to the attack, while a column of cavalry followed, mounted, on each flank. When the enemy broke, the mounted troops charged.

Waynesborough, Ga., Dec. 4, 1864.

(R. R., Vol. 44, p. 392.)

Ext. No. 162.—In this charge we were met by the enemy and succeeded in driving him back under cover of his dismounted sharpshooters, who were posted in the woods on each side of the road.

Mounted attack supported by dismounted men. Aldie, Va., June 17, 1863.

(Major Breckenridge, R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 742.)

Ext. No. 163.—Four companies were dismounted and thrown forward rapidly as skirmishers, a mounted company being sent to either flank and the remainder of the regiment kept sheltered within supporting distance.

Dismounted attack supported by mounted men. Anderson's Cross-Roads, Tenn. Oct. 2, 1863.

(Col. O. H. LaGrange, 1st Wis. Cav., R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 683.)

Ext. No. 164.—The enemy advanced in three columns, one on the road, dismounted, and one on either flank, mounted, rendering it almost impossible for my dismounted men to regain their horses.

Dismounted attack supported by mounted men on the flanks makes it difficult for the enemy to regain their led horses. Ripley, Miss., Dec. 1, 1863.

(Col. J. K .Mizner, 1st Brig. Cav. Div., 16th Corps, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 580.)

Ext. No. 165.—The 1st and 2d U. S. Cavalry were accordingly ordered to make a detour through the woods to our right and turn the enemy's left flank. Nearly 100 infantry prisoners were taken by these regiments in this movement. In the meantime the 1st N. Y. Dragoons and the 6th Pa. Cavalry were occupying the enemy's attention in front. Here was accomplished a work of which every one connected with the brigade is justly proud—a success by cavalry which has no parallel in this war—a single brigade contending with and taking from an enemy, at least three times its numbers, one-third infantry, a naturally strong position, made doubly strong by artificial means.

Dismounted attack supported by mounted turning movement. Cold Harbor, Va., May 31, 1864.

(Brig. Genl. Wesley Merritt, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 849.)

Mounted troops charge in the open while dismounted men hold the woods on the flanks.

Near Ream's Station, Va., July 12, 1864.

Ext. No. 166.—About 200 yards beyond this barricade the advance was charged by a large column of cavalry, moving up the plank road, this column having on either flank a line of dismounted men in the woods.

(Brig. Genl. D. McM. Gregg, R. R., Vol. 40, Part I, p. 614.)

Mounted men should always cover the retreat of dismounted men.

Ext. No. 167.—When dismounted men retreat while under fire, the retreat is always covered by a mounted line stationed behind, whose imposing attitude awes the enemy for a brief space, long enough for the footmen to get away in safety.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 18.)

4th U. S. Cav. charges in column of fours along the pike, breaking the enemies center.

Use saber.

West Harpeth River, Tenn., Dec. 17, 1864.

Ext. No. 168.—Deploying Knipe's division as skirmishers, dismounted, with Hatch's in close support, General Wilson ordered the 4th U. S. Cavalry, Lieutenant Hedges commanding, to charge the enemy. Forming on the pike in column of fours, the gallant little command of 200 men charged with sabers drawn, breaking the enemy's center, while Knipe's and Hatch's men pressed back the flanks, scattering the whole command and causing them to abandon their artillery.

(Maj. Genl. Geo. H. Thomas, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 41.)

Conduct of an attack in a lane bordered by rail or wire fence.

Aldie, Va., June 17, 1863.

Ext. No. 169.—The heads of columns met in the narrow road in a hand-to-hand saber fight. While this was in progress Captain Irving threw down the fence on the right of the road and, bringing his squadron to the front, opened fire on the enemy's left flank. Captain Tebbs executed a similar movement on the left of the road, while the sharpshooters were all the time firing into the enemy's rear. Their attack was completely broken, and their leading squadron almost destroyed.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 299.)

Ext. No. 170.—We met in a lane, both sides of which were post and rail fences too strong to be broken with an ax. The country is open, the fields small, and all the fences the same character as along the lane. No estimate could be made of the opposing force, but knowing that a vigorous assault must put even a small force on a perfect equality with a large one until a larger field could be prepared, I at once ordered the 7th regiment, which was in front, to charge. Before the enemy could be reached he succeeded in throwing carbines through the gates right and left, who poured into our flanks a galling fire. The leading men hesitated, the regiment halted and retreated, losing more men than a glorious victory would have cost had the onset been made with boldness and vigor.

Fences too strong to break.

Vigorous assault in a lane should put a small force on an equality with a large one.

Fairfield, Pa., July 3, 1863.

Retreat more costly than a victory.

(Brig. Gen. W. E. Jones, C. S., R. R. Vol. 27, Part II, p. 752.)

COMMENTS.

In the combined mounted and dismounted actions, with few exceptions, the dismounted men were in the center and the mounted men on the flanks. (Exts. 152, 155, 161, 163, 164, 165.) The exception is where the the most suitable ground for a charge is along a narrow lane, running at right angles and leading to the center of the enemy's line, along which the charge will necessarily be made in column of fours. (Exts. 153, 160, 166, 168.) The reason for the mounted men being on the flanks is that by rapid movements they can attack or threaten the enemy's flanks and rear. If the enemy breaks, it will be difficult for them to regain their led horses, provided that the mounted men are quick to take the aggressive. (Exts. 156, 164.) The reason for the formation with the mounted men in the center is explained in Ext. 168. Dismounted men were pressing back the enemy's flanks, thus presumably weakening their center by drawing troops away from that part of their line.

Mounted troops should always be ready to charge when the enemy's line breaks. (Exts. 153, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161.)

When the enemy is broken, he should not be given time to form new lines with his reserve. (Ext. 153.)

Dismounted sharpshooters under cover are a good support for a weak or timid mounted force. (Exts. 162, 166.)

If the terrain is not suited to retiring by successive formations, then the retreat of the dismounted men should be covered by mounted troops whose threatening attitude will give the dismounted men time to regain their horses. (Exts. 167, 191.)

When mounted troops meet in a lane, the head of the column should engage in mounted combat, while those in rear break through the fences to the right and left and endeavor to gain a flank fire on the rear of the enemy's column. (Exts. 169, 170.)

In a lane from which no deployment can be made, a small force is on an equality with a large one so long as this condition can be maintained. (Ext. 170.)

COMBINED ACTION—CAVALRY AND INFANTRY.

Cavalry, with infantry mounted behind, makes a circuit of 32 miles.

Ext. No. 171.—October 17, just before daylight, the rebel General Rosser, with one brigade of infantry, riding behind the cavalry, attacked Brigadier General Custer's extreme right picket from the rear. He had made a circuit of 32 miles to get in rear of our picket line.

(Maj. Genl. A. T. A. Torbert, R. R. Vol. 43, Part I, p. 432.)

(For mounting cavalry behind infantry, see also report of Maj. Genl. Jubal A. Early, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 561.)

Cavalry construct field works over one mile long.

Ext. No. 172.—On September 22 my division, with the exception of McCausland's Brigade, was dismounted and placed on the left of the line at Fisher's Hill and directed to throw up works continuous with those of the infantry. This line was over one mile long and to be occupied by about 1,000 men.

Line to hold one man to 1.7 yards.

(Maj. Genl. L. L. Lomax, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 611.)

Cavalry reinforce infantry in holding a mountain pass. Crampton's Gap, Md., Sept. 14, '62.

Ext. No. 173.—Every available cavalryman was dismounted and placed in line of battle to strengthen the two regiments of infantry under his (Munford's) command.

(Munford's Defense of Crampton's Gap, Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 120.)

Confederate cavalry fight with infantry during the battle of Chickamauga. Sept. 19-20. '63.

Ext. No. 174.—The command took an active part in the skirmishes and battle at and near Chickamauga, fighting dismounted, with or on the flanks of the infantry during the battles.

(Maj. Genl. W. T. Martin, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 545.)

(See also 138.)

Cavalry holds enemy till infantry can get into position. Cedar Run, Va., Oct. 14, 1863.

Ext. No. 175.—At this time, meeting Major General Warren, commanding the 2d Corps, I was asked by him to hold my position until he should be able to get his corps across Cedar Run.

(Genl. D. McM. Gregg, Comg. 2d Cav. Corps., R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 357.)

Infantry attack supported by cavalry on the flanks. Near New Baltimore, Va., Oct. 20, 1863.

Ext. No. 176.—The enemy in front of Custer now returned to the attack. He advanced in two lines of infantry skirmishers, supported on the flanks by cavalry.

(Genl. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 383.)

Weak cavalry is followed close by infantry supports.

Ext. No. 177.—Their cavalry force is about two regiments, and they keep close to infantry supports.

(Maj. Genl. S. D. Lee, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 26.)

Cavalry occupies trenches to cover withdrawal of infantry. Ream's Station, Va., Aug. 25, 1864.

Ext. No. 178.—After the fight General Hill directed me to put my command in the trenches to cover the withdrawal of the infantry.

(Maj. Genl. Wade Hampton, C. S., R. R., Vol. 42, Part I, p. 944.)

Cavalry assaults redoubts defended by good infantry. Nashville, Tenn. Dec. 15, 1864.

Ext. No. 179.—Whilst slightly swinging to the left, came upon a redoubt containing four guns, which was splendidly carried by assault at 1:00 P. M. by a portion of Hatch's division, dismounted, and the captured guns

turned upon the enemy. A second redoubt, stronger than the first, was next assailed and carried by the same troops that captured the first position, taking four more guns and about 300 prisoners.

The infantry of McArthur's division, on the left of the cavalry, participated in both of the assaults; and, indeed, the dismounted cavalry seemed to vie with the infantry to see who should first gain the works; as they reached the position nearly simultaneously, both lay claim to the artillery and prisoners captured.

(Battle of Nashville, Maj. Genl. G. H. Thomas, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 38.)

While infantry attacks in front cavalry, by turning movement, cuts off the enemy's retreat.

Nashville, Tenn., Dec. 15, 1864.

Ext. No. 180.—Wilson's Cavalry, dismounted, attacked the enemy simultaneously with Schofield and Smith, striking him in reverse and gaining possession of the Granny White Pike, cut off his retreat by that route.

(Battle of Nashville, Maj. Genl. G. H. Thomas, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 40.)

Cavalry assault field works.

Five Forks, Va., April 1, 1865.

Ext. No. 181.—The firing of the 5th Corps was the signal to General Merritt to assault, which was promptly responded to, and the works of the enemy were soon carried at several points by our brave cavalrymen. The enemy were driven from their strong line of works and completely routed, the 5th Corps doubling up their left flank in confusion, and the cavalry under General Merritt dashing on the White Oak road, capturing their artillery and turning it upon them and riding into their broken ranks so demoralized them that they made no serious stand after their line was carried, but took flight in disorder. Between 5,000 and 6,000 prisoners fell into our hands, and the fugitives were driven westward and were pursued till long after dark by Merritt's and MacKenzie's cavalry for a distance of six miles.

The great moment for cavarly is when infantry breaks.

When infantry breaks energetic cavalry may secure great reward in prisoners and trophies.

The pursuit should be kept up as long as possible.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, p. 1105.)

Ext. No. 182.—Hq. Dept. of the Cumberland,
Oct. 1, 1863, 2:15 A. M.

Weak cavalry force supported by infantry and artillery.

Colonel McCook, commanding Division of Cavalry.

* * * The General commanding directs that you * * * move with all dispatch with the balance of your force to Anderson's Cross Roads * * * Three regiments of infantry and a section of artillery have been ordered there to support you.

(Sig.) J. A. GARFIELD,
Brigadier General and Chief of Staff.

(Campaigns of Wheeler and his Cavalry, p. 120.)

Ext. No. 183.—Hq. 1st Cavalry Division,
May 28, 1864.

Lieut. D. H. How,
A. A. A. G. Cavalry Command,
Department of the Cumberland.

* * * Privately this thing of covering the flank of infantry seems a one-sided affair; if they are attacked I am to pitch in, while if I am attacked by a superior force I can expect no assistance. These last paragraphs of my letter are unofficial, of course.

Infantry supported by cavalry on its flank; good for the former but hard on the latter

(Sig.) E. M. McCOOK,
Colonel Commanding.

Hq. Chief of Cavalry, Dept. of the Cumberland.
May 28, 1864.

Brigadier General E. M. McCook,
Commanding 1st Division of Cavalry.

Don't write unofficial remarks with official; the latter are necessary to have, the former is a pleasure to receive.

(Sig.) W. L. ELLIOTT,
Brigadier General,
Chief of Cavalry.

(R. R., Vol. 38, Part IV, p. 336.)

Ext. No. 184.—Rosecrans was determined to make his superior numbers tell, at least in the immediate vicinity of his army. He inaugurated a system about this time which resulted in the decided improvement of

Cavalry backed by infantry support which could finish the fight begun by the cavalry.

his cavalry. He would send out a body of cavalry stronger than anything it was likely to encounter, and that it might never be demoralized by a complete whipping, he would back it by an infantry force never far in the rear, and always ready to finish the fight the cavalry had begun. This method benefited the latter greatly.

(Morgan's Cavalry, by Duke.)

Confederate support cavalry skirmishers by infantry.

Ext. No. 185.—General Wirt Davis states that at Chickamauga the Confederates supported their cavalry skirmish lines by infantry.

Two cavalry brigades replace a corp of infantry in the trenches for two weeks.

Atlanta Campaign, Aug. 1-14, 1864.

Ext. No. 186.—August 1 to 14 the 1st and 3d Brigades, dismounted, relieved the 23d Corps in the trenches on the extreme left of the army. During this time it did duty as infantry.

(Col. R. G. H. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 813.)

Cavalry is kept in action as infantry for four days.

Ext. No. 187.—At the battle of Chickamauga Forrest's Cavalry was not relieved from the lines where it had been fighting as infantry till it had been in action four days.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 353.)

Cavalry go to the assistance of shaken infantry.

Gettysburg, Pa., July 1, 1863.

Ext. No. 188.—Seeing our troops retiring, and their need of assistance, I immediately rushed Gamble's Brigade to Doubleday's left, and dismounted it in time to render great assistance to our infantry, and to check and break the enemy's line. My troops at this place had partial shelter behind a low stone fence, and were in short carbine range. Their fire was perfectly terrific, causing the enemy to break and rally on their second line, which made no further advance toward my position.

(Brig. Genl. Jno. Buford, July 1st, Gettysburg, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 927.)

COMMENTS.

The tactical action of combined cavalry and infantry is much the same as that of mounted and dismounted cavalry.

The case of Early's infantry riding double behind Rosser's Cavalry (Ext. 171) is very rare and of doubtful utility.

At Fisher's Hill the cavalry threw up earth works, the same as infantry, to be occupied at the rate of one man to 1.7 yards. (Ext. 172.) This line would seem to be weak. It was not so since the cavalry was armed with repeating carbines at this time.

Cavalry was often thrown into the battle to strengthen infantry. (Exts. 138, 173, 174, 183, 188.)

Extract 175 illustrates the case of cavalry holding a position long enough to enable infantry to complete its maneuver.

It is sometimes thought that the Manchurian war furnished a new method of handling weak cavalry—namely, following it up by light infantry behind which it took refuge when driven back. This use of cavalry was frequently resorted to during the war of the Rebellion. (Exts. 177, 182, 184, 185.)

In principle the system attributed to Rosecrans (Ext. 184) is altogether wrong. Cavalry should not be imbued with the idea that a lot of infantry must follow it around like the tail of a comet. The correct idea is expressed by Sheridan (Ext. 238), namely, that cavalry ought to fight the enemy's cavalry, and infantry the enemy's infantry. It is true that cavalry, the same as artillery is a subordinate arm, and, under the commanding general, should work to the central idea, and while doing so, can and will fight anything. Good cavalry is, however, too difficult to replace to expend it on foot troops massed behind entrenchments, and its possibilities are likewise too great to kill its mobility by tying it to infantry supports.

Cavalry can often cover the withdrawal of infantry by being placed in trenches, thus enabling the infantry to get away without molestation or their absence being discovered. Wilson's cavalry screened the movement of Grant's army across the James River. (See also Exts. 178, 249.)

Extract 180 furnishes a good illustration of the ability of cavalry to make a turning movement and cut off the retreat of defeated troops and thus secure a rich reward in prisoners and trophies.

It will happen more frequently that cavalry acts as support for infantry than that infantry acts as support for cavalry. However, Colonel E. M. McCook has some ideas of his own on the subject, as expressed in Ext. 183.

The putting of cavalry in trenches for longer than twenty-four hours is very demoralizing to the cavalry (Ext. 186.) The fighting of men in the trenches will not, as a rule, compensate for the damage to their horses resulting from neglect.

COMBINED ACTION—WITH ARTILLERY.

Combined cavalry and artillery action.

Parker's Cross Roads, Tenn., Dec. 30, 1862.

Ext. No. 189.—Dismounting his men, except about 200 who were distributed equally on his right and left flanks, the Confederate commander disposed them in one line of battle with his artillery, occupying three positions, Morton's battery in the center and a section of Freeman's on each flank, a few paces in advance of the dismounted men.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 211.)

Stuart's handling of his horse artillery.

Near Union, Va., Nov. 2-3, 1862.

Ext. No. 190.—The successful resistance which Stuart was enabled to oppose to the Federal advance was in great measure due to the skillful handling of his artillery. Stuart's fondness for the use of artillery was almost excessive; Pelham's skill in its management amounted to genius. Stuart and Pelham imparted to the horse artillery an independency of action and celerity of movement which characterized it to the end of the war, and which was nowhere equalled or imitated, except in the same arm of the Federal service. Achievements of the batteries attached to both Federal and Confederate cavalry are worthy of a separate record and the careful attention of military men.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 173.)

CHAPTER V.

DELAYING ACTIONS AND ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF RIVER CROSSINGS.

A charge will often disconcert an enemy long enough to permit a force to mount and withdraw.

Ext. No. 191.—Morgan ordered the command to retreat on the Augusta road and charged with the mounted reserve to cover the withdrawal.

(Morgan's Cavalry by Duke.)

Rear of retreating army covered by cavalry.

Knoxville Campaign. Dec. 4, '63.

Ext. No. 192.—The army, the siege of Knoxville being raised, commenced its retreat toward Rogersville. General Morgan's division followed, covering the rear of General McLaw's division on the south side of the Holston. General Armstrong's division performed the same service on the Knoxville and river roads.

(Maj. Gen. W. T. Martin, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 548.)

973 men delay 7000 for 10 hours so that they advance only five miles.

Chickamauga Campaign. Sept., 1863.

Ext. No. 193.—With 973 men the First Brigade had disputed the advance of 7,000 rebels from 7 o'clock in the morning until 5 o'clock in the evening, and at the end of that time had fallen back only five miles.

(Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 30, Part I, p. 923.)

One brigade delays a large force so that they advanceseven miles in five hours.

Shelbyville, Tenn., Oct. 7, 1863.

Ext. No. 194.—For five and a half hours, over seven miles of country, the unequal contest continued. My gallant brigade was cut to pieces and slaughtered.

(Col. G. B. Hodge, C. S., R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 728.)

COMMENTS.

When Bragg retreated from Perryville followed by Rosecrans, Wheeler's cavalry covered his retreat.—Ext. 261.

The retreat of Hood's army after the battle of Nashville was covered by Forrest's cavalry.

Cavalry is particularly fitted for the work of delaying the advance of a victorious army. Its mobility enables it to take advantage of the terrain in places where its horses can be kept close up. Under this condition it can delay its retirement with impunity. If horses cannot be kept close up, and owing to unfavorable terrain are sent to the rear, cavalry will still have an advantage over foot troops in that they carry no packs and are stimulated by the assurance of safety upon regaining their horses.

The further use of cavalry in delaying actions is fully illustrated by the following extracts.

RETIRING BY SUCCESSIVE FORMATIONS.

Retire by alternate platoons.

Ext. No. 195.—I received orders to retire behind barricades. I moved back by alternate platoons, at the same time checking the rebel advance till we arrived at the barricades.

(Capt. Forman, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 376.)

Retire by successive positions. Waynesborough, Ga., Dec. 4, 1864.

Ext. No. 196.—Their cavalry having turned our flanks, we were compelled to fall back which was done by taking successive positions till we reached the town.

(Genl. J. Wheeler, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 410.)

Brigades successively retire. Brandy Station, Va., Oct. 11, 1863.

Ext. No. 197.—I received orders to retire my command behind the line of the 2d Brigade and reform them, which was done, and I then held a position under cover of which the 2d Brigade withdrew and again took up a position near the river.

(Brig. Genl. H. E. Davies, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 386.)

When outflanked troops retire and take up new positions. Shelbyville, Tenn., Oct. 7, 1863.

Ext. No. 198.—Upon being repulsed, the enemy commenced extending his flanks which his numerical superiority enabled him to do, compelling me to form fresh lines in the rear and withdraw those he was enveloping.

(Col. G. B. Hodge, C. S., R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 728.)

Line retires successively by regiment. Talbott's Station, Tenn., Dec. 29, 1863.

Ext. No. 199.—The retreat under a heavy fire of artillery and small arms, was effected in perfect order, the regiments falling back in succession to advantageous

points, and then fighting until, having checked the enemy sufficiently, they could gain another point of vantage.

(Maj. Genl. W. T. Martin, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 548.)

Regiment retires successively by battalions. Okolona, Miss., Feb. 22, 1864.

Ext. No. 200.—The regiment fell back slowly and in good order for some distance by alternate battalions, and then resumed its march in column.

(Lieut. Col. T. M. Browne, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 276.)

Brigade retires successively by regiment. Okolona, Miss., Feb. 22, 1864.

Ext. No. 201.—I was ordered to fall back as successive lines were formed in my rear. My regiment was formed some seven or eight times during the day on the rear and flanks of the brigade.

(Maj. C. T. Cheek, 5th Ky. Cav., R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 310.)

Regiment retires for five miles taking up successive positions. Kingston, Ga., May 18, 1864.

Ext. No. 202.—Now the fighting became fierce and desperate, charge after charge received and as often repulsed. I found it impossible to hold a given line longer than to deliver a single volley. In this manner we fought our way back five miles.

(Lieut. Col. J. B. Park, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 828.)

Regiments fall back alternately two miles. Shoal Creek, Ala. Nov. 19, 1864.

Ext. No. 203.—Each regiment then fell back alternately and formed lines for two miles, when we reached Shoal Creek, and I found to my surprise, the 6th Ill. pack train, artillery and ambulances all safe on the opposite side, and the regiment dismounted to cover the crossing.

(Col. D. E. Coon, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 585.)

Stuart retires en échelon of regiment for an entire day. Middleburg, Va., June 21, 1863.

Ext. No. 204.—The first position held by Stuart was about three miles west of Middleburg. Here he delayed the enemy as long as prudence permitted, and then retired *en échelon* of regiments, covered by his artillery. This order of retiring was maintained throughout the entire day, and at no time was the enemy able to cause any serious disorder in his ranks.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 308.)

Stampede ensues because the retirement is not made successively.

Woodstock, Va., June 2, 1862.

Ext. No. 205.—The Yankees pressing on my rear captured 8 men. Such management I never saw before. Had the batteries retired by echelon, and the cavalry in the same way, we could have held our position or driven back their cavalry by a counter charge from ours. But a retreat was ordered and a disgraceful stampede ensued.

(Col. T. T. Munford, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, Part I, p. 731.)

Brigades fall back alternately.

Collierville, Tenn., Nov. 3, '63.

Ext. No. 206.—I determined to draw off as soon as we could do so successfully, and for this purpose ordered McCulloch's brigade to dismount and skirmish with the enemy until Slemons could be formed in his rear to cover his retreat. This was accomplished easily and in good order, each brigade forming alternately in rear of the other until we were out of reach of the enemy.

(Brig. Genl. J. R. Chalmers, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 248.)

COMMENTS.

From reading these extracts it is clear that the usual method of withdrawing was by alternate successive formations. It is possible, at times, to pit the whole fight on one good strong position. In this case, when the smash comes, it will be every man for himself (Ext. No. 205). No mention has been observed, in any of the reports, of intentionally using this latter method in a delaying action.

It will frequently happen that when circumstances, not known to the firing line, render a retirement desirable, that a successful retirement may be made under cover of the confusion caused by a vigorous attack (Exts. 191, 218, 440, 441).

In the method of retiring by alternate formations, battalions or regiments seem to be the favorite tactical units (Exts. 199, 200, 201, 203, 204).

We find in Extract 204 Stuart's cavalry keeping this up for an entire day by first getting back to the new line alternate regiments supported by artillery whose fire cov-

ered the withdrawal of the advanced line. Sometimes the movement was executed alternately by platoons (Ext. 195), and sometimes by entire brigades (Exts. 197, 206).

ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF A RIVER CROSSING—FORDS.

Dismounted men ford and attack a battery. Culpeper, C. H., Va., Sept. 13, 1863.

Ext. No. 207.—I advanced rapidly to the creek, but finding it impossible from abrupt and miry banks to cross with horses, I dismounted 100 men with carbines, who, wading and swimming the stream, charged rapidly up the hill towards the battery.

(Col. Mann, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 127.)

Dismounted men attack the ford supported by mounted men. Opequan Creek, Va., Sept. 19, '64.

Ext. No. 208.—The reserve brigade was ordered to effect a crossing at Seiver's Ford; this was done in fine style by Col. Lowell, who threw over dismounted men, closely supported by the 5th U. S. Cavalry and part of the 2d Mass. Cav. mounted.

(Brig. Genl. W. Merrittt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 443.)

Under cover of artillery, cavalry go through swamp, cross stream and take field works. Near Barnwell, S. C., Feb. 6, 1865.

Ext. No. 209.—The enemy, about 300 strong, occupied a well chosen position behind earthworks upon the opposite side, commanding the bridge. The bridge was already on fire, but the 9th Ohio Cav., 92d Ill. Mtd. Inf. (Dismounted) gallantly dashed through the swamp, the men wading in the water up to their arm pits, crossed the stream on trees felled by our pioneers, and under cover of a rapid fire of artillery, gallantly carried the works, driving the enemy in confusion toward the town of Barnwell.

(Maj. Genl. J. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 47, Part I, p. 858.)

Enemy allowed to get well into the stream before firing on them.

Ext. No. 210.—They made another attempt some distance leftward, and were suffered to get well into the stream without molestation, when Captain Forrest attacked with vigor, and repulsed them with loss.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 239.)

Cavalry boldly dash across a shallow ford, and

Ext. No. 211.—The Federals were forced to retire to their fortifications, eastward of the stream, which is

dismount on the other side to attack field works.

some 250 yards broad at this point, but shallow, and with an excellent ford, across which, under cover, secured by eight pieces of artillery that had been previously placed in a favorable position, the Confederates dashed boldly in the face of the Federals. Dismounting his men as soon as they reached the other bank, they were formed as infantry, and pushed up with the loss of eight or ten men killed or wounded before the Federals abandoned their position.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 355.)

To recross artillery is sent with a support to cover the crossing.

Morton's Ford, Va., Nov. 27, 1863.

Ext. No. 212.—I determined to recross the river. As the enemy began a brisk attack on my skirmishers, I directed them to stand firm and at once sent my main body across the ford, having my guns in position and placing a battalion in the houses at the ford, I ordered the skirmishers in at the gallop. They retired, followed closely by the enemy's cavalry which were checked by the guns and the men posted at the ford and the whole command crossed the river without losing a man.

(Brig. Genl. H. E. Davies, Jr. R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 815.)

BRIDGES.

Cavalry crosses bridge under cover of artillery.

Morgantown, N. C., April 17, '65.

Ext. No. 213.—Another battalion of the same regiment was dismounted and placed as near the bridge as shelter could be found. The second shot from our artillery dismounted the rebel gun, a few more discharges drove them from their rifle pits, when the dismounted battalion charged across the bridge on the sleepers and drove the rebels from the ford.

(Brig. Genl. A. C. Gillem, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 335.)

Cavalry crosses bridge under cover of carbine fire.

Position fire.

Broad Run, Va., Oct. 15, 1863.

Ext. No. 214.—The enemy occupied a strong position on the opposite side of Broad Run which could only be crossed at a bridge and a ford one mile below. After a determined effort of over two hours, General Custer had succeeded in pushing his command up to the bridge and on the hills to the right of the road overlooking the

enemy's position. I ordered General Custer to charge the bridge. The charge was successfully made, the buildings on the opposite side were gained and held by our sharpshooters and in a few minutes General Custer's entire brigade had crossed.

(Genl. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 382.)

Cavalry charge with sabers and capture bridge which had been prepared for burning.

Flint River near Columbus, Ga., April 17, 1865.

Ext. No. 215.—Lieut. Col. Pritchard commanding the 3d Ohio Cav. had orders to push forward and save the double bridges over the Flint River. He carried out his orders faithfully and energetically and saved the bridges, although every preparation had been made to burn them, and captured the battalion which had been left to destroy them. Captain Hudson led his battalion at the gallop over these unknown bridges, dashed into the rebel battalions with sabers, and captured the entire force.

(Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 445.)

A sudden charge succeeds where a cautious advance would fail.

Flint River near Columbus, Ga., Apr. 17, 1865.

Ext. No. 216.—From there a charge was ordered, and was executed with such precipitancy that the guard at the bridge, consisting of a force of fifty men, was completely surprised, receiving no knowledge of our approach until the head of the column struck the bridge at the gallop, which was swept like a hurricane, not allowing the enemy time to fire a volley. A few scattering shots were fired, but to no effect. The whole force then broke and fled.

(Lieut. Col. B. D. Pritchard, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 465.)

Cavalry attack burning bridge.

Mimm's Mills, Ga., Apr. 20, 1865.

Ext. No. 217.—I again moved forward at a fast trot in order to be on time to save the bridge over the Tabesofkee Creek. Here we found the enemy in line, about 300 strong, and attacked them. The advance charged, mounted, over the burning bridge until stopped by the plank being torn up. They then dismounted, as did also the two advance companies, and I double quicked them across the bridge, and after a sharp fight of about five minutes, drove the enemy off in confusion. In the meantime I had part of the companies at work extinguish-

ing the fire on the bridge, the men carrying water in their hats, caps, and everything else available. The fire was sufficiently suppressed in about fifteen minutes to admit of horsemen crossing, and, leaving men still at work against the flames, I crossed the command and pushed on.

(Lieut. Col. F. White, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 458.)

Retiring across a bridge.

Deliver a vigorous attack and retire under cover of it.

Led horses and trains are sent ahead.

Ext. No. 218.—At 2:00 p. m. Wheeler had his wagon trains and horses carried to the south side of the river. He then charged the enemy's line and before they could recover from their consternation, he had, by a rapid movement, reached the river with his dismounted men and hurried them across the pontoons, cut loose the bridge and swung it around to the south side of the river just as the enemy in force reached the other bank.

(Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 196.)

COMMENTS.

In the attack of a ford or bridge, the whole trick consists in keeping down the enemy's fire till the crossing can be effected and a deployment made on the opposite side. This may be done by rifle fire (Ext. 214), artillery fire (Exts. 209, 213), or by both combined (Ext. 212). The method of employing it will depend upon the ground. If high banks overlook the crossing, position fire (Ext. 214) is desirable. Often a bold dash will turn the trick (Exts. 211, 215, 216, 217). This method is particularly applicable where the defenders can be surprised (Ext. 216).

Extract 212 furnishes a good illustration of withdrawing from the firing line and crossing while under fire. Under these circumstances, horses and trains should be sent ahead (Ext. 218).

The method here used by General Wheeler will often be possible, namely, deliver a vigorous attack and cross under cover of the confusion caused to the enemy's ranks.

The cutting loose of one end of a pontoon bridge was also resorted to by Lee's army when crossing the Potomac after the battle of Gettysburg.

Usually some method can be found by which the crossing can be turned. The mobility of cavalry will enable it to reconnoitre, in a short time, a considerable distance to both flanks of the crossing, while other troops are engaging the enemy's attention in front. If a crossing can be found, it will be cheaper to turn the position than to force it.

When the defense is sufficiently strong, the enemy will suffer more by permitting his column to get well into the stream (Ext. 210).

CHAPTER VI.

MISCELLANEOUS TACTICS.

THE BATTLE OF BOONEVILLE.

This battle is described in Sheridan's Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 156. It is well worth the study of every cavalry officer. As it was the first fight where Sheridan commanded independent cavalry, and is so full of good cavalry tactics that it is here quoted in full.

Sheridan at this time showed a fine conception of the correct use of cavalry. The details of the battle were well known to General Grant, and probably had a material influence on the latter when he recommended Sheridan for the command of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac.

It resulted in Sheridan's immediate promotion, gave him the command of an infantry division, brought his sterling qualities to the attention of higher commanders, and who shall say that it did not, in this indirect manner, have an important bearing on the destiny of the nation.

Cavalry outposts three and one-half miles out.

Ext. No. 219.—On the morning of July 1, 1862, a cavalry command of between five and six thousand men, under the Confederate General James R. Chalmers, advanced on two roads converging near Booneville. The head of the enemy's column on the Blackland and Booneville road came in contact with my pickets three miles and a half west of Booneville. These pickets, under Lieutenant Leonidas S. Scranton, of the Second Michigan Cavalry, fell back slowly, taking advantage of every tree or other cover to fire from till they arrived at the point where the converging roads joined. At this junction there was a strong position in the protecting timber, and here Scranton made a firm stand, being reinforced presently by a few men he had out as pickets on the road

Pickets resist stubbornly when forced to fall back.

to his left, a second company I had sent him from camp, and subsequently by three companies more, all now commanded by Captain Campbell. This force was dismounted and formed in line, and soon developed that the enemy was present in large numbers. Up to this time Chalmers had shown only the heads of his columns, and we had doubts as to his purpose, but now that our resistance forced him to deploy two regiments on the right and left of the road, it became apparent that he meant business, and that there was no time to lose in preparing to repel his attack.

Advance, by heads of column, is not deployed till compelled to do so by fire.



Full information of the situation was immediately sent me, and I directed Campbell to hold fast, if possible, till I could support him, but if compelled to retire he was authorized to do so slowly, taking advantage of every means that fell in his way to prolong the fighting. Before this I had stationed one battalion of the Second Iowa in Booneville, but Colonel Edward Hatch, commanding that regiment, was now directed to leave one company for the protection of our camp a little to the north of the station, and take the balance of the Second Iowa, with the battalion in Booneville except two saber companies, and form the whole in rear of Captain Campbell,

Prompt report of subordinate enables commander to act promptly.

Stubborn resistance by advance troops enables troops in rear to form to meet the attack.

Dismounted troops are supported by mount-

ed troops which are ordered to charge if the enemy breaks the dismounted line.

to protect his flanks and support him by a charge should the enemy break his dismounted line.

While these preparations were being made, the Confederates attempted to drive Campbell from his position by a direct attack through an open field. In this they failed, however, for our men, reserving their fire until the enemy came within about thirty yards, then opened on him with such a shower of bullets from our Colt's rifles that it soon became too hot for him and he was repulsed with considerable loss. Foiled in this move, Chalmers hesitated to attack again in front, but began overlapping both flanks of Campbell's line by force of numbers, compelling Campbell to retire toward a strong position I had selected in his rear for a line on which to make our main resistance.

Fire is reserved till the enemy gets within thirty yards.

As soon as the enemy saw this withdrawing he again charged in front, but was again as gallantly repelled as in the first assault, although the encounter was for a short time so desperate as to have the character of a hand to hand conflict, several groups of friend and foe using on each other the butts of their guns. At this juncture the timely arrival of Colonel Hatch with the Second Iowa gave a breathing spell to Campbell, and made the Confederates so chary of direct attacks that he was enabled to retire; and at the same time I found opportunity to make disposition of the reinforcement to the best advantage possible, placing the Second Iowa on the left of the new line and strengthening Campbell on its right with all the men available.

In view of his numbers, the enemy soon regained confidence in his ability to overcome us, and in a little while again began his flanking movements, his right passing around my left flank some distance, and approaching our camp and transportation, which I had forbidden to be moved out to the rear. Fearing that the enemy would envelop and capture the camp and transportation, I determined to take the offensive.

Commander makes thorough reconnaissance of country sur-

Remembering a circuitous wood road that I had become familiar with while making the map heretofore

mentioned, I concluded that the most effective plan would be to pass a small column around the enemy's left, by way of this road, and strike his rear by a mounted charge simultaneously with an advance of our main line on his front. I knew that the attack in rear would be a most hazardous undertaking, but in face of such odds as the enemy had the condition of affairs was most critical, and could be relieved only by a bold and radical change in our tactics; so I at once selected four saber companies, two from the Second Michigan and two from the Second Iowa, and placing Captain Alger, of the former regiment, in command of them, I informed him that I expected of them the quick and desperate work that is usually imposed on a forlorn hope.

rounding his camp and gains knowledgewhich is of immense advantage to him when his camp is attacked.

Enemy attacked simultaneously in front and rear.

Sheridan stakes his future military career on one bold stroke, and wins.

Forlorn hope.

To carry out the purpose now in view, I instructed Captain Alger to follow the wood road as it led around the left of the enemy's advancing forces, to a point where it joined the Blackland road, about three miles from Booneville, and directed him, upon reaching the Blackland road, to turn up it immediately, and charge the rear of the enemy's line. Under no circumstances was he to deploy the battalion, but charge in column right through whatever he came upon, and report to me in front of Booneville, if at all possible for him to get there. If he failed to break through the enemy's line, he was to go ahead as far as he could, and then if any of his men were left, and he was able to retreat, he was to do so by the same route he had taken on his way out. To conduct him on this perilous service I sent along a thin, sallow, tawny-haired Mississippian named Beene, whom I had employed as a guide and scout a few days before, on account of his intimate knowledge of the roads, from the public thoroughfares down to the insignificant by-paths of the neighboring swamps. With such guidance I felt sure that the column would get to the desired point without delay, for there was no danger of its being lost or misled by taking any of the many by-roads which traversed the dense forests through which it would be

Use of guide.

obliged to pass. I also informed Alger that I should take the reserve and join the main line in front of Booneville for the purpose of making an advance of my whole force, and that as a signal he must have his men cheer loudly when he struck the enemy's rear, in order that my attack might be simultaneous with his.

A commander is not justified in withdrawing from the fight till he has put all of his reserves into the firing line.

I gave him one hour to go around and come back through the enemy, and when he started I moved to the front with the balance of the reserve, to put everything I had into the fight. This meant an inestimable advantage to the enemy in case of our defeat, but our own safety demanded the hazard. All along the attenuated line the fighting was now sharp, and the enemy's firing indicated such numerical strength that fear of disaster to Alger increased my anxiety terribly as the time set for the cheering arrived and no sound of it was heard. Relying, however, on the fact that Beene's knowledge of the roads would prevent his being led astray, and confident of Alger's determination to accomplish the purpose for which he set out, as soon as the hour was up I ordered my whole line forward. Fortunately, just at this moment a locomotive and two cars loaded with grain for my horses ran into Booneville from Corinth. I say fortunately, because it was well known throughout the command that in the morning, when I first discovered the large numbers of the enemy, I had called for assistance; and my troops, now thinking that reinforcements had arrived by rail from Rienzi, where a division of infantry was encamped, and inspired by this belief, advanced with renewed confidence and wild cheering. Meantime I had the engineer of the locomotive blow his whistle loudly, so that the enemy might also learn that a train had come; and from the fact that in a few moments he began to give way before our small force, I thought that this stratagem had some effect. Soon his men broke, and ran in the utmost disorder over the country in every direction. I found later, however, that his precipitous retreat was due to the pressure on his left from the Second Iowa,

Prearranged signal for simultaneous attack cannot usually be relied upon.

Time agreement better than a sound signal.

Courage of troops kept up by a belief that assistance had arrived.

in concert with the front attack of the Second Michigan, and the demoralization wrought in his rear by Alger, who had almost entirely accomplished the purpose of his expedition, though he had failed to come through, or so near that I could hear the signal agreed upon before leaving Booneville.

After Alger had reached and turned up the Blackland road, the first thing he came across was the Confederate headquarters; the officers and orderlies about which he captured and sent back some distance to a farmhouse. Continuing at a gallop, he soon struck the rear of the enemy's line, but was unable to get through, nor did he get near enough for me to hear his cheering; but as he had made the distance he was to travel in the time allotted, his attack and mine were almost coincident, and the enemy, stampeded by the charges in front and rear, fled toward Blackland, with little or no attempt to capture Alger's command which might readily have been done. Alger's troops soon rejoined me at Booneville, minus many hats, having returned by their original route. They had sustained little loss except a few men wounded and a few temporarily missing. Among these was Alger himself, who was dragged from his saddle by the limb of a tree that, in the excitement of the charge, he was unable to flank. The missing had been dismounted in one way or another, and run over by the enemy in his flight; but they all turned up later, none the worse except for a few scratches and bruises. My effective strength in this fight was 827 all told, and Alger's command comprised ninety officers and men. Chalmers' was composed of six regiments and two battalions, and though I have been unable to find any returns from which to verify his actual numbers, yet, from the statements of prisoners and from information obtained from citizens along his line of march, it is safe to say that he had in action not less than five thousand men. Our casualties were not many —forty-one in all. His loss in killed and wounded was considerable, his most severely wounded—forty men—

Good cavalry should always be able to cut its way out.

falling into our hands, having been left at farm houses in the vicinity of the battle field.

Sheridan disobeys orders, but on account of his complete victory it seems to be justified. Had he been badly whipped it might have been a different matter.

The victory in face of such odds was most gratifying, and as it justified my disinclination—in fact, refusal—to retire from Booneville without fighting (for the purpose of saving my transportation, as directed by superior authority when I applied in the morning for reinforcements), it was to me particularly grateful. It was also very valuable in view of the fact that it increased the confidence between the officers and men of my brigade and me, and gave us the balance of the month not only comparative rest, but entire immunity from the dangers of a renewed effort to gobble my isolated outpost. In addition to all this, recommendation from my immediate superiors was promptly tendered through oral and written congratulations; and their satisfaction at the result of the battle took definite form a few days later, in an application for my promotion.

A victory increases confidence between officers and men.

(Sheridan's Memoirs, pp. 156 to 165 inclusive.)

COMMENTS.

General Sheridan here displayed the same characteristics which he afterwards displayed in the valley. He loved a fight and disobeyed orders to withdraw in order to save his transportation. He here used the same tactics which were so popular with Forrest, viz:—Holding the enemy in front while a turning movement attacked him simultaneously in rear. He had made a thorough reconnaissance of the surrounding country and mapped it. He personally knew every road and trail in the vicinity of his camp and utilized them to the best advantage. His outposts were well out and resisted stubbornly till the main body could form for defense.

In our drill it is often thought that if the attack can get to within two hundred yards, a charge will be practicable. Such will seldom ever be the case. We here find Sheridan's men holding their fire till the enemy gets within thirty yards. They were armed with revolving

carbines and could deliver a rapid fire as fast as with our present rifle.

It will be noticed often in these extracts that fire is held till the enemy gets to within very short range.

It will be noted that prearranged signals which depend on sound are not to be relied upon. Sound signals failed in the battles of Seven Pines, Malvern Hill, Gettysburg, and many others during the rebellion. A time signal is better if the conditions are known to the commander. In case a time signal is agreed upon, care should be exercised to see that watches agree.

We here see the commander playing with the courage of his men, and keeping up their spirits by making them believe in conditions which did not exist.

In this fight Sheridan staked his whole reputation on the result. The people of the United States seem to lay great stress on a commander gaining a victory in his first fight. All through the war we see many careers ruined because the commander was unfortunate in his first fight, while those who were fortunate were greeted as heroes and were permitted to continue with their former experience to support them in future operations.

A commander is not justified in withdrawing from a fight till he has put all his reserves into the firing line.

CAVALRY SHOULD NOT SURRENDER.

Forrest's cavalry breaks out of Fort Donelson when 17,000 troops surrender

Ext. No. 220.—Forrest declared that he would lead forth all who desired to accompany him, and then inquired how many would make the attempt. The answer was unanimous that they would follow him to the last. Orders were issued accordingly for an immediate movement. About 4 o'clock a. m. Forrest was ready and took the road through Dover. About 500 officers and men formed the column. * * * Thus assured, Forrest returned to his command, that meanwhile had continued on the road to the crossing of the creek eastward of Dover. The creek expanded by backwater to a breadth of about 100 yards, lined with ice, it was supposed to be "swimming." Forrest dashed through the ice as their

Cavalry should not surrender. Fort Donelson, Tenn., Feb. 15, '62.

pioneer just as he had but lately been their scout. Passing entirely across, the water proved not deeper than to the saddle skirts. The whole command now moved over and took up the march for Cumberland City.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 91.)

Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia do not at first surrender at Appomattox.

Appomattox, Va. April 9, 1865.

Ext. No. 221.—Upon hearing that the Army of Northern Virginia had surrendered, the men generally dispersed and rode off to their homes, subject to reassembling for a continuation of the struggle. I rode out in person with a portion of W. H. F. Lee's division, the nearest to me at the time, and previous to the negotiations between the commanders of the two armies. It will be recalled that my action was in accordance with the views I had expressed in the council the night before—that if a surrender was compelled the next day, I would try to extricate the cavalry, provided it could be done without compromising the action of the commanding general.

(Maj. Genl. Fitzhugh Lee, C. S., R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, p. 1303.)

Escape of the cavalry at Harper's Ferry

Sept. 14, 1862.

Ext. No. 222.—At the capture of Harper's Ferry, 1862, Colonel B. F. Davis, 8th N. Y. Cavalry marched out at the head of 1,500 horsemen and not only escaped surrender, but inflicted serious loss on the Confederates by capturing Longstreet's ordnance train.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 122.)

Custer cuts way out, when surrounded, with saber.

Brandy Station, Va., Oct. 11, 1863.

Ext. No. 223.—Heavy masses of rebel cavalry were seen covering the heights in front of my advance; my rear guard was hotly engaged with a superior force and a heavy column was enveloping each flank. Leaving the 6th and 7th Michigan Cavalry to hold the force in rear in check, I formed the 5th Michigan Cavalry on my right in column of battalions; on my left I formed the 1st Michigan Cavalry in column of squadrons. After ordering them to draw their sabers I informed them that we were surrounded, and all we had to do was to open

a way with our sabers. They gave three hearty cheers and the band struck up Yankee Doodle which excited the enthusiasm of the command to the highest pitch. Simultaneously both regiments moved forward to the attack. After a series of brilliant charges we succeeded in reaching the river which we crossed in good order.

When in a tight place the band plays Yankee Doodle.

(Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 390.)

Ext. No. 224.—I was finally completely surrounded and compelled to abandon everything that would impede me in order to cut my way through. I took Colonel Jones with me and got through 1,200 men by a charge in column, and crossed the river below Franklin.

Cutting way out.

Near Lovejoy Station, Ga., July 29, 1864.

Brig. Genl. E. M. McCook, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 762.)

Ext. No. 225.—General Van Dorn attacked and captured the town of Holly Springs, Mississippi, on the 20th of December. The attack was sudden and overpowering, and the garrison was speedily captured. Six companies of the 6th Illinois Cavalry under the brave Major Mudd, refused to surrender and cut their way through the ranks of the enemy and escaped.

Cavalry refuse to surrender.

Holly Springs, Miss., Dec. 20, 1862.

(History of the U. S. Cavalry, Brackett, p. 266.)

Ext. No. 226.—At 5:00 p. m. my patrols and pickets reported the enemy in force in my rear. I formed the 5th Iowa in charging column on the pike. The 16th Illinois, dismounted, on the right and the 8th Michigan, dismounted, on the left of the pike; led horses of both regiments to follow at safe distance in their respective rears; the 14th Illinois was placed in column of fours to the left and rear of the 8th Michigan and parallel to the 5th Iowa. As soon as the enemy's fire was drawn, the dismounted men were to immediately fall back, mount and follow out the 5th Iowa which was to go through with sabers. In fifteen minutes we struck the enemy in line barricaded and posted in out houses and buildings. The movement was entirely successful.

This is an exception to the rule that mounted men should be formed on the flank.

The formation was not for an attack but to cut a way out when surrounded.

Out of 1,500 brought out safe not more than 30 were missing. Permit me to add the fact of growing

Opinion that good cavalry cannot be captured.


To Franklin.
To Shelbyville.
8th Mich.
16th Ill.
14th Ill.
LED HORSES.
5th Iowa.
LED HORSES.
FORD.
FORD.
FORD.

confidence amongst our troops that good cavalry can never be captured. Duck River, Tenn., Nov. 28, '64.

(Maj. J. M. Young, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 604.

IMPROPER USE OF CAVALRY.

Ext. No. 227.—The officers and men were in pretty good condition, so far as health and equipment were concerned, but their horses were thin and very much worn out by excessive, and, it seemed to me, unnecessary picket duty, the picket line almost encircling the infantry and artillery camps of the army, covering a distance, if stretched out on a continuous line, of nearly 60 miles. Improper use of cavalry to picket infantry camps.

The enemy, more wise, had been husbanding the strength and efficiency of his horses by sending them to the rear, in order to bring them out in the spring in good condition for the impending campaign. During winter horses should be sent where they can recuperate. Rapidan to the James, Apr. 1864

(Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 787.)

Ext. No. 228.—As it was difficult to overcome the established custom of wasting cavalry for the protection of trains, and for the establishment of cordons around a sleeping infantry force, we had to bide our time. Cavalry should not be wasted for the protection of trains. Rapidan to the James, Apr. 1864.

(Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 787.)

Ext. No. 229.—The enemy here again made an error in tactics by sending a large force to attack my rear, thus weakening his force in front, enabling me to throw all my strength on that which opposed my front, and fight this force with a small rear guard. Cannot oppose the advance of a large force by attacking in the rear with a large force. Yellow Tavern, Va., May 11, 1864.

(Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 790.)

Ext. No. 230.—Custer's charge, with Chapman on his flank, was brilliantly executed; first at a walk, then at a trot, then dashing at the enemy's line and battery, capturing the guns and gunners and breaking the line, which was simple enough to receive the charge in a stationary position. In this assault General J. E. B. Stuart, commanding the enemy's cavalry, was mortally wounded. Cavalry should not receive a charge standing. Yellow Tavern, Va., May 11, 1864.

(Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 790.)

Marching cavalry in rear of infantry trains is ruinous to cavalry.

Lynchburg Campaign, June, 1864.

Ext. No. 231.—On the morning of the 23d I was ordered to proceed, via New Castle, in rear of the train and in rear of the rest of the army. From that time till the arrival of my division at Loup Creek it was marched in the rear. No opportunity has been offered to obtain forage or subsistence for the men, everything having been taken by the troops marching in my front. As a consequence many of the men of my command have perished by the roadside from hunger and fatigue, whilst their horses fell by the way from the same cause. I would respectfully call attention to the fact that my marching has been done principally during the night time, thus affording little opportunity for rest or sleep.

Night marching proves to be very bad for cavalry.

(Brig. Genl. A. N. Duffie, R. R., Vol. 37, Part I, p. 144.)

COMMENTS.

When Sheridan took command of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac he found the conditions as stated in Extract 227. The horses had been worn out in doing picket duty around an infantry camp on a line of nearly sixty miles; while the Confederates habitually sent their horses to the rear in winter to recuperate. The use of cavalry for train guards is not to be encouraged. It is a great waste of cavalry and besides the duty can be better done by infantry. In case of an attack the infantryman from the ground can do much more effective shooting than can a man on a horse. The rate of speed of a train being much slower than the rate of march of cavalry, it is very wearing on horses to hold them down to the rate of travel of the train.

The marching of cavalry in rear of infantry trains means that there will be nothing left for the cavalry to eat, and when this condition is combined with night marching the situation could not be worse for a cavalry command (Ext. 231).

Extract 229 illustrates an error in the use of cavalry where Stuart tried to bring Sheridan to a fight by attacking his rear. Sheridan fought to the rear with a small rear guard and kept on his Richmond raid without serious opposition.

STREET FIGHTING.

Street fighting. The offensive Augusta, Ky., Sept. 27, 1862.

Ext. No. 232.—A fierce fight at once began. I made the men force their way into the houses whence they were fired upon. Details were posted in the middle of the street in front of every house, to fire on the inmates when they showed themselves and prevent them from maintaining an accurate and effective fire. Other details were made to break doors of the houses and enter them. Artillery was brought into the town and turned upon the houses in which the most stubborn resistance was kept up.

(Morgan's Cavalry, by Duke.)

Formation for street fighting is column of fours. Street fighting, defensive. Attack by successive units each forming in rear after delivering its blow. Boonsboro, Md., Sept. 15, 1862.

Ext. No. 233.—The street through which he necessarily passed was so narrow that his regiment could only be operated in column of fours. A sufficient interval was, however, preserved between his squadrons, which were employed successively in charging the head of the enemy's advancing column. As one squadron retired from the charge, to form again in rear of the regiment, the one in front took up the battle. By a rapid series of well executed attacks the 9th regiment thus covered the retreat of the remainder of the brigade and gave it time to take position west of Boonsboro.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 125.)

Dismounted troops clear the town and follow it by a mounted charge through. New Market, Va., Sept. 24, 1864.

Ext. No. 234.—I had pressed up to within 500 yards when the enemy retired precipitately through the town. I charged half way through the main street, and on the left, but a hot fire from the enclosures and gardens forced me back. I now dismounted five squadrons of the 1st N. Y., cleared the town, and charged through with the rest of my command.

(Brig. Genl. T. C. Devin, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 476.)

NIGHT OPERATIONS.

This is a fine illustration of night operations, and is worthy of an extensive study.

Wauhatchie, Tenn., Oct. 28, 29, 1863.]

Ext. No. 235.—On October 28, 1863, a part of the 2d Division of the 12th Corps under Brig. Genl. Geary, camped at Wauhatchie two and one-half miles from the 11th Corps.

Between 12 midnight and 1:00 a. m. on a bright moonlight night, his camp was attacked and the attack repulsed.

When the attack began, General Hooker immediately ordered General Carl Schurz to double quick his division to the aid of Geary, and at the same time sent word to General Howard, who was in immediate command of both divisions, that such orders had been given.

General Schurz started promptly with three brigades, marching at their head. Each brigade had orders to follow the one in front of it. Schurz, while en route, received orders to occupy a neighboring hill. The brigade ordered there got off the road and into a boggy thicket where it was obliged to halt; but it eventually succeeded in reaching the hill. The second brigade did not follow the first and halted without orders. The third brigade, not having orders to halt, marched past the second. Then an aide of General Howard began to give orders in the name of his general, and the two brigades were formed in line of battle with no enemy near. At about this time a few prisoners were brought in and an order was issued to escort them to Chattanooga; one entire brigade started off with them.

General Hooker came up and found everything being done except relieving General Geary's small command; he thereupon got mad and made remarks.

Finally one brigade reached Geary at 5:30 a. m. followed by another at 7:00 a. m.

Schurz asked for a court of inquiry and was held blameless. The court found that "It was right and

proper that he (Hooker) should give expression to his righteous indignation in his official report."

The whole operation is a fine illustration of night maneuvers, when undertaken after dark in an unknown country. It is believed that all the points are covered by this concrete example.

(See the report of the Court of Inquiry, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 206.)

Friendly troops fire into each other at night. Thompson Station, Tenn., Nov. 30, 1864.

Ext. No. 236.—Remaining in possession of the pike for half an hour we withdrew upon the approach of several bodies of infantry, which, coming up in opposite directions, by mistake got to shooting into each other and fired several volleys before finding out their error.

(Brig. Genl. L. S. Ross, C. S., R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 770.)

Formation for attack made just before dark and the attack made just after dark, over a short distance, succeeds. Columbus, Ga., Apr. 16, 1865.

Ext. No. 237.—I reached the head of Winslow's brigade at 4 o'clock and found the troops marching to the position assigned them by General Upton. Winslow did not arrive till after dark, but General Upton proposed to make the assault in the night, and coinciding with him in judgment, I ordered the attack. Three hundred men of the 3d Iowa were dismounted and moved forward and forced across the road under a heavy fire of artillery. At 8:00 p. m. the troops were ready. Generals Upton and Winslow directed the movement in person. The troops dashed forward; during the attack the rebel guns threw out perfect storm of canister and grape. General Upton swept away all opposition and took possession of the foot and railway bridges.

(Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 363.)

COMMENTS.

A very poor opinion is held of night operations. Their chief use will be limited to an attack over a short space of ground directly to the front after the troops have worked into position by daylight as illustrated in Ext. 237.

Another application will be where the troops can work into position under the cover of darkness and make the attack at daybreak (Ext. 275).

Correct use to be made of a cavalry corps.

Ext. No. 238.—During the period of my immediate control of the Corps, I tried to carry into effect, as far as possible, the view I had advanced before and during the opening of the Wilderness campaign, *i. e.*, "that our cavalry ought to fight the enemy's cavalry, and our infantry the enemy's infantry"; for there was great danger of breaking the spirit of the Corps if it was to be pitted against the enemy's compact masses of foot troops posted behind intrenchments, and unless there was some adequate tactical or strategical advantage to be gained, such a use of it would not be justified.

(Sheridan's Memoirs, p. 453, Vol. I.)

Battle tactics of a corps, three lines.

Brigade front one-half mile.

2d line have drawn sabers.

3d line in column of fours.

Ext. No. 239.—Our line of battle in corps front was always formed in one way. Each brigade detached one of its regiments to cover its whole front, often half a mile long, with a chain of skirmishers. Two more regiments followed behind each wing at about 200 yards apart, in line, with sabers drawn. The rest of the brigade formed a third line in column of fours.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 18.)

For the offensive a division must be arranged in many lines and for mutual support.

Ext. No. 240.—The only principle to establish for the employment of a body of cavalry as considerable as the division is the division of this mass of troops into many lines arranged for mutual support. The disposing lines in echelons should be considered as most favorable for safe offensive.

(Cooke's New Cavalry Tactics, p. 266.)

A straight line is a strong one.

A sharp salient is a weak part of a line.

Ext. No. 241.—The enemy was dismounted behind the crest of a hill. Their formation was defective in that instead of forming a straight, uniform line, they were formed in the shape of a "V," perhaps to meet my movement to flank them. When we charged over the hill, although the enemy had some advantage in firing upwards, it was more than counterbalanced by the fact that the men upon their flanks could not fire at us at all, while our

whole line could fire without difficulty upon any portion of their formation. After a short, but hot fight, they gave way.

(Morgan's Cavalry, by Duke.)

Marching a cavalry corps.

Ext. No. 242.—This movement was made at a walk, with three divisions on the same (plank) road—making a column of about 13 miles in length—marching by the flank of the enemy. I preferred this, however, to the combinations arising from separate roads, combinations rarely working as expected, and generally failing, unless subordinate commanders are prompt and fully understand the situation; besides, an engagement was imminent, and it was necessary that the force be well together.

One road better than several when engagement is imminent.

Rapidan to the James, May 1864.

(Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 789.)

Evils of a divided command.

Yazoo City, Miss., Mar. 5, 1864.

Ext. No. 243.—There was no lack of courage, but clearly an absence of concert and of sustained movement in this operation; and, worst of all, a divided command, for though General Richardson claimed to be the senior, he waived the chief command in deference to the fact that General Ross had a superior knowledge of the theatre of operations. It would appear, therefore, that each brigade was handled in the attack as a separate force, with little regard to the movements or purposes of the other—an incongruity in war utterly hostile to success.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 405.)

CHAPTER VII.

SECURITY AND INFORMATION.

ADVANCE GUARD.

Advance guard preceded by guides. Rousseau's Raid July 10–22, 1864.

Ext. No. 244.—Captain Ruger, who took and maintained his position at the head of the advance guard, in charge of the guides, and who conducted the column, and whose services were almost indispensable to me.

(Maj. Genl. L. H. Rousseau, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 909.)

How to enter a town.

Ext. No. 245.—On arriving at Woodstock the scouts dashed through the town followed by the advance guard.

(Maj. C. C. Brown, 22d N. Y. Cav., R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, p. 532.)

Morgan has a permanent advance guard.

Ext. No. 246.—Morgan appreciated the necessity of having an advance guard which could be thoroughly relied on, and disinclined to trust to details changed every day for that duty, had organized a body of twenty-five men selected with great care from the entire force under his command, to constitute a continuous advance guard for the expedition. So well did this body perform its duty that it became an honor eagerly sought and a reward for gallantry.

Selected men.

Selection a reward for bravery.

Order of march.

This guard habitually marched at a distance of 400 yards in front of the column. Three videttes were, as connecting files, placed between it and the column with distances of 100 yards. Their duties were to transmit information and orders between the column and the advance guard, and to regulate the gait of the former so that it would not press too closely on the latter. Six videttes were thrown out in front of the guard; 125 yards in front of the main body of the advance guard

was a group of four riding in pairs with a distance of 50 yards between each pair, and 125 yards in front of them was the other pair. It was found best to keep the same men always on the same duty. The advance videttes were required to carefully examine on all sides and report. When they came to cross roads one or both galloped down them as the case might require for 200 or 300 yards and remained till men were sent from the head of the column to relieve them, when they returned to their posts. As soon as they notified the commander of the advance guard that they were about to leave their posts, he took measures to supply their places. The two videttes next to them in the chain galloped to the front, and the other two moved up respectively fifty yards. Two men were sent from the guard to fill the places of the last.

Investigating side roads.

Places of such men taken by others sent forward.

(Morgan's Cavalry, by Duke.)

Ext. No. 247.—The size of an advance guard for a corps should be one brigade. In the point should be a sergeant and two men, connecting files should extend back for a mile 100 yards apart, then about 30 men with connecting files for another mile, total 70 men; then the leading brigade with a battery. In this way signals can be transmitted back two miles in two minutes. At each side road the leading man rides out one quarter mile or more and all the connecting files move up. When the last file goes past the lookout takes his place in rear. The employment of flankers and skirmishers, unless the enemy is known to be near, hardly pays for the consumption of horse flesh occasioned by constantly riding over broken ground. The flanking should be done by scouts who travel light.

Formation of advance guard.

(Volunteer Cavalry, The Lessons of a Decade, p. 90.)

COMMENTS.

Attention is invited to the system of advance guard as used by Morgan (Ext. 246).

Captain Whittaker also highly recommends this system (Ext. 247).

The system prescribed in the cavalry drill regulations will find little application. In a close country the flanking groups cannot be used, and in an open country a more open formation will be used.

SCREENING.

Screening the march of an infantry column.

Ext. No. 248.—During Sherman's march to the sea his cavalry was commanded by Kilpatrick.

The infantry marched in four strong columns. The cavalry repeatedly attacked barricades both mounted and dismounted. The enemy was not able to touch a train or annoy the flanks.

The cavalry crossed the entire front of the army three times, and marched 541 miles in 33 days.

(General Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 366; also, General Sherman, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 368.)

Screens the withdrawal of infantry from the battle line.

Ext. No. 249.—From the evening of June 12th till 2 a. m. of the 14th McIntosh's brigade covered the rear of the army, crossed the Chickahominy at Long's bridge and on the afternoon of the 14th reached Charles City court house. On the 15th and 16th both brigades were kept unceasingly active in making demonstrations from Philip's house and St. Mary's church upon the enemy between White Oak Swamp and Malvern Hill.

(Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 884. Covering of Grant's army while crossing the James.)

Screening the withdrawal of infantry.

Withdrawal from Winchester, Va., July 18, 1861.

Ext. No. 250.—So skillfully was this movement screened by the disposition which Stuart made of his cavalry that General Patterson does not appear to have been aware of it until the 21st of July, on which day Johnston's forces were actively engaged at Bull Run.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 34.)

Ext. No. 251.—To conceal my movements as far as possible from the enemy, Brig. Genl. Ashby, who has remained in front of Banks during the march against Milroy, was directed to continue to hold that position till the following day, when he was to join the main body, leaving, however, a covering force sufficient to prevent information of our movements crossing our lines.

Cavalry screens the movements of infantry.

Shenandoah, Valley, May 17, 1862.

(Lieut. Genl. T. J. Jackson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, Part I, p. 701.)

Ext. No. 252.—May 7, 1864, crossed Taylor's Ridge, through Nickajack Trace, forced back the rebel cavalry, covering and masking the movements of the 20th Corps.

Characteristic work of a cavalry corps before and during a battle.

Resaca, Ga., May 13, 1864.

May 8, moved to Villanow and opened communication with the Army of the Tennessee. Led the advance of the Army of the Tennessee on Resaca, drove the enemy's cavalry and infantry skirmish line back behind his works, masking the movements of our infantry until the force of the enemy was too great to contend with longer, when I was relieved by the infantry and the command took post on the right of our army then in line of battle before Resaca.

(Genl. J. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 857.)

Ext. No. 253.—You may depend upon it, we can never discover the whereabouts of the enemy, or divine his intentions, so long as he fills the country with a cloud of cavalry. We must break through that and find him.

Enemy's intentions cannot be discovered as long as he fills the country with a cloud of cavalry.

(Maj. Genl. J. Hooker, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 45.)

COMMENTS.

The subjects of security and information are distinctly different. Security embraces advance, rear and flank guards, outposts and screening; while information embraces all kinds of reconnaissance, the employment of a spy and scout system, and the strategic use of cavalry.

Security will usually find troops on the defensive (Ext. 250), while reconnaissance and the strategic use of

cavalry will usually involve them in combat. (Ext. 252.) See Strategic Use of Cavalry.

The defeat of the enemy's cavalry may prevent it from gaining information of the main body that is following. (Ext. 252.)

The offensive screen will naturally result from a cavalry fight just preceding a battle, and not far from the main body. (Ext. 252.) (299.)

The defensive screen is well illustrated in extract 253.

The formations used by cavalry on screening duty will necessarily be different from those used when seeking information. In screening cavalry may be disposed as indicated in extract 253. In this case, if the enemy approaches, the screen, in falling back, gathers strength as it retires; while the cavalry seeking the information will try and break the screen and locate the enemy's main body. In order to do this, officer's patrols may be sent out which will endeavor to locate the weak points in the screen. The aggressors can then concentrate their forces in an effort to break the screen (Ext. 253) (299) at the weak point, leaving the duty of screening their own forces to the divisional cavalry.

Screening means separation, while the penetration of an enemy's screen means concentration.

OUTPOSTS.

Pickets should always be supported.

Ext. No. 254.—On October 31, 1863, the 4th Ind. Cav. went into Fayetteville and put out unsupported pickets at the principal exits of the town. At about 8 p. m. twenty men appeared from the town and in answer to the challenge said, "Friends to relieve the pickets." They advanced and shot down the pickets and passed on and fired on the videttes.

(Maj. J. P. Leslie, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 236.)

Reserve found useful.

Ext. No. 255.—My pickets were attacked at 10 o'clock this morning by a small scouting party. I immediately pursued them with the reserve, capturing six, etc.

(Col. Wm. J. Palmer, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 440.)

Ext. No. 256.—The division marched to Auburn; I established my headquarters about a mile from Auburn, throwing out my picket a distance of ¾ mile beyond. Division pickets only ¾ miles out.

(M. H. Avery, 10th N. Y. Cav., R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 368.)

Ext. No. 257.—On Nov. 28, about noon, the pickets gave notice of the enemy's advance at various fords and in such force as to leave no doubt of his intention. Outpost gives notice of the enemy's advance at several points at the same time.

Duck River, Tenn., Nov. 28, '64.

(Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 550.)

Ext. No. 258.—In May, 1862, Morgan's squadron went into Lebanon, Tenn., and quartered three companies in buildings, and put horses in stables; the night was rainy and bleak and the pickets sought shelter in a neighboring house. The next mornig the Federal cavalry surprised the picket and then the town and captured nearly all of Morgan's command and all of his horses. Quartering of pickets in houses leads to disaster.

(Morgan's Cavalry, by Duke.)

Ext. No. 259.—Morgan's death occurred because of quartering in towns and also because of improper outpost duty. The picket was posted beyond a by-road through which the enemy entered. "The town, had the instructions been obeyed and the pickets correctly posted, would have been perfectly protected. The enemy gained admittance, unchallenged, through an unaccountable error in the picketing the roads on the left." Unguarded by-roads should not be left in rear of pickets.

(Morgan's Cavalry, by Duke.)

Ext. No. 260.—Orders issued by General Bragg May 29th, 1862, for retreat from Corinth, direct:

3d. At 10:00 p. m. retrograde movement to commence as already indicated.

4th. At 12:00 p. m. rear guard to follow the movement.

5th. Outposts will be called in at 9:00 p. m., their places supplied by cavalry. Outposts replaced by cavalry when infantry retreat.

Camp fires kept burning.

6th. Three rockets at 3:00 a. m. to be sent up by the cavalry; camp fires will be kept up.

The above orders were sent to Col. Joseph Wheeler, who entirely misled the Federal forces as to what was confronting them the next day.

(Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 7.)

Cavalry covers the retreat of an army.

Ext. No. 261.—During Bragg's retreat from Perryville, Wheeler's cavalry covered the retreat of his army. From Bryantville General Bragg wrote Wheeler: "Your services have been most valuable and brilliant. No cavalry force was ever more handsomely handled and no army better covered." While covering Bragg's army Wheeler's cavalry was engaged in thirty engagements and innumerable skirmishes.

(Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 25.)

COMMENTS.

Outposts should be well out and so arranged that the advance troops can be promptly supported as illustrated by the battle of Booneville. (Ext. 219.)

The evils resulting from the absence of supports are illustrated by extracts 254, 258; while the advantages of supports are likewise illustrated by extracts 255 and 257.

The ¾ mile from the main body of a division outpost (Ext. 256) is regarded as altogether too little. If the outpost is well out, care should be exercised that by-roads do not enter behind the outpost. (Ext. 259.)

Divisional cavalry remains on outpost till the infantry outposts are posted. It should then be brought in behind the infantry lines. If this is not done, the horses will all be rendered unserviceable by excessive work in a very short time. Only enough should be left out to do the patrolling in front of the infantry outpost. The divisional cavalry may be sent out again early in the morning to take up the duties of the infantry while the latter is withdrawn. (Ext. 260.)

FLANK GUARD.

Flank guard of infantry column. Expedition against Weldon R. R., Dec. 7-12, 1864.

Ext. No. 262.—The 22d N. Y. Mounted Rifles were detailed to guard the flank of the infantry and were retained on duty with the infantry till the expedition returned.

(Bvt. Brig. Gen. C. H. Smith, R. R., Vol. 42, Part I, p. 649.)

Cavalry acts as flank and rear guard to Jackson's corps. Manassas, Aug. 2, 1862.

Ext. No. 263.—During this movement his rear and flanks were covered by Stuart's cavalry, and he received correct information concerning the Federal forces, which were now rapidly concentrating upon him.

(Jackson's retirement from Manassas Aug. 2d, 1862. Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 103.)

Cavalry protects the flank of infantry during battle. Kernstown, Va., Mar. 23, 1862.

Ext. No. 264.—During the engagement, Colonel Ashby, with a portion of his command, including Chew's battery, which rendered valuable service, remained on our right, and not only protected our rear in the vicinity of the Valley turnpike, but also served to threaten the enemy's front and left. Colonel Ashby fully sustained his deservedly high reputation by the able manner in which he discharged the important trust confided to him.

(Maj. Genl. T. J. Jackson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, Part I, p. 383.)

Flank guard used to beat up bushwhackers.

Ext. No. 265.—In countries infected with guerrillas and bushwhackers, flankers will have to be used to scour the country and beat them up on the flank.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of a Decade, p. 91.)

COMMENTS.

The use of cavalry as a flank guard for other troops will most frequently ocur while on the march. (Exts. 262, 263, 273.)

In battle, cavalry will frequently be found on the flank of infantry either as a support or as a part of the firing line. (Exts. 264, 272.)

CONVOYING RAILROAD TRAINS.

Guarding the rear of Sherman's army against Wheeler's cavalry.

Ext. No. 266.—Trains are run to and from the front in sections under convoy. One follows another as close as may be, so as to be able to assist each other in case of attack. Each train or section has a strong guard; when forces are combined quite an army can be organized on the roadside for the defense of the cars. At any rate, no mere guerrilla force can capture a train. All the bridges are stockaded and the towns fortified, so that a run of a few miles brings a train into a place of comparative safety.

(Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 265.)

Position of the commander during an advance.

Ext. No. 267.—Again, at the time and place of danger Stuart was always present. He habitually rode with his advance guard and was ever ready to seize and improve an opportunity.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 164.)

Active cavalry plays the mischief with the communications

Ext. No. 268.—February 2, 1863,

The Honorable E. M. Stanton. * * *

One rebel cavalryman takes on an average three of our infantry to watch our communications, while our progress is made slow and cautious, and we command the forage of the country only by sending large train guards. * * *

(Sig.) W. S. Rosecrans, Maj. Gen.

(Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 78.)

COMMENTS.

The annoyance caused by cavalry to a line of communications is illustrated in extract 268, where Rosecrans states that one cavalryman takes three infantrymen to watch his line of communications. Extract 266 also verifies this statement. If the total number of men who were watching Sherman's line of communications while at Atlanta were known it would probable be more than three infantrymen to each cavalryman.

WEAKNESS OF A FLANK.

Weakness of a flank.
Spotsylvania Court House, May 8, 1864.

Ext. No. 269.—At the court house Wickham's brigade was struck in the flank by a gallant charge and scattered in all directions.

(Brig. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 878.)

Use of cavalry to envelop both flanks at the same time.
Cedar Creek, Va., Oct. 19, 1864.

Ext. No. 270.—The attack on the enemy was made about 3:00 p. m. by a left half wheel of the whole line, with a division of cavalry turning each flank of the enemy, the whole line advancing.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 33. Battle of Winchester or Cedar Creek.)

Weakness of flank causes a panic.
Fisher's Hill, Va., Sept. 22, 1864.

Ext. No. 271.—In the affair at Fisher's Hill the cavalry gave way, but it was flanked. This could have been remedied if the troops had remained steady, but a panic seized them at the idea of being flanked, and without being defeated, they broke, many of them fleeing shamefully.

(Lieut. Genl. Jubal A. Early, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 558.)

At Gettysburg the Federal cavalry protect the right flank.
Gettysburg, July 1-3, 1863.

Ext. No. 272.—As soon as General Gregg was aware of Stuart's presence he wisely assumed the aggressive, and forced upon Stuart a battle in which he had nothing to gain but the glory of fighting; while Gregg himself had performed the paramount duty of protecting the right flank of the Federal army.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 341, Gettysburg campaign.)

Campaign of the Carolinas, cavalry protects the left flank of Sherman's army.

Ext. No. 273.—During the campaigns of the Carolinas, 1865, Sherman used his cavalry to protect his left flank and trains against the Confederate cavalry under Wheeler and Hampton.

(R. R., Vol. 57, Part I.)

Stuart threatens the Federal right at Gettysburg.
Gettysburg, Pa., July 3, 1863.

Ext. No. 274.—This change having been made, a strong line of skirmishers displayed by the enemy was evidence that the enemy's cavalry had gained our right, and were about to attack, with a view of gaining the rear of our line of battle. The importance of successfully

resisting an attack at this point, which, if succeeded in by the enemy, would have been productive of the most serious consequences, determined me to retain the brigade of the Third Division until the enemy were driven back.

(Brig. Genl. D. McM. Gregg, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 956.)

COMMENTS.

The great advantages in having cavalry on the flanks is here further illustrated. Its great mobility enables it to acomplish the results reported in extracts 270 and 271; while its presence on the flanks will check a turning movement of the hostile cavalry. (Exts. 272, 274.)

SURPRISE.

Surprise.

Ext. No. 275.—The enemy during the night, under Wade Hampton, taking advantage of the darkness of the night and the inclemency of the weather, it being quite rainy, moved heavy columns of cavalry through the open pine woods to the vicinity of our camp, preparatory to attacking the camp at daylight on the following morning.

Improper outposts.

At early dawn we were awakened from our slumbers by the deadly missile and fiendish shouts of the rebel cavalry charging into our camp in three different places, rear and both flanks.

Individual training.

Monroe's Cross Roads, S. C., Mar. 10, 1865.

It was individual bravery that saved the day on this occasion; men fighting, not in organized bodies, but behind trees, stumps, and anything that could afford protection. Many of the men fought almost in a state of nudity, not having had time to dress themselves before the rebels were upon them.

(Maj. C. T. Cheek, 5th Ky. Cav., R. R., Vol. 47, Part I, p. 899.)

Avoid enclosures.

Near Ft. Brown, Texas, Apr. 24, '46.

Ext. No. 276.—Captain Thornton sent his men inside a corral to feed their horses and soon followed himself. He found his command suddenly surrounded and the entire command was killed or captured.

(History of U. S. Cavalry, Brackett, p. 55.)

COMMENTS.

It is an old military maxim that a surprise is inexcusable.

INFORMATION.

Ext. No. 277.—The cavalry that crossed at Seneca Ford have passed on up through Westminster and Hanover some 6,000 to 8,000 strong. The people are all so frightened that accurate information is not to be obtained.

Information received from country people is generally not to be relied on.

Gettysburg Campaign, July, 1863.

(Maj. Genl. G. G. Meade, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 69.)

Ext. No. 278.—

A model report from a cavalry commander.

Gettysburg Campaign, June, 1863.

Gettysburg, June 30—10:40 p. m.

I have the honor to state the following facts: A. P. Hill's corps, composed of Anderson, Heth and Pender, is massed back of Cashtown, 9 miles from this pace. His pickets, composed of infantry and artillery, are in sight of mine. There is a road from Cashtown running through Mummasburg and Hunterstown on to York pike at Oxford, which is terribly infested with roving cavalry detachments. Rumor says Ewell is coming over the mountains from Carlisle. One of his escort was captured today near Heidlersburg. He says Rodes, commanding a division of Ewell's, has already crossed the mountains from Carlisle. When will the reserve be relieved, and where are my wagons? I have no need of them, as I can find no forage. I have kept General Reynolds informed of all that has transpired. The inclosed is in reply to my last dispatch.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. BUFORD,

Brigadier-General of Volunteers.

To General Alfred Pleasonton.

(R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 924.)

Ext. No. 278A.—I entered this place at 11 a. m. today. Found everybody in a terrible state of excitement on account of the enemy's advance upon this place. He had approached within half a mile of the town when

Truthful but inexperienced men exaggerate the force of the enemy when under stress of excitement.

Gettysburg, Pa., June 30, 1863.

the head of my column entered. His force was terribly exaggerated by reasonable and truthful but inexperienced men. On pushing him back toward Cashtown, I learned from reliable men that Anderson's division was marching from Chambersburg, by Mummasburg, Abbottstown, on toward York.

(Genl. Jno. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 923.)

Keeping touch.

Tuscumbia, Ala., Oct. 28, 1863.

Ext. No. 279.—About 1:30 p. m. today I discovered the enemy retiring. My command is following closely.

(Maj. Genl. S. D. Lee, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 29.)

Absence of Stuart's cavalry makes it impossible for General Lee to obtain information of the Federal army and results in a slow march of concentration.

Gettysburg Campaign, June, 1863.

Ext. No. 280.—No report had been received that the Federal Army had crossed the Potomac, and the absence of the cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information. * * * By the route he pursued, the Federal Army was interposed between his command and our main body, preventing any communication with him until his arrival at Carlisle. The march toward Gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it would have been had the movements of the Federal Army been known.

(General R. E. Lee, R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 307.)

SPIES.

Execution of a spy.

Ext. No. 281.—A spy from the enemy, who came into my camp soon after my arrival, was killed by my order.

(Brig. Genl. Wm. W. Averell, R. R., Vol. 37, Part I, p. 147.)

Use of false spies.

Ext. No. 282.—Sheridan suspected two of his spies of playing double. He had them shadowed and found his suspicions to be correct. Instead of letting them know that he was aware of their treachery he utilized their services to give false information to the enemy.

(See Sheridan's Memoirs, Vol. 11, p. 109.)

SCOUTS.

Ext. No. 283.—Scouts should go in pairs, well mounted, leave saber and packs with baggage train, and live off the country. A well organized scout organization should be kept at headquarters. They should not dress in the enemy's uniform. (p. 85.) Horses should be shod with rubber pad shoes. Scout organization necessary.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of a Decade, p. 86.)

Ext. No. 284.—

To General Garfield.

General Crittenden wishes to know if you intend to establish a line of couriers between department headquarters and his own at Shellmound. * * * Couriers or relay posts.

(Sig.) J. J. McCook, Aide de Camp.

(R. R., Vol. 30, Part III, p. 348.)

Ext. No. 285.—I at once prepared to establish a line of couriers to Loudon and Kingston, and the 5th Ohio Cavalry was assigned to that duty. Line of couriers or relay posts.

(General Eli Long, Comg. 2d Brig., R. R., Vol. 31, Part II, p. 563.)

COMMENTS.

This shows that the use of relay posts is not entirely a German idea, but was used in our Civil War.

Ext. No. 286.—At this moment (4:00 p. m.) I received information from Colonel Garrard that the enemy was crossing infantry at Fain's Island Ford and that an officer of his command had watched them wading the stream for more than an hour, estimating the force at three brigades. Strength of enemy estimated by time taken to pass a given point. Fain's Island Ford, Tenn., Jan. 28, 1864.

(Brig. Genl. S. D. Sturgis, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 137.)

Ext. No. 287.—

Headquarters Army of the Potomac.

June 28, 1863—4:45 p. m.

Maj. Genl. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief.

The following statement has been furnished me. It is confirmed by information gathered from various other sources regarded as reliable.

I propose to move this army tomorrow in the direction of York.

GEO. G. MEADE, Major General.

Illustrates the amount of valuable information that can be obtained by citizens if they go about it in an intelligent and systematic manner.

Gettysburg Campaign, June, 1863.

Thomas McCammon, blacksmith, a good man, from Hagerstown, left there on horseback at 11 a. m. today. Rebel cavalry came first a week ago last Monday. General Jenkins having 1,200 mounted infantry, said to be picked from Jackson's men, and 300 or 400 cavalry of his own. The cavalry went back and forth, out of Pennsylvania, driving horses and cattle, and the first infantry came yesterday a week ago—General Ewell's men. He came personally last Saturday, and was at the Catholic church Sunday, with General Rodes and two other generals. On Monday he left in the direction of Greencastle, in the afternoon, Rodes having left the same morning. Rebel troops have passed every day, more or less, since; some days three or four regiments or a brigade, and some days, yesterday, for instance, all of Longstreet's command passed through excepting two brigades. Saw Longstreet yesterday. He and Lee had their headquarters at Mr. Grove's, just beyond the town limits, toward Greencastle, last night, and left there this a. m. at 8 o'clock. Think A. P. Hill went through last Tuesday. Heard from J. D. Roman, prominent lawyer and leading Confederate sympathizer, who was talking in the clerk's office last night; said that their officers reported their whole army, 100,000 strong, now in Maryland or Pennsylvania, excepting the cavalry. Mr. Logan, register of wills, and Mr. Protzman, very fine men in Hagerstown, have taken pains to count the rebels, and could not make them over 80,000. They counted the artillery; made it 275 guns. Some of the regiments have only 175 men—two that I saw, 150. Largest regiment that I saw was a Maryland regiment, and that was about 700. Don't think their regiments would range 400. Great amount of transportation; great many wagons captured at Winchester. Horses in good condition. Ewell rides in a wagon. 2,000 comprise the mounted infantry and

cavalry. Saw Wilcox's brigade wagons yesterday or day before. Saw Kershaw's wagons in town yesterday. Kershaw's brigade is in McLaw's division, Longstreet's corps. Know Hood and Armistead. Have passed through Hood's division and Armistead's brigade. Pickett's division is in Longstreet's corps. The Union men in Hagerstown would count them, and meet tonight. Officers and men in good condition; say they are going to Philadelphia. Lots of Confederate money; carry it in flour barrels, and give $5 for cleaning a horse; $5 for two shoes on a horse, rather than 50 cents United States money.

(R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 65.)

March of Stuart's column observed for three and one-half hours. Chambersburg Raid, Oct. 1862.

Ext. No. 288.—Stuart's march was not, however, unobserved. Captain Logan, 12th Ill. Cav., who had charge of the pickets in the vicinity, was apprised by a citizen as early as half past 5 o'clock that the enemy was crossing at McCoy's Ferry, and he immediately moved out his reserve to support of his interior pickets, who had been attacked but not surprised. He remained in observation of Stuart's column until 9 o'clock a. m.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 139.)

Important information gained by climbing a tree.

Ext. No. 289.—Climbing a tree, about 7 p. m., Forrest sought to satisfy himself of the situation, and discovered the enemy in a disordered retreat into Chattanooga, which lay in full view beneath him, a scene of wild chaos and tumult. This state of affairs was immediately communicated, in written dispatches, both to Generals Bragg and Polk.

Report made to two different superiors at the same time. Missionary Ridge, Sept. 21, 1863.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 351.)

Information of enemy's march communicated by the blowing of horns.

Ext. No. 290.—Marching by roads unfrequently traversed and bridle paths, he would have kept his motions perfectly secret but for a system of communicating intelligence adopted about this time by the Home Guards of southern Kentucky. Conch shells and horns were blown along his route by these fellows, the sound of

which, transmitted a long distance, traveled faster than his column.

(Morgan's Cavalry, by Duke.)

Important information should not be accepted without being verified.

Fisher's Hill, Va., Sept. 22, 1864.

Ext. No. 291.—I learned that it was his intention to withdraw from the enemy's front, and this, too, on the indefinite report of a signal officer that a "brigade or division" of Confederates was turning his right flank, and that he had not seriously attempted to verify the information.

(Sheridan's Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 43.)

Boldness of scouting parties indicate the presence of a large body.

Movement to the James, June, 1864.

Ext. No. 292.—During the evening and night of the 10th, the boldness of the enemy's scouting parties, with which we had been coming in collision more or less every day, perceptibly increased, thus indicating the presence of a large force, and thus evidencing that his shorter line of march had enabled him to bring to my front a strong body of cavalry.

(Sheridan's Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 419.)

Disposition of captured dispatches.

On April 4, 1865, Sheridan captured a dispatch signed by Lee's Commissary General, which he forwarded to its destination. As a result of this dispatch several trains of rations were sent as ordered and captured by Sheridan, who was on the lookout for them. The following is the dispatch with Sheridan's comments:

Ration return a basis for an estimate of the enemy's strength

Pursuit after battle of Five Forks, Apr. 1, '65.

Ext. No. 293.—"The Army is at Amelia Court House, short of provisions. Send 300,000 rations quickly to Burkville Junction."

There was thus revealed not only the important fact that Lee was concentrating at Amelia Court House, but also a trustworthy basis for estimating his troops.

(Sheridan's Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 175.)

Important dispatches should be sent in duplicate.

After battle of Waynesboro, Va., Mar. 2, 1865.

Ext. No. 294.—It was of the utmost importance that General Grant should receive these dispatches without chance of failure, in order that I might depend absolutely on securing supplies at the White House; therefore I sent the message in duplicate, one copy overland direct to City Point by two scouts, and the other down the James River in a small boat.

(Sheridan's Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 120.)

COMMENTS.

The information obtained from independent cavalry by strategic reconnaissance is much more accurate and valuable than that obtained from civilians. The former will be trained military observers (Ext. 278), while the latter, under stress of excitement, will either not know or terribly exaggerate. (Exts. 277, 278A.) Occasionally intelligent citizens will be found who, in a systematic way, go about the matter of observing an enemy passing through a town and succeed in getting a report to the general of their own forces. (Ext. 287.) This extract is a fine illustration as to what may be accomplished by intelligent civilians. It will be noted, however, that General Meade was careful to verify it from other sources.

The information obtained from spies will be more or less valuable, depending upon the reliability of the spy, his intelligence and opportunity for observation. Even a spy that plays double may be utilized. (Ext. 282.)

A well organized scout system should be maintained in every army. (Ext. 283.) All officers should be trained in the matter of estimating the number of troops seen. (Exts. 286, 288.) Autumn maneuvers furnish an excellent opportunity to make application of this valuable accomplishment. A number of officers should be detailed daily to observe and report on the number of troops seen.

It is desirable to send important duplicate reports to different superiors. Each report should mention the fact that a duplicate one has been sent to the other superior. (Exts. 289, 294.)

A novel method of communicating information is illustrated in extract 290.

A commander who hastily acts on information without seeking to verify it will usually make a mistake. (Ext. 291.)

It will always be necessary to have at headquarters a bureau of information, where different reports can be compared and conclusions drawn from the multitude of reports received. (Exts. 287, 292, 293.)

The absence of information is as much of a handicap to a commander as the possession of it is an advantage. (Ext. 280.) Had Stuart's cavalry been present at Gettysburg to furnish Lee with information, the field would have been in Lee's possession instead of in Meade's. (Ext. 280.) Lee then could have fought a defensive battle, which he was never known to lose.

When contact is gained the cavalry should not again lose it. (Ext. 279.)

STRATEGIC USE OF CAVALRY.

Stuart keeps Pleasanton from getting information, for four days, of movement of Lee's army.

Strategic use and screening.

Gettysburg Campaign, June, 1863.

Ext. No. 295.—My command has been fighting almost constantly for four days. * * * General Buford sent a party to the top of the Blue Ridge, that saw a rebel camp about two miles long on the Shenandoah, just below Ashby's Gap. The atmosphere was so hazy that they could not make out anything more beyond.

(General A. Pleasonton, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 913.)

Strategic use.

Savannah Campaign, 1864.

Ext. No. 296.—During the entire movement (Sherman's march to the sea) I kept my superiors fully informed of the strength and all the movements of the enemy.

(General J. Wheeler, C. S., R. R., Vol. 44, p. 411.)

How to defend a river line. An example of good strategy.

Fleetwood, Va., June 9, 1863.

Ext. No. 297.—Regarding his dispositions at Beverley Ford, Brandy Station, or Fleetwood, June 9th, 1863, General Stuart says: "On a field geographically so extensive, and much of it wooded, presenting to the enemy so many avenues of approach, I deemed it injudicious to separate my command into detachments to guard all the approaches, as in such case the enemy could concentrate upon any one and, overwhelming it, take the others in detail. * * * I conceived it to be my policy to keep my command concentrated, except sufficient to watch and delay the enemy as to his real move, and then strike him with my whole force."

(General J. E. B. Stuart, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 681.)

Strategic objective. Bristoe, Va., Campaign, Oct., 1863.

Ext. No. 298.—About midnight I received a communication asking that I obtain early information of the enemy's movements in the direction of Sperryville. Agreeably to my orders, Colonel Gregg, commanding 2d Brigade, sent one regiment to obtain the required information. I directed the 2d Brigade to move to the east side of the Rappahannock, leaving one regiment on the west side to be in a position to support the 1st Maine should it be compelled to return.

(D. McM. Gregg, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 356.)

A fine illustration of strategic use of cavalry. James City, Va., Oct. 10, 1863.

Ext. No. 299.—Believing this attack of the enemy, who had shown only cavalry and artillery, was but a cover of the movement of other troops, I ordered General Davis to make an attack from his right and discover, if possible, the movements of the enemy. The attack was made and the enemy's cavalry was driven back three miles and a heavy column of infantry and a large wagon train discovered to be moving in the direction of Woodville.

(Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 381.)

Successful strategic use. Florence Ala., Nov. 9, 1864.

Ext. No. 300.—By great activity, watchfulness and good judgment on the part of General Hatch, every movement of the enemy and indication of his intention were promptly reported to Generals Stanley, Schofield and Thomas.

(Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 556.)

Reconnaissance in force discloses the enemy's infantry. Shoal Creek, Ala., Nov. 19, 1864.

Ext. No. 301.—Colonel Coon's brigade made a forced reconnaissance, met the enemy's cavalry in force, and after a severe engagement, discovering the march of the rebel infantry, was compelled to join the main force on the east side of the creek.

(Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 557.)

Cavalry fights infantry.

Ext. No. 302.—The question then arose in my mind whether I should pursue my course on to Lynchburg, leaving General Early in my rear, or to go out and fight him with my cavalry against his infantry and what cav-

Good strategy not to leave large force in rear without a fight.

Expedition to Petersburg, Va., Mar., 1865.

alry he could collect, defeat him, and open a way through Rock Fish Gap, and have everything in my own hands for the accomplishment of that portion of my instructions which directed the destruction of the Central Railroad and the James River Canal.

I decided upon the latter course.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, p. 476.)

Stuart's Chickahominy raid a strategic success.

Ext. No. 303.—June 11, 1862, General J. E. B. Stuart was ordered to take only such men and horses as could stand the expedition and make a "scout movement" to the rear of McClellan's army with a view of gaining intelligence of his operations, communications, etc., and to return as soon as the object of the expedition was accomplished. This was known as the Chickahominy Raid. The results following were increased morale of the Confederate cavalry; loss in confidence in McClellan; accurate information as to the location of the Federal army, and incidentally the capture of 165 prisoners, 260 horses, destruction of two schooners and seventy-five wagons.

Successful raid increases confidence in commander, and morale of his command.

Has a depressing effect on the enemy.

Chickahominy Raid, June 12-15, 1862.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 52.)

Strategic use of Confederate cavalry.

Chancellorsville Campaign, April, May, 1863.

Ext. No. 304.—General Lee reports: "The cavalry of the army, at the time of these operations, was much reduced. To its vigilance and energy we were indebted for timely information of the enemy's movements before the battle, and for impeding his march to Chancellorsville."

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 228.)

Same as above.

Ext. No. 305.—Hidden in the woods, Stuart remained in observation of the enemy for a long time. Satisfied that he was witnessing the movement of a large part of Meade's army, Stuart sent Major Venable, of his staff, to convey this information to General Lee.

Staff officer sent to make report.

Gettysburg Campaign, June, 1863.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 392.)

Ext. No. 306.—Cavalry that sticks close to the Army loses half its strength. It must be employed on distant expeditions to cut the enemy's lines, to be worth its cost in strategic combinations. For its full strategical effect cavalry is obliged to live on the country after the first three days. Theoretical strategic use.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 63.)

COMMENTS.

Cavalry operating strategically will be on the offensive and a considerable distance from its main body, while the opposing cavalry will be defensively screening its own forces. Extract 295 well illustrates this matter, in which it appears that Pleasonton's cavalry fought Stuart's for four days and then only succeeded in slipping a small strategic patrol through, which observed and reported the Confederate camp.

Cavalry operating strategically will endeavor to break through the enemy's screen and observe the numbers and dispositions of the enemy and what they are doing.

Cavalry can be screening defensively, and, while using good strategy, will not be strategically used. (Ext. 297.) Cavalry performing a defensive role may take the offensive and thus be used strategically. (Ext. 299.) A forced reconnaissance amounts to a strategic use. (Ext. 301.)

The strategic use will require great activity, watchfulness and good judgment on the part of the commander. (Exts. 296, 300.)

Tactical use may also involve the use of strategy. (Ext. 302.) Here Sheridan concluded to fight the enemy's infantry rather than leave it in his rear.

A successful raid may be merged with strategic use depending upon the object of the raid. (Ext. 303.) In the reference quoted, other important results followed which were unforeseen; such as the effect on the enemy, increased morale of the raiders, etc.

While cavalry strategically used may not get all the

information desired, it may assist the commander's plans so as to produce great tactical results. (Ext. 304.)

When cavalry, on a strategic mission, obtains valuable information, a staff officer should be sent with it to the commanding general. The messenger will then be able to answer questions and make explanations, thus elucidating matters which would otherwise remain obscure to the commanding general. (Ext. 205.)

For its full strategic effect, cavalry will be employed on distant expeditions and be obliged to live on the country. (Ext. 306.) When war is declared it should therefore be well organized at its war strength and ready to move on very short notice. Skeleton organization or war inflation will deprive cavalry of its mobility and therefore its strategical importance at a time when it is most needed.

CHAPTER VIII.

MISCELLANEOUS USE OF CAVALRY.

BRIDGES—CONSTRUCTION OF.

Improvised bridge made from telegraph poles and the floor of neighboring mills.

Bridge 60 feet long made in 60 minutes.

Expedition to Memphis, Aug., 1864.

Ext. No. 307.—General Forrest learned that it would be necessary to bridge Hickahala Creek, a deep stream running 60 feet broad, with full banks. He spread detachments about to collect lumber from the cotton-gin floors, which they carried four miles on their shoulders. At the creek they found a narrow flatboat about 20 feet long. Out of grapevines a strong twisted cable was made and fastened to a tree on each side of the river. They cut down dry cedar telegraph poles and fastened them together with grapevines for floating piers. These were attached to the grapevine cable with grapevines and the flatboat was attached likewise in the center as a pontoon. Telegraph poles were used for balks and on these the flooring from the gin mills was placed. The bridge was completed in sixty minutes. The command began crossing at once in column of twos, the men leading their horses, and the artillery, unlimbered, was taken over by hand. Six miles beyond, Cold Water River, twice as wide, was crossed in the same way. The bridge over the latter stream was constructed in less than three hours.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 535.)

Mounted troopers bring in boards from surrounding country and make railway bridge passable for cavalry.

Rapidan to the James, Apr.-Aug. 1864.

Ext. No. 308.—It was found on examination that the railroad bridge at the White House had been but partially burned, and could be repaired, and General Merritt was at once put on this duty. By sending mounted parties through the surrounding country, each man bringing back a board, it was made passable in one day.

(Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 792.)

Improvised bridge made of artillery caissons and fence rails.

Ext. No. 309.—Today we built a novel bridge over one of the creeks. Our artillery had mired down and it was impossible for the column to ford. General Upton ordered every trooper to carry a fence rail on his shoulder, and when we came to the crossing we found a couple of caissons in midstream, for a foundation, and on them rested two forked pine trees for piers, across which ran saplings for stringers; every man threw his fence rail for a flooring, and, swaying and swinging, the command crossed the rude bridge.

(The Last Campaign, by E. N. Gilpin, published in the Cavalry Journal.)

Bridge built of flat boats.

Ext. No. 310.—We crossed Mud River that night on a bridge constructed of three flat bottom boats laid endwise, tightly bound together and propped, where the water was deep, by beams passing under the bottom of each one and resting on the end of the next; each receiving this sort of support, they mutually braced each other. Planks were placed across the intervals between the boats and the horses, wagons and artillery were crossed without trouble. The bridge was built in about two hours.

(Morgan's Cavalry, by Duke.)

Cavalry are their own pioneers.

Campaign in Ala., Oct. 1864.

Ext. No. 311.—I immediately made a heavy detail from the 2d Iowa Cavalry to finish a bridge across the Hatchie, which the 7th Ill. Cav. had been sent in advance to construct.

(Col. D. E. Coon, 2d Ia. Cav., R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 580.)

At night cavalry cross river in face of fire and hold opposite side while pontoneers construct a bridge.

Rapidan to the James, June 12, 1864.

Ext. 312.—Col. Chapman reached the Chickahominy just after dark, expecting to find the bridges ready for him to cross. The officer in charge of the pontoons seemed somewhat timid. General Warren, commanding the 5th Corps, would give him no assistance. Colonel Chapman was therefore compelled to take the matter in hand. The stream at this place divided into two branches,

leaving a small island in the center, and was unfordable. Colonel Chapman dismounted the 22d N. Y. and 3d Ind. The former pushed along the stream to a point about 50 yards above the site of the old bridge, and by means of fallen trees and overhanging limbs succeeded in getting across. The 3d Ind., launching a pontoon, pushed across in the face of a sharp fire from the enemy, posted on the south bank of the stream in a line of rifle pits hastily formed, and dashed at the rebels, driving them in confusion from the works. Nothing could have been more steady and dashing than the conduct of these two regiments. The night was very dark, the difficulties to be overcome by no means trifling, and the enemy's strength entirely uncertain. The whole affair did not require over half an hour; the bridge was soon constructed, and by midnight the entire brigade had crossed.

(Brig. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 883.)

Bridge built from scows and plank. Dunkirk, Va., May 23, 1864.

Ext. No. 313.—I was ordered to bridge the river if possible. This I effected by means of scows or ferry-boats, lashed together, anchored, and covered with lumber procured by tearing down the store-houses of the ferry. The bridge was amply sufficient to cross the corps.

(Col. T. C. Devin, 6th N. Y. Cav., R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 836.)

Cavalry force and hold crossing while engineers construct pontoon. Rapidan to the James, Apr., 1864.

Ext. No. 314.—The 17th Cavalry was detached to make a demonstration as if we intended to cross at Jones' Ferry. Two canvas pontoon boats were put up beyond the range of the enemy's guns, and then taken to the river banks by the engineers, preceded by a regiment of Custer's brigade, who drove the enemy from the opposite bank, while the boats were put in the river and two squadrons dismounted ferried over at once and held the opposite bank till the pontoon bridge was laid.

(Brig. Genl. A. T. A. Torbert, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 804.)

Cavalry make bridge 870 feet long over Alabama River, without assistance of engineers

Ext. No. 315.—Selma was taken April 2d, 1865. April 3d pontoons were ordered to be constructed in the city shops. April 6th canvas pontoon train under Major Hubbard arrived. Major Hubbard was ordered to begin the construction of a bridge over the Alabama River.

Bridge completed in three days.

April 8th the bridge was completed. It consisted of 30 canvas pontoons, 16 wooden pontoons made in the city shops, and 3 barges. General Wilson states that the bridge was 870 feet long. Major Hubbard states that the bridge was 700 feet long. Forty-nine boats would bridge 50 bays, which at 17½ feet each would make a bridge 875 feet long. By reason of strong current the bridge was broken twice while being crossed. It was repaired and on April 10th the three cavalry divisions, consisting of 17,000 men, and all equippage had crossed and the bridge was dismantled. The bridge was constructed by cavalry.

17,000 cavalry cross with all equipage in less than three days while the bridge breaks twice and the crossing is delayed while it is being repaired.

Wilson's Raid, Apr. 1865.

(Major Hubbard, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 412, and Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, p. 362.)

Rate of crossing pontoon 27 men per minute or two miles per hour.

Wilson's Raid, Apr., 1865.

Ext. No. 316.—April 8th, at 4:10 p. m., I commenced crossing the Alabama River on the pontoon bridge (870 feet long) which had that moment been completed, and had the entire division across by 7:25 p. m., notwithstanding the fact that the crossing had to be stopped three times in consequence of damage done to the bridge by driftwood. The division consisted of about 5,500 men. The rate of crossing was 27 or 28 men per minute, or about two miles per hour.

(Col. R. H. G. Minty, Com'd. Div., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 442.)

COMMENTS.

In these extracts we see how resourceful cavalry must be. We find them bridging wide streams and otherwise doing their own pioneer work. The pioneer work naturally belongs to cavalry. To be sure, engineers can do it, but they are seldom in the right place at the right time for cavalry. If this work is going to fall to the cavalry, as it did, then cavalry should have men regu-

larly trained and organized to do it. In the volunteer cavalry will be found men who can be collected into an improvised pioneer detachment, as was Wilson's in 1865. (Ext. 315.) The Engineer Corps has a mounted detachment for the purpose of accompanying cavalry troops. They are numerically so small, and in time of war their services would be in such demand for other duties, that the pioneer work would again, just as it did during the War of the Rebellion, fall to the cavalry service. The pioneer organization, then, ought to be in the cavalry and not in the engineers.

USE OF CAVALRY TO STOP ROUTED INFANTRY.

Cavalry used to stop routed infantry.
Cupp's Ford, (Cedar Creek) Oct. 19, 1864.

Ext. No. 317.—The 5th U. S. Cavalry, attached to division headquarters, was immediately deployed across the fields, and, together with the officers and orderlies of the division staff, did much to prevent the infantry going to the rear, and forced everyone to stop and form line.

(Brig. Genl. W. Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 449.)

Routed troops checked by use of the saber and rifle fire.
Cedar Creek, Va. Oct. 19, 1864.

Ext. No. 318.—I found large numbers of the infantry retiring by regiments, companies, squads and stragglers. With some difficulty I checked the rout at this point, it being necessary in several instances to fire on the crowds retiring and to use the saber frequently.

(Brig. Genl. Thos. C. Devin, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 478.)

Cavalry used as horse marines.
Indian Bayon, Miss., June 8, 1864.

Ext. No. 319.—On the 8th instant a Federal cavalry force, from 300 to 400 strong, landed at Greenville, Miss. This force consisted of four companies of "land cavalry" sent up from Vicksburg, the rest were cavalry of the marine boats, and the raid was under General Ellet of the Marines.

(Captain Perry Evans, 9th Tex. Cav., R. R., Vol. 39, Part I, p. 232.)

Cavalry stop stragglers and send them to that part of the line that needs strengthening.

Ext. No. 320.—The nature of the battle was such that cavalry could not be used in front; I therefore formed ours into line in rear to stop stragglers—of

Shiloh, Tenn., Apr. 6, 1862.

whom there were many. When there would be enough of them to make a show, and after they had recovered from their fright, they would be sent to reinforce some part of the line which needed support, without regard to their companies, regiments or brigades.

(Memoirs of General U. S. Grant, Vol. I, p. 344.)

SWIMMING STREAMS.

Regiment swims Tennesee River. Meridian Expedition, Jan., 1864.

Ext. No. 321.—The larger portion of my regiment swam their horses, and lost several horses, some arms, but no men.

(Col. J. P. C. Shanks, 7th Ind. Cav., across the Tennessee River, Jan. 25, 1864, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 272.)

Naked men cross river with only guns and ammunition. June 9, 1864.

Ext. No. 322.—Brownlow performed one of his characteristic feats today. I ordered a detachment to cross at Cochran's Ford. It was deep, and he took them over naked; nothing but guns, cartridge boxes and hats. They drove the enemy out of their rifle pits, captured a non-commissioned officer and three men, and the two boats on the other side. They would have got more, but the rebels had the advantage in running through the bushes with clothes on. It was certainly one of the funniest sights of the war, and a very successful raid for naked men to make.

(Brig. Genl. E. M. McCook, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 761.)

Cavalry cross river at night with arms and equipment in canoes, horses swimming. Chattahoochie River, July 31, '64.

Ext. No. 323.—The river being very deep and muddy, they had to swim the horses. It being very dark, it could only be done by the aid of boats or canoes; three of the latter were found on the opposite shore. The canoes were laden with arms and equipments and three men placed in each, who guided the horses across. Daylight the next morning found them (283 men) comparatively safe upon the north bank of the river.

(Lieut. Col. H. P. Lampson, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 784.)

Ext. No. 324.—Two of Capehart's (regiments) swam the river above the bridge, charged Rosser and routed him.

Two regiments swim river.
Shenandoah River, Mar. 1, 1865.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, p. 475.)

Ext. No. 325.—The dismounted men and prisoners forded the stream in groups of fifty or sixty, holding each other by the arm. It was impossible for a single footman to ford, the water being breast high, with a rapid current.

Dismounted men cross swift stream in groups by locking arms
Shenandoah River, Mar. 7, 1865

(Col. J. L. Thompson, N. H. Cav., R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, p. 529.)

Ext. No. 326.—We reached Johnson's Ferry at sundown. I ordered the 8th Iowa to begin crossing at once and at sundown the next day the whole command (65 officers and 1,734 men) was west of the Black Warrior River, the men with their equipments crossing in a single flatboat and the horses swimming, losing only two or three.

Cavalry brigade crosses large river in 24 hours by swimming horses, equipments in flat boat.
Wilson's Raid, Apr. 2, 1865.

(Brig. Genl. J. T. Croxton, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 421.)

Ext. No. 327.—April 15th began crossing Sipsey Fork at Calloway's and Lindsay's Ferries, having no means of crossing men and equipments but in canoes and the horses by swimming. April 17th all were over (65 officers and 1,734 men).

Cavalry brigade crosses in two days at two crossings with horses swimming and equipments in canoes.
Wilson's Raid, Apr. 15, 1865.

(Brig. Genl. J. T. Croxton, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 423.)

Ext. No. 328.—Enough débris of the old bridge remained to facilitate the construction of another. A large, abandoned warehouse was at hand, and the party was at once set to work to tear down this house and convey the timbers to the bridge. In a wonderfully short time a footway was constructed, over which the cavalrymen at once commenced to pass, holding the bridles of their horses as they swam by their side.

Cavalry cross footbridge horses swimming by their side.
Okickahominy River, June 14, 1862.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 64.)

Cavalry crosses Tennessee River by swimming animals and ferrying guns and wagons.
Dec., 1862.

Ext. No. 329.—Meanwhile, the animals, detached from the vehicles and artillery, were being driven into the river and made to swim across, as also the horses of the cavalry. Quite as many as 1,000 animals were at one time in the river, which was about 600 yards broad with favorable banks. The ferriage of the artillery and wagons was very much slower. Loaded upon the old flatboat, it was poled up stream a distance of nearly half a mile, and, pushed out into the stream, was caught and carried by the current gradually to the other bank. On its return trip the process was reversed. By this means about 1,000 cavalry, 5 pieces of artillery with caissons, 60 wagons and 4 ambulances crossed the Tennessee River from 12:00 m. till 8:00 p. m. with one flat bottom boat.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 220.)

COMMENTS.

It is not believed that large organizations did much swimming with the troopers on their horses. Rivers of any magnitude must be crossed either by bridging or by ferrying the men and equipments and swimming the animals. (Ext. 239.)

Streams necessitating a swim of from fifty to sixty feet may be crossed by large commands, but those necessitating a longer swim should only be tried by organizations that have been previously trained. Untrained horses quickly lose their heads, paw the air and finally go over backwards. Even if the trooper is floating by the horse, he will be compelled to let go with grave danger to himself, though he may be a good swimmer. Under such circumstances a line of lariats with empty canteens for floats should be stretched across the stream on the down-stream side. Men who lose their horses can quickly gain the line marked by the floating canteens and reach the shore with no difficulty. The line should be held by men on shore, who can move it up or down stream. If possible, a row boat should be kept manned and ready to take out men who lose their horses. A large

blanket roll will furnish buoyancy till the blanket gets wet through. It is better to leave the rifle in the scabbard. Then it will surely go ashore with the horse. If held in the hand, and the horse goes over, it is sure to be lost.

PLUNDER—PILLAGE.

Pillage. Branding.

Ext. No. 330.—The commanding general directs that any person found guilty of such disgraceful conduct be stripped of his uniform, his head shaved, then branded on his left cheek with the letter T as a Thief, and drummed out of the service.

(G. O. No. 11, Hq. Army of the Ohio, Aug. 31, 1863. R. R., Vol. 30, Part IV, p. 262.)

Effect of pillage on troops. Moorefield, W. Va., Aug. 7, 1864.

Ext. No. 331.—Every crime in the catalogue of infamy has been committed, I believe, except rapine and murder. Pillage and sack of private dwellings took place hourly. I believe a higher tone of morals and discipline may be infused in any soldier. Had there been less plunder there would have been more fighting at Moorefield on Sunday.

(Brig. Genl. Bradley T. Johnson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 8.)

Plunder demoralizes a command.

Ext. No. 332.—General Wheeler's command was much demoralized by plunder, and officers and men behaved unbecomingly on this trip, thinking more of their plunder than of fighting the enemy.

(Maj. Genl. S. D. Lee, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 25.)

Victory incomplete because soldiers stop to plunder the enemy's camp. Cedar Creek, Va., Oct. 19, 1864.

Ext. No. 333.—Word was sent to Gordon and Kershaw to swing around and advance with their divisions, but they stated in reply that a heavy force of cavalry had got in their front, and that their ranks were so depleted by the number of men who had stopped in the camps to plunder that they could not advance them.

(Lieut. Genl. J. A. Early, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 562.)

By stopping to plunder, victory is turned to defeat.

Ext. No. 334.—The enemy, eager to plunder, failed to promptly follow us up. We rallied and at once advanced upon him. We retook the cavalry camp, and, encouraged by our success, charged the enemy, who was endeavoring to harness up the battery horses, and plundering my headquarters, not twenty steps distant, and finally forced him out of the camp with great slaughter. We re-established our line and for an hour and a half foiled every attempt of the enemy to retake it.

(Maj. Genl. J. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 47, Part I, p. 861.)

After capturing a town by assault, the best disciplined troops will plunder to some extent.

Selma, Ala., Apr. 2, 1865.

Ext. No. 335.—The cavalry corps commanded by General J. H. Wilson, which captured Selma, Ala., April 2, 1865, was composed of well organized and disciplined troops. Lieut. Col. E. Kitchell, 98th Ill., says: "I kept my men together till after we went into camp, and did not permit them to straggle or go in search of plunder or captured property in the city, although quite a number of them, following the general example, did find their way there during the night time."

(R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 452.)

Pursuit discontinued because advance troops stop to pillage.

Winchester, May 25, 1862.

Ext. No. 336.—I am now to record the fact that so many of Ashby's command, both cavalry and infantry, forgetful of their high trust as the advance of a pursuing army, deserted their colors, and abandoned themselves to pillage to such an extent as to make it necessary for that gallant officer to discontinue further pursuit.

(Lieut. Genl. T. J. Jackson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, Part I, p. 704.)

COMMENTS.

The branding of men as ordered in extract 330 would not now be permitted. (A. W. 38, 98.) The Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, and since branding would be so classed, it was not legal at the time of the order quoted. Pillage is a serious military offense and calls for drastic punishment. The deplorable condition of discipline resulting from pillage is described in extracts 331, 332. The offense is so grave

that A. W. 42 authorizes the death penalty. In time of victory, men who stop to plunder will neutralize the advantages gained (Exts. 333, 336) and sometimes convert a victory into a defeat. (Ext. 334.) Plundering is very difficult to stop, even among well disciplined troops. (Ext. 335.)

PURSUIT.

Ext. No. 337.—The next day I received orders from Maj. Genl. Sheridan to start out at daylight and whip the rebel cavalry or get whipped myself. * * *

Routed enemy pursued for 20 miles.

Shenandoah Valley Campaign, 1864.

After a spirited engagement for about two hours, the enemy, seeing that they were being flanked and severely pressed in front, gave way in great confusion, which was immediately taken advantage of by both division commanders.

The enemy endeavored to rally several times, but were unable to stand the desperate charges made by our men, and they were driven in a perfect rout for twenty miles.

(Maj. Genl. A. T. A. Torbert, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 431.)

Ext. No. 338.—His retreat was so rapid that pursuit by dismounted men was impossible, and the 1st Mich., supported by two regiments of the reserve brigade, were sent forward and drove the enemy for two miles, returning with many prisoners.

Pursuit by dismounted men impossible.

Rapidan to the James, May, 1864.

(Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 819.)

Ext. No. 339.—It now became apparent that the enemy, in following up our rear, had made a great mistake, and he began to see it, for, when we leisurely took the Negro Foot road to Richmond, a doubt arose in his mind as to whether his tactics were good, whereat he immediately hauled off from the rear, and urged his horses to the death so as to get in between Richmond and our column.

Rear pursuit useless. Parallel pursuit more likely to succeed.

Rapidan to the James, May, 1864.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 790.)

Parallel pursuit succeeds.
Rapidan to the James, June 8, 1864.

Ext. 340.—Having notified the commanding general on the morning of June 8th that Sheridan, with a heavy force of cavalry and artillery, had crossed the Pamunkey, I was ordered to take one division in addition to my own and follow him. Supposing that he would strike at Gordonsville and Charlottsville, I moved rapidly with my division so as to interpose my command between him and the places named above, at the same time directing Maj. Genl. Fitzhugh Lee to follow as speedily as possible. In two days' march I accomplished the object in view—that of placing myself in front of the enemy.

(Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton, C. S., R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 1095.)

Rear pursuit.
Shenandoah Valley, Oct. 8, 1864.

Ext. No. 341.—The enemy, after being charged by our gallant cavalry, were broken, and ran; they were followed by our men on the jump twenty-six miles.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 31.)

Method of making a successful pursuit.
Franklin, Tenn., Dec. 17, 1864.

Ext. No. 342.—The pursuit was immediately continued, Knipe and Hatch moving in parallel columns along the Columbia pike, Johnson down the Carter's Creek pike, and Croxton on the Lewisburg pike. The flanking columns were directed to push rapidly forward and endeavor to pass around the flanks of the enemy's rear guard, composed almost entirely of infantry, while a strong force of skirmishers across the pike should press it continuously and compel it to form line as frequently as possible.

(Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 565.)

Pursuit not successful without cavalry when infantry is exhausted.
Winchester, Va., May 25, 1862.

Ext. No. 343.—Hoping the cavalry would soon come up, the artillery, followed by the infantry, was pressed forward for two hours, for the purpose of preventing, by artillery fire, a reforming of the enemy, but as nothing was heard of the cavalry, and as but little or nothing could be accomplished without it in the exhausted condition of the infantry, between which and the

enemy the distance was constantly increasing, I ordered the halt.

(Lieut. Genl. T. J. Jackson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, Part I, p. 706.)

COMMENTS.

It is desirable to have a well organized mounted force ready to take up the pursuit in case of victory. (Ext. 338.) The approved method of making a pursuit is described in extract 342, namely, flanking columns should take up the pursuit on parallel roads, endeavoring to cut in on the enemy's column (Sheridan at Appomattox), while troops following in rear endeavor to compel the enemy to deploy as frequently as possible. Only the parallel pursuit can meet with great results when cavalry is pursuing cavalry. (Exts. 339, 340.)

Fresh infantry can pursue defeated infantry, but exhausted infantry cannot. In this case cavalry is necessary. (Ext. 343.)

The distance that a pursuit should be kept up will depend upon the progress of the general engagement. If cavalry defeats cavalry at the beginning of a battle, they should not pursue to the extent of becoming disorganized, but should rally and be kept in readiness to contribute to the general result. A decisive cavalry victory would amount to nothing if the general engagement was lost. If an enemy is defeated in a general engagement, then there should be no limit to the pursuit. In that case, push it as far and as long as possible. (Exts. 337, 341.)

RAIDS.

Conditions favorable to a raid.

Raid to Lynchburg, Va., Oct. 25, 1863.

Ext. No. 344.—Should a raid be contemplated, a strong diversion should be made in its favor by an attack on the enemy in force, or a demonstration to his opposite flank. No raid could succeed if attacked and compelled to fight at its outset. To prepare and start a raiding party after a general action has commenced, and when the enemy's attention is diverted, would be much more favorable for its success.

(General Alfred Pleasonton, R. R., Vol. 29, Part II, p. 383.)

Sheridan's Richmond raid.

Ext. No. 345.—In May, 1864, General Sheridan made a raid on Richmond, Va. He was gone 16 days; average march, 18 miles; longest march, 30 miles. Horses that failed were shot by the rear guard.

(See Sheridan's report, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 792.)

Morgan's method of conducting a raid.

Ext. No. 346.—His favorite strategy on his important expeditions or "raids" was to place himself by long and swift marches—moving sometimes for days and nights without halt except to feed horses—in the very heart of the territory where were the objects of his enterprise. He relied on this method to confuse, if not to surprise, his enemy, and prevent a concentration of his forces. He would then strike right and left. He rarely declined to fight advancing, but after commencing his retreat he would use every effort and stratagem to avoid battle.

(Morgan's Cavalry, by Duke.)

Successful raid draws troops away from the main objective. Grierson's Raid, Apr.-May, 1863.

Ext. No. 347.—Grierson continued his movement with about 1,000 men, breaking the New Orleans and Jackson railroad, arriving at Baton Rouge May 2d. This raid was of great importance, for Grierson had attracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement against Vicksburg.

(Memoirs of General U. S. Grant, Vol. I, p. 489.)

If raiding party cannot rejoin in safety, it will not pay for the loss of men and horses.

Ext. No. 348.—The close of a raid is the point of greatest danger. If a commander cannot join his army in safety all his work may be thrown away. If he has to cut his way through, the losses in men and horses will more than counterbalance the gains of the raid. (P. 93.)

Duties of the commander.

A cavalry general on a raid must be always awake, or at least take as little sleep as nature will permit. He must surround himself with pickets that stretch for miles and keep his corps encamped in as small a space as possible. Woods are best for this purpose, on many ac-

Woods the best camp.

counts. They hide the number of troops, furnish fuel for fires, and hitching posts for horses. They are easily defensible in case of surprise or attack, and by pushing out pickets to the edge of the open ground the grand requirements of a perfect camp ground are fulfilled, viz., wood, water and security. Water is almost invariably to be found in or near the woods. Security against attack is gained by felling a few trees on the flanks of the camp to entangle an enemy in. In the summer, by taking the precaution to camp early, and put out the fires after dark, a whole corps of cavalry may be buried in the woods without giving a sign of its presence.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of a Decade, p. 95.)

Any damage done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition is soon repaired.

Kilpatrick's Raid, Aug. 18-22, 1864.

Ext. No. 349.—Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of August to reach the Macon road about Jonesboro. He succeeded in doing so, and passed entirely around the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was back again in his former position on our left by the 22d. These little affairs contributed, however, but very little to the grand result. They annoyed, it is true, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition is soon repaired.

(Memoirs of General U. S. Grant, Vol. II, p. 172.)

Raid leaves cavalry unserviceable at the beginning of the Gettysburg campaign.

Ext. No. 350.—As many of my cavalry are still unserviceable from the effects of Stoneman's raid, I am too weak to cope with the numbers of the enemy if as large as represented.

(Genl. Jos. Hooker, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 33.)

Absence of Stuart's cavalry during Gettysburg campaign leaves his general without adequate information regarding the enemy, and much embarrasses the Confederate Army. It also leaves his cavalry much reduced in numbers and in bad condition.

Gettysburg Campaign, 1863.

Ext. No. 351.—Upon the suggestion of the former officer (Stuart) that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge; but he was instructed to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our column as soon as he could perceive the enemy moving northward. * * * It was expected that as soon as the Federal Army should cross the Potomac, General Stuart would give notice of

its movements, and nothing having been heard from him since our entrance into Maryland, it was inferred that the enemy had not left Virginia. * * * The movements of the army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry. * * * The ranks of the cavalry were much reduced by its long and arduous march, repeated conflicts, and insufficient supplies of food and forage.

(General R. E. Lee, R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, pp. 316, 321, 322.)

COMMENTS.

A raid, to be successful, will have to be started without much preparation. If suspected by the enemy, it will not succeed. A strong diversion should be made in its favor, as stated in extract 344.

The most successful raider the war produced was Morgan. His method is described in extract 346.

Raids are seldom worth their cost in horse flesh, and the damage done to the cavalry will operate later to the detriment of the raiders, as illustrated by Stoneman's raid (Ext. 350), which left the Federal cavalry weak at the beginning of the Gettysburg campaign, and Stuart's raid (Ext. 351), which left his ranks reduced after his long march, and left General Lee without the information he had a right to expect, and further much embarrassed him in the movements of his army preceding the battle of Gettysburg.

It may well be doubted if Sheridan's Richmond raid was worth its cost. He accomplished no lasting results except the death of Stuart, while he left Grant's army without its eyes, while Lee, by use of his cavalry, was enabled to ascertain Grant's movements and successfully interpose his army between the Federal army and Richmond at the North Anna.

If the raiders cannot rejoin in safety, the raid may be counted as a failure.

The most successful raid during the war was Grierson's (Ext. 347), which drew a large number of troops away from opposing Grant's army when it was maneuvering Pemberton into Vicksburg. Since Grierson marched with only 1,000 men, he did not greatly deplete the Federal forces.

The results of a raid will necessarily be temporary and the damage soon repaired; and, as stated by Grant, they "contribute very little to the grand result." (Ext. 349.)

Successful raids will generally be made in a friendly country, or at least in a country where many sympathizers are found to give information.

As long as Morgan stayed in Kentucky and Tennessee he was completely successful; but as soon as he crossed the Ohio River, where he could no longer obtain the information necessary to enable him to elude his pursuers, his raid was a most complete failure.

CAPTURE OF STEAMBOATS.

Capture of steamboat by cavalry. Jan., 1863.

Ext. No. 352.—During the same month a party of cavalry from the 10th Ill. and the 1st Ark. cavalry, under Lieut. Col. Stewart, captured a steamboat near Van Buren, Arkansas, and about 300 prisoners.

(History of the U. S. Cavalry, by Brackett, p. 277.)

Cavalry capture three steamboats. Wilson's Raid, 1865.

Ext. No. 353.—On April 13 Major John F. Weston captured and brought to Montgomery three steamboats loaded with cotton, bacon, salt and corn.

(Col. W. Cooper, 4th Ky. Cav., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 433.)

Cavalry capture gunboat and other boats loaded with wounded.

Ext. No. 354.—Dispatch to N. Y. Herald: Nashville, Jan. 14.—Wheeler's rebel cavalry, with a battery of artillery, attacked three or four boats at Harpeth Shoals yesterday. One or two hundred sick and wounded were captured and the men paroled. One gunboat surrendered. Her guns were thrown overboard and the boat burned. The others also taken were burned.

(Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 64.)

CHAPTER IX.

TRAINS, TRANSPORTATION AND SUPPLIES.

TRAINS—WHERE MARCHED; ATTACK AND DEFENSE.

Cavalry field trains, where marched.
Savannah Campaign, 1864.

Ext. No. 355.—In the Savannah campaign the cavalry field trains marched with the trains of the infantry columns, while the cavalry did the screening and protected the flanks.

(Col. Heath, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 400.)

Supply train an encumbrance to cavalry in enemy's country.
Meridian Expedition, Jan., 1864.

Ext. No. 356.—The supply train was a heavy encumbrance during the whole march; it caused a week's delay, while it was little use to the main column, which lived off the country nearly all the time and could have done so entirely.

(Col. G. E. Waring, Jr., Comg. Brig., R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 264.)

Disposition of field trains when battle is expected.
Fleetwood, Va., June, 1863.

Ext. No. 357.—With all his camp equipage—except two tent flies—packed in wagons and in readiness for an early start, Stuart himself bivouacked on the night of the 8th on Fleetwood Hill. * * * Every scrap of camp was removed toward Culpeper Court House, and there remained nothing upon the hill except the adjutant and his couriers.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, pp. 263, 269.)

Cavalry trains are an encumbrance to cavalry column.
Atlanta Campaign, 1864.

Ext. No. 358.—

Kingston, May 23, 1864.

Colonel Long, Commanding Cavalry Brigade.

Cavalry with a train is worse than useless. Let your train fall in with the infantry when your cavalry can act effectively on the south flank of Blair's column.

* * * (Sig.) W. T. SHERMAN,
Maj. Genl., Cmdg.

(R. R., Vol. 38, Part IV, p. 296.)

Ext. No. 359.—The train was strongly guarded by a corps front and rear, but the flanks were exposed. While the 12th and 7th regiments kept up a brisk skirmish with the corps that was marching in rear, I succeeded in destroying 35 or 40 wagons, brought 8 loaded with ordnance stores, 7 ambulances, 230 mules and horses, and 95 prisoners with the loss of 2 men killed and 3 wounded.

Guard in front and rear of a long train is not sufficient.
Near Ely Ford, Va., Nov. 27, 1863.

(Brig. Genl. T. L. Rosser, C. S., R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 904.)

Ext. No. 360.—General Wheeler, with 1,500 rebel cavalry and some artillery, attacked a wagon train moving from Knoxville to Chattanooga, and escorted by infantry, convalescents, etc. Colonel Long at once mounted a small portion of his command and charged the enemy, whose ranks had been broken by the infantry escort, scattering them in every direction.

Cavalry useful as support to infantry escort.
Knoxville Campaign, Dec. 28, '63.

(Colonel Long, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 435.)

Ext. No. 361.—I have the honor to report the arrival at this place with all the brigade train but about eight or ten wagons. We were attacked at daylight yesterday morning, and a disgraceful panic ensued, resulting in the entire destruction of the Reserve Brigade train and a portion of ours, with battery forges, etc., the running off of all the mules, the capture of a large number of prisoners, etc.

Train successfully attacked at daylight.
Winchester, Va., Aug. 13, 1864.

(Maj. W. E. Beardsley, 6th N. Y. Cav., R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 484.)

COMMENTS.

These extracts go to show clearly that a cavalry column, when operating against an enemy, has little use for trains. Cavalry must have trains, but, when operating against an enemy, the trains must march with the infantry column. To quote General Sherman (Ext. 358): "Cavalry with a train is worse than useless." This will necessitate cavalry often camping without its baggage. It must then be prepared to live on saddle bag or emergency rations. (Exts. 355, 356, 358.) The best

system will be for each troop to have a led horse or mule with a pack saddle. The Moore cross-tree saddle is a good type for this purpose. On one side of the saddle should be carried a water can, inside of which should be a nest of camp kettles and other necessities for cooking; on the other side should be a similar water can carrying one day's rations for the troop; carried as a top pack should be a picket rope with iron pins. This will avoid individual cooking, keep the horses from getting burned on small lariat ropes, and enable the command to always have a supply of boiled water, which is considered so indispensable to modern warfare. The command will then have one day's field rations, two saddle bag or haversack rations and one emergency ration, so that if the baggage wagons connect with it only once in three days no great harm will be done.

When a battle is expected, the trains must be sent to the rear. (Ext. 357.)

The most suitable escort for trains is infantry, dismounted cavalry, or convalescents. (Ext. 360.) Escort duty is very trying on cavalry, and, besides, a horseman cannot fire as rapidly or with as much precision as a man on foot.

Trains should have a flank guard if possible. (Ext. 359.)

The best time to attack a train is at daybreak. (Ext. 361.)

TRANSPORTATION.

Allowance of transportation.

Ext. No. 362.—

Headquarters Army, Adjutant General's Office,
War Department.

General Orders
No. 160.

Washington, D. C.,
October 18, 1862.

The following regulations are established for Army Trains and Baggage:

1. There will be allowed wagons to
Headquarters Army Corps..... 4
" Div. or Brig..... 3
Full regiment of Infantry..... 6
Light battery or Squadron of Cavalry..... 3

Cavalry regiment 20 wagons.

In no case will this allowance be exceeded, but always proportionately reduced according to the number of officers and men actually present.

2. The wagons allowed to a regiment, battery or squadron must carry nothing but forage for the teams, cooking utensils and rations for the troops, hospital stores, and officers' baggage. One wagon to each regiment will transport exclusively hospital supplies, under the direction of the regimental surgeon; the one for regimental headquarters will carry the grain for the officers' horses, and the three allowed for each battery or squadron will be at least half loaded with grain for their own teams. Stores in bulk and ammunition will be carried in the regular or special supply trains.

4. Officers' baggage will be limited to blankets, one small valise or carpet bag, and a moderate mess kit. The men will carry their own blankets or shelter tents, and reduce the contents of their knapsacks as much as possible.

Officers baggage allowance.

Ext. No. 362.—

ALLOWANCE OF WAGONS.

Allowance of wagons.

	W. D. Oct. 18, '62. G. O. 100.	*Army Potomac, Aug. 21, 1863, G. O. 38.*	*Army Potomac, Nov. 5, 1863. G. O. 100.*	*W. D. 1908, G. O. 95.*
Hq. Army Corps	4	2	.....	.....
Hq. Division	3	3	4	3
Hq. Brigade	3	2	2	2
Hq. Regiment	1	1	.....	1
Hq. Battalion, 12 officers	.....	1	1	1
Regiment of Inf., 12 Cos.	6	6	6	12
Reg. of Cav. 12 Troops	20	6	6	34
Battery	3	3	.....	3
Supply Trains	.....	1000 men, 7 Div. 75	.....	Div. 63
Ammunition Trains	.....	1000 men, 5	.....	1000 men, 3
Hospital Supply Train	.....	1500 men, 3 Div. 30	.....	Div. 40
Wagons for intren. tools	.....	Corps, 6	.....	.....

Wheeler has no wagons. Atlanta Campaign, 1864.

Ext. No. 364.—Wheeler's cavalry, while opposing Sherman's march to the sea, had no wagons for five months.

(Lieut. Genl. J. Wheeler, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 412.)

Gettysburg Campaign, June, 1863.

Ext. No. 365.—Stuart's cavalry, while marching around the Federal army during the Gettysburg campaign, had no wagons or vehicles excepting six pieces of artillery with caissons, and a few ambulances.

(Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 692.)

Sheridan's cavalry strips down to lowest limit.

Ext. No. 366.—From February 27 to March 28, 1865, Sheridan marched the 1st and 3d Cavalry Divisions, 10,000 officers and men, from Winchester to Petersburg. Division headquarters had one wagon.

The command had 8 ambulances, ammunition train, 16 wagons, a pontoon train of 8 boats. The fifteen days' rations of coffee, sugar and salt only took 60 wagons.

Each regimental headquarters had two pack mules. Each squadran had one pack mule.

(R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, pp. 475 and 485.)

Load carried by trooper.

Load carried on pack mules.

Load carried on wagons.

180 rounds per man taken for the raid.

Ext. No. 367.—Division commanders were directed to see that every trooper was provided with five days' light rations in haversacks, 24 pounds of grain, 100 rounds of ammunition and one pair of extra shoes for his horse; that the pack animals were loaded with five days' hard bread, ten days' sugar, coffee and salt, and the wagons with 45 days' coffee, 20 sugar, 15 salt and 80 rounds of ammunition. These calculations were made on a basis of sixty days' campaign, under the supposition that the command would be able to supply itself from the enemy's country with everything else in abundance. Only enough hard bread was taken to last through the sterile region of north Alabama.

Bridge train, 30 boats.

Train escorted by unmounted men, organized into battalions.

One light canvas pontoon train of 30 boats, with fixtures complete, transported by 50 six-mule wagons in charge of a battalion of cavalry was got ready to accompany the expedition. The entire train, in charge of

the Chief Quartermaster, numbered not far from 250 wagons, escorted by 1,500 dismounted men of the three divisions. These men were organized into battalions and commanded by majors.

(Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 356.)

Wilson's raid, known also as the Selma raid, started March 15, 1865. It was composed of three divisions and numbered about 17,000 men, 1,500 of which were without mounts.

If we deduct the 50 bridge train wagons, we have only 200 left for supplies and equipage of 17,000 men and horses. Some of these wagons might have been hauling artillery supplies or might have been ambulances, but assuming that they were not so occupied, we have left about 12 wagons per 1,000 men for a sixty days campaign. This large number of wagons was taken along to assist the command in crossing the Alabama river, after which 30 wagons were destroyed.

For supplies for 60 days campaign, 12 wagons per 1,000 men.

Ext. No. 368.—The following should be allowed: One wagon to each corps and division headquarters; one two-wheeled vehicle to each brigade and regimental headquarters.

The amount of transportation cavalry should have.

Every officer should carry his kit and grain for both horses on his second horse, and a suitable pack saddle should be provided for that purpose.

Each troop should have one pack mule for cooking purposes.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 76.)

Ext. No. 369.—In regard to the carriage of rations, the experience of a single campaign is sufficient to decide a thing—that the haversack, as used in the United States army, while very good perhaps for infantry, is a poor thing for cavalry.

Haversack is no good for cavalry.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 35.)

Ext. No. 370.—To carry three days' rations on the saddle, have a long bag slit in the middle, put grain in both ends and throw it across the saddle and sit on it.

How to carry three day's grain on the saddle.

Tie the ends to the cincha rings. Distribute the grain to equalize the pack.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 35.)

Transportation necessary for a cavalry corps of 14,000 men.

Ext. No. 371.—There are just three things which are loaded in cavalry trains, viz., food, ammunition and baggage. The provision and forage part of the train should not be taken on raids. Great bulk and weight are necessary, and such cannot be moved rapidly. Ammunition must be carried, so must a small quantity of baggage, the less of this the better. The problem becomes, then, to carry the ammunition and baggage in the smallest space and safest and most expeditious manner. Pack trains take an immense number of animals and make a long and tedious train. Since cavalry must be always accompanied by artillery, wherever a gun can go a wagon should follow. One wagon with six mules will carry as much as twenty-four pack mules.

The following is an estimate of transportation for a cavalry corps of three divisions, each of three brigades of four regiments with an average strength of 400 men, total strength of corps, 14,000 men. (Wilson's Corps in 1865 numbered 17,000): Forty rounds per man for each battle, three battles during raid; ammunition for these three battles on wagons makes 120 rounds per man on wagons, total, 1,680,000 rounds. Besides this each man should carry enough on his person for two battles.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 72.)

Note.—In 1910 forty wagons each carrying 3,500 pounds would be necessary to carry this ammunition.

COMMENTS.

The orders affecting the allowance of wagons are quoted for all arms, but the comments will be confined to the cavalry service.

G. O. 160, 1862, allowed 3 wagons per squadron of two troops each, one for regimental headquarters and one for hospital supplies, making a total of 20 for each

regiment of cavalry. G. O. 83, Army of the Potomac, August 21, 1863, allowed 6 wagons to each regiment of cavalry, and G. O. 100, Army of the Potomac, November 5, 1863, still retained that allowance. G. O. 95, W. D. 1908, allows each regiment of cavalry 34 wagons. The two orders of 1863, allowing 6 wagons per regiment of cavalry, were issued after the Gettysburg campaign, and were based on war experience.

The allowance of 34 wagons is simply and flatly absurd. The maximum allowance of wagons per regiment of cavalry should be one to each troop, one to regimental headquarters and band, and one ammunition wagon to each squadron of four troops, total of 16 wagons. Supplies will be carried on supply trains and issued as needed; but supply trains are no part of a regimental equipment. (Ext. 362.)

Wheeler's cavalry, opposing Sherman's march to the sea, had no wagons for five months. (Ext. 364.)

Stuart's cavalry, on the Gettysburg campaign, had no wagons and only a few ambulances. (Ext. 365.)

Sheridan marched 10,000 cavalry for a month at the rate of one wagon to 130 men. (Ext. 366.)

Wilson's Selma raid started with 17,000 cavalry for a two months' campaign with one wagon to 84 men. (Ext. 367.)

On the Trevillian raid Sheridan had wagons for ammunition only. (Ext. 377.)

The recommendation contained in Extract 368, that each officer should carry his baggage on his extra horse, is a good one, and sometimes practiced in the regular service.

A single-track railroad will supply an army of 60,000 to 70,000 men. (Ext. 373.)

SUPPLIES.

Ext. No. 372.—I employed a brigade once a week in the duty of collecting and bringing in forage, sending out sometimes as many as 150 wagons to haul the grain which my scouts had previously located. In nearly every

How to gather forage in a hostile country.

Use of scouts.

Murfreesboro, Tenn., Jan. 1863.

one of these expeditions the enemy was encountered, and the wagons were usually loaded while the skirmishers kept up a running fire.

(Sheridan's Memoirs, p. 253.)

Capacity of a single track railroad.

Ext. No. 373.—A single-track railroad can supply an army of 60,000 or 70,000 men with the usual number of cavalry and artillery, but beyond that number or with a large mounted force the difficulty of supply is very great.

(Halleck to Grant, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 668.)

In hostile country only simple receipts are given for supplies taken.

Ext. No. 374.—They will help themselves to corn, meat and what they need, and take all good horses, giving simple receipts to be settled at the end of the war or according to circumstances.

(Genl. W. T. Sherman, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 719.)

Cavalry can subsist on parched corn diet if necessary.

Operations around Dandridge, Tenn., Jan., 1864.

Ext. No. 375.—I will avail myself of this occasion to call the attention of the commanding general to the fact that for nearly two months my command has been almost daily engaged with the enemy and compelled to live mainly on parched corn, most of which has been gathered at a distance of from six to fifteen miles. The weather at times has been intensely cold and the suffering very great, most of them being without shelter of any kind.

(Brig. Genl. S. D. Sturgis, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 138.)

During two days fight horses get nothing to eat.

Rapidan to the James, June 1864.

Ext. No. 376.—In addition, the animals were, for two entire days, in which we were engaged, without forage, the surrounding country affording nothing but grazing of a very inferior quality, and generally at such points as were inaccessible to us.

(Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 785.)

Number of days rations carried on a raid.

How rations and forage are carried.

Ext. No. 377.—On his Trevillian raid Sheridan started with two divisions carrying three days' rations in haversacks, to last for five days, and carrying two days' grain on the pommel of the saddle.

They carried 100 rounds of ammunition per man, 40 of which was on the person and the other 60 in wagons. Amount of ammunition carried on a raid.

The only other wagons were one medical wagon, eight ambulances and one wagon for each brigade and division headquarters. Amount of transportation allowed. Rapidan to the James, June, 1864.

(See Sheridan's report, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 795.)

Ext. No. 378.—I made application for and obtained permission to gather up corn and wheat and take it to a mill five miles distant, where I supplied my command scantily for the next four days. Cavalry gather wheat and grind it at a mill. Campaign in No. Alabama and Tennessee, Oct. '64.

(Col. D. E. Coon, 2d Iowa Cav., R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 581.)

Ext. No. 379.—Two divisions of cavalry marched on the morning of the 29th, the men, as usual, carrying on their horses five days' rations, thirty pounds of forage and forty rounds of ammunition. Customary to carry five days rations, 30 pounds of forage and 40 rounds of ammunition on horse. Appomattox Campaign, Mar. 29, 1865.

(Maj. Genl. Wesley Merritt, R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, p. 1116.)

Ext. No. 380.—Sheridan, on his march from Winchester to Petersburg, February 27 to March 28, 1865, started with five days' rations in haversacks, and on each horse 30 pounds of forage; he carried in wagons fifteen days' rations of sugar, salt and coffee. The wagons also carried 100 rounds of ammunition, while each man carried 75 rounds on his horse. Rations. Forage. Transportation. Ammunition.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, p. 475; also report of Maj. Genl. W. Merritt, p. 485.)

Ext. No. 381.—I had often seen bread baked upon a flat rock or board, or by twisting it around a ramrod or stick and holding it to the fire, but one method of baking corn bread was practiced successfully on this march which I had never witnessed before. The men would take meal dough and fit it into a corn shuck, tying the shucks tightly. It would then be placed on the hot embers and in a short time would come out beautifully Improvised method of baking bread.

browned. The dough was worked up in an oil cloth or a half pumpkin, thoroughly scooped out.

(Morgan's Cavalry, by Duke.)

Living off of a friendly country causes straggling Gettysburg, Campaign, June, 1863.

Ext. No. 382.—I can get no forage or rations; am out of both. The people give and sell the men something to eat, but I can't stand that way of subsisting; it causes dreadful straggling.

(Genl. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 324.)

Cavalry subsists on the country. Savannah Campaign, 1864.

Ext. No. 383.—During the campaign my brigade marched 520 miles, having subsisted ourselves principally on the country.

(Col. Atkins, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 393.)

Wheeler's cavalry have no transportation. Subsist upon country. Bake bread upon boards and stones, broil meat on sticks. Not paid in twelve months. Average 16 miles per day for five months. Supper at midnight, march at daylight. Forage packed into camp on horses. Savaunah Campaign, 1864.

Ext. No. 384.—During the last five months my command has been without wagons or cooking utensils, with orders to subsist upon the country. The food has been limited to bread baked upon boards and stones and meat broiled on sticks. It has not been paid in twelve months. During five months it has averaged in direct marching 16 miles per day, and having no wagons, has been obliged to pack all forage and rations to camp on horseback. Our camps could not be designated before nightfall. Details had then to be sent to procure forage and rations, frequently making it midnight before supper could be prepared for my men, and then they were compelled to be in the saddle before daylight.

(Maj. Genl. Joseph Wheeler, C. S., R. R., Vol. 44, p. 412.)

Stuart's cavalry carried only three days rations on the horse when going on a raid. No transportation. Gettysburg Campaign, June, 1863.

Ext. No. 385.—Stuart's raid around Federal army during the Gettysburg campaign carried only three days' rations on the horse and with no transportation except ambulances.

(Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 692.)

When cavalry commander asks for rations he is told to get it himself.

Ext. No. 386.—Merritt, commanding reserve brigade at Bristoe Station, October 17, 1863, reported: The command is hard up for something to eat. They have not a thing to feed on; cannot rations be sent immediately?

Reply: General Meade directs that you make the necessary arrangements to have rations sent out by cars. * * *

(R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 352.)

No wonder the Army of the Potomac lost horses.

Ext. No. 387.—A whole division has been twenty-one days without hay. No horses, however good, and bought at whatever price, can stand this kind of treatment in a region where but little, if any, grass can be procured.

Forage.

(Brig. Gen. Stoneman, R. R. Vol. 29, Part. II., p. 419.)

Forage allowance for the Army of the Potomac.

Ext. No. 388.—G. O. 100, Army of the Potomac, fall of '63, prescribes maximum forage for horses, 10 pounds hay and 14 pounds grain; mules 10 pounds hay and 11 pounds grain. When short forage (no hay) only can be procured, horses, 18 pounds grain; mules, 15 pounds grain. When the army is on the march the above allowance will not apply. Marching ration, 10 pounds average per animal per day. Increased allowance of grain intended to be fed only when animals are at rest, after long marches, to recuperate them and when hay cannot be procured.

(R. R., Vol. 29, Part II, p. 420.)

Forrest's horses kept on the battle field for two days suffer greatly for food and water.

Chickamauga, Ga., Sept. 20, 1863.

Ext. No. 389.—My command was kept on the battle field during the night of the 20th, and men and horses suffered greatly for want of water. The men were without rations, and the horses had only received a partial feed once during the two days' engagement.

(General Forrest, C. S., Battle of Chickamauga, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 525.)

Soldiers remain cheerful under adverse conditions, without regular rations.

Wheeler and Roddey's raid, Oct., 1863.

Ext. No. 390.—Having but three days' rations in twenty days, and many of them nearly naked and several times exposed to a cold, drenching rain, yet they never complained, but were always cheerful and ever ready to perform all duties required of them.

(Brig. Genl. George Crook, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 688.)

Confederate cavalry find it difficult to be effective without clothing or pay.

Knoxville Campaign Dec., 1863.

Ext. No. 391.—A very large proportion of my men, and even officers, are ragged and barefooted, without blankets or overcoats. We have drawn no clothing for fall or winter. The men have received no pay for six months. The extremely cold weather has made it almost impossible for me to move.

(Maj. Genl. W. T. Martin, C. S., Jan. 8th, 1864, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 549.)

COMMENTS.

Forage: Cavalry must expect to live on the country. The way to obtain forage is to locate it by scouts and then either send wagons for it or impress wagons from the inhabitants and make them haul it. Usually, however, the inhabitants of a hostile country will have disappeared; the forage will then have to be brought in by troops. (See also Ext. 453. Ext. 372.) Receipts should be given, to be paid or not at the end of the war, depending upon the policy of the government. (Ext. 374.)

In going on raids each horse carried 30 pounds of grain. (Exts. 377, 379, 380.) Cavalry was expected to gather forage from the surrounding country when the 30 pounds were exhausted. Wheeler's cavalry, for five months, had to pack all forage into camp on horseback. (Ext. 384.)

The forage allowance of the Army of the Potomac, G. O. 100, 1863, was a maximum of 10 pounds of hay and 14 pounds of grain. When no hay could be obtained, 18 pounds of grain were allowed when animals were at rest recuperating; when marching only 10 pounds were allowed. (Ext. 388.)

Rations: The best single diet known is Indian corn. Men can live on it by parching it. (Ext. 375.) Corn and wheat should be gathered and ground in neighboring mills. (Ext. 378.)

Foraging in a friendly country causes straggling. (Ext. 382.)

During a battle soldiers can expect little except what is carried on their persons or horses. (Exts. 376, 389.)

Cavalry started on raids with from three (Exts. 377, 385) to five days' rations on the horse. (Exts. 379, 380.) The best way to carry rations is described in extract 370.

Emergency rations were unsuccessfully tried during the war. (Ext. 395.)

Improvised methods of baking were frequently used, viz: on a flat rock or by twisting it on the ramrod; tied in corn shucks and baked in hot embers (Ext. 381); on boards and stones. (Ext. 384.)

Amount of ammunition carried: The amount depended upon the length of the expedition.

In the Selma raid the ammunition carried per man for 60 days was 100 rounds on the horse and 80 in wagons. (Ext. 367.)

Extract 371 recommends 80 rounds on the man and 120 rounds per man in the wagons as enough for five battles, allowing 40 rounds per man per battle.

On the Trevillian raid each man carried 40 rounds on the horse and 60 per man in wagons (Ext. 377), but the Federal troops ran out of ammunition and Sheridan gives that as the reason why he retreated. (Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 425.)

During Sheridan's march from Winchester to Petersburg the ammunition carried per man was 75 on the horse and 100 in the wagons. (Ext. 380.)

During the war, then, cavalry carried from 100 to 180 rounds per man.

Our cavalry can now carry 80 rounds of rifle ammunition on the trooper, depending on the type of cartridge belt used. If each squadron of four troops has one ammunition wagon carrying 2,800 pounds, or 700 pounds per troop, each troop will have 8,400 rounds, or 84 per man, in the squadron wagon. It will be impossible to carry more in the saddle pockets unless something else is thrown out. There is already carried one day's emergency rations, one day's field rations, two

haversack rations, extra grain in the nose bag, extra horseshoes and other necessary articles. More ammunition can be carried on the person in bandoliers. If each trooper carries one, he will have on the person 140 rounds and in the wagon 84 rounds, making a total of 224 rounds, which should be ample for at least two modern battles.

AMMUNITION SUPPLY—TO THE FIRING LINE.

Ammunition supply to the firing line.

Rapidan to the James, May, 1864.

Ext. No. 392.—And here let me call your attention to the necessity of having some organized system of ordnance sergeants, or men detailed whose duty it shall be to keep cavalry commands well supplied with ammunition during engagements. Men armed with the breech-loading weapon will necessarily fire a greater number of rounds than those armed with a muzzle-loading piece, and it is utterly impossible for a cavalryman to carry more than from 60 to 80 rounds upon his person, and when dismounted and away from his horse this supply can easily be exhausted in a few hours' firing.

At daylight details were sent to the train. Captain Weeks, in command of detail, immediately started for our own train, some nine miles distant, making the trip back to Hanover Court House, thence to Ashland, twenty-seven miles, each man loaded with 85 pounds of ammunition, in less than one-half day and even then hardly arrived in time, as three boxes were captured by the enemy before we could issue it to the men.

(Lieut. Col. G. A. Purington, 2d Ohio Cav., R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 895.)

Mounted details distribute ammunition to the firing line while heavily engaged.

Five Forks, Va., Apr. 1, 1865.

Ext. No. 393.—Through the kindness of Major Dana, who furnished me with a mounted detail, I succeeded in procuring a supply of ammunition, which was delivered and distributed to the men on the line of battle while heavily engaged.

(Col. A. C. M. Pennington, 3d N. J. Cav., R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, p. 1136.)

Amount of ammunition necessary for a cavalry skirmisher to last all day.

Trevillian Station, Va., June 11-12, 1864.

Ext. No. 394.—Forty rounds of ammunition ought to be enough for any cavalry skirmisher if he fights from daylight to dark, and a regiment announcing itself "out of ammunition" in the thick of a fight ought to be severely censured in brigade, division and corps orders. But these "out of ammunition" fellows have often got better men into grave peril by falling back, and thus leaving a gap for the enemy to occupy. I have seen the whole of a brigade forced into a retreat and the loss of many prisoners from the failure of a single regiment in this manner. It was at Trevillian Station, near Gordonsville, Va., we were fighting on foot, and before we were aware of it a force of the enemy was in our rear and firing into the led horses. Only the approach of darkness saved many of us, myself in the number, from capture, and I lost my horse and had to foot it till I captured another.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 21.)

Sheridan claims that he had to withdraw from Trevillian Station because his ammunition had given out.

(Sheridan's Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 425.)

COMMENTS.

A soldier should carry enough ammunition on his person to fight at least one battle. A cavalryman may have ammunition on his horse, which ammunition, under most circumstances, will be available. It will seldom be possible to bring ammunition from the squadron wagons to the firing line, but where horsemen can approach the firing line from the rear under cover, ammunition can be so supplied. (Ext. 393.)

Pack mules will usually be available to bring ammunition from the wagons to some sheltered place, where the boxes can be broken open and the bandoliers distributed. If an organization is well controlled in fire discipline, the 80 rounds in the belt and one bandolier on the person, together with what can be obtained from the dead and wounded, should enable it to fight at least one pitched battle. (Ext. 394.)

EMERGENCY RATIONS.

Emergency rations.

Ext. No. 395.—They have also sent us compressed cakes which Lun, our mess cook, calls "desecrated vegetables." We have boiled, baked, fried, stewed, pickled, sweetened, salted it, and tried it in puddings, cakes and pies, but it sets all modes of cooking at defiance, so the boys break it up and smoke it in their pipes. They say the Dutch of the "Fourst Missouri" know how to cook it, but we are too proud to learn.

(The Last Campaign, by E. N. Gilpin, 3d Ia. Cav., published in the Journal of the U. S. Cavalry Association.)

CHAPTER X.

ANIMALS—ENDURANCE, CARE AND DISEASE.

ENDURANCE.

Division marches 247 miles in six days.
Wheeler and Roddey's raid, Sept.-Oct., 1863.

Ext. No. 396.—From September 26 to October 9, 1863, Crook's division, composed of Minty's and Long's brigades, marched and fought 247 miles in six days.

(Genl. D. S. Stanley, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 668.)

Regiment marches 90 miles without rest.
Bristoe (Va.) Campaign, Oct., 1863.

Ext. No. 397.—The First Maine Cavalry marched 90 miles without rest.

(J. Irvin Gregg, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 366.)

Division marches 52 miles in 24 hours.
Wheeler and Roddey's raid, Oct., 1863.

Ext. No. 398.—Mitchell's Cavalry Division marched 52 miles in 24 hours.

(Brig. Genl. R. B. Mitchell, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 669.)

Six days forced march puts cavalry out of business.
Wheeler and Roddey's raid Oct., 1863.

Ext. No. 399.—In the pursuit of Wheeler's cavalry, October 4th to 9th, 1863, there was scarcely an hour during the whole pursuit that the horses were unsaddled. For days and nights together the men were in the saddle, almost constantly on the march, and some days making as high as 53 and 57 miles. A greater part of the time the troops were out of rations, our hasty movements giving them no time to forage on the country; the nights were very cold and the men without overcoats. It is positively necessary that a large number of horses be had before the command can be in working condition again.

(Brig. Genl. R. B. Mitchell, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 672.)

Brigade marches 350 miles in 14 days.

Ext. No. 400.—First Brigade Michigan cavalry marched 350 miles in 14 days.

Wheeler and Roddey's raid Oct., 1863.

(Col. A. P. Campbell, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 678.)

Regiment marches 61 miles in 22½ hours.

Wheeler and Roddey's raid, Oct., 1863.

Ext. No. 401.—The 9th Penn. Cav. marched 61 miles from 2:30 P. M., October 2d, to 1:00 P. M., October 3d, 1863.

(Lieut. Col. R. M. Russell, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 679.)

Wheeler and Roddey's raid, Oct., 1863.

Ext. No. 402.—First Tenn. Cav. marched 750 miles in two months.

(Lieut. Col. J. P. Brownlow, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 681.)

Division marches 41 miles in one day.

Wheeler and Roddey's raid, Sept.-Oct., 1863.

Ext. No. 403.—I had marched 41 miles that day.

(Brig. Genl. George Crook, 2d Cav. Div., R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 686.)

Brigade marches 30 miles per day for eight weeks.

Wheeler and Roddey's raid, Sept.-Oct., 1863.

Ext. No. 404.—Although my horses and men were wearied with marches, which for eight weeks had averaged 30 miles a day, I obeyed the order.

(Col. G. B. Hodge, C. S., Comg. Brig., R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 726.)

Division marches 52 miles in 24 hours.

Chalmer's raid Oct., 1863.

Ext. No. 405.—My command having marched 52 miles in 24 hours.

(Col. Edward Hatch, Comg. Cav. Div., R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 741.)

Brigade marches 50 miles in 15 hours.

Philadelphia, Tenn., Oct. 20, '63.

Ext. No. 406.—After making a march of 50 miles in 15 hours.

(Col. J. J. Morrison, Comg. Cav. Brig., R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 12.)

Division marches 30 to 40 miles daily for six days.

South of Richmond, May, 1864.

Ext. No. 407.—We marched 30 to 40 miles daily for six days, during which a great deal of rain had fallen, and the roads in some places very heavy. Considering the work done, comparatively few of the horses failed. We captured as many horses as we lost.

(Brig. Genl. A. V. Kautz, Comg. Cav. Div., R. R., Vol. 36, Part II, p. 174.)

Two divisions march 56 consecutive days.

Rapidan to the James, Apr.-Aug., 1864.

Ext. No. 408.—During the Trevillian raid Sheridan's two divisions marched fifty-six consecutive days.

(R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 799.)

Ext. No. 409.—If such is their expectation, it is impossible that they can know that this command has marched 1,400 miles since the 1st of May, without a remount, and without a halt sufficiently long to set the shoes on my horses.

Division marches 1,400 miles in 95 days.

Shenandoah Valley Campaign, May-July, 1864.

(Report of Brig. Genl. Wm. W. Averill, Comg. 2d Cav. Div., dated Aug. 3d, 1864, R. R., Vol. 37, Part I, p. 330.)

Ext. No. 410.—Both men and horses of my division need rest. They have been in the saddle from eighteen to twenty hours each day since the 2d of this month.

Division stay in the saddle 18 to 20 hours per day for 19 days.

Atlanta Campaign May, 1864.

(Col. E. M. McCook, May 20, 1864, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 752.)

Ext. No. 411.—I received orders to move to Gillem's Bridge (five miles) at a gallop and to hold the bridge at all hazards. This five-mile gallop rendered about 300 horses unserviceable.

Brigade gallops 5 miles and renders 300 horses unserviceable.

Kingston, Ga., May 19, 1864.

(Col. Robt. H. G. Minty, Comg. Brig., R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 811.)

Ext. No. 412.—My command up to this time had traveled about seventy miles without having halted.

Cavalry command marches 70 miles without halt.

Atlanta Campaign, 1864.

(Maj. Genl. Jos. Wheeler, C. S., R. R., Vol. 38, Part III, p. 955.)

Ext. No. 413.—The march of 470 miles from Cynthia to the Cumberland river and back to Lexington in eleven days is, perhaps, the most rapid and trying known during the war, especially that from Irvine to the Cumberland, a distance of 120 miles, in less than sixty hours, with stock the most of which had already traveled nearly a thousand miles.

Cavalry march 470 miles in 11 days, and 120 miles in less than 60 hours.

Morgan's raid into Kentucky, June, 1864.

(Col. Chas. S. Hanson, R. R., Vol. 39, Part I, p. 42.)

Ext. No. 414.—The forces under Generals Burnbridge and Hobson, who were at Pound Gap and Mud Creek, finding that the state was invaded, immediately gave up their intended expedition into Virginia and pursued my command. They reached Mount Sterling

Morgan concedes that enemy marched 90 miles in 24 hours.

Morgan's raid into Kentucky June, 1864.

at daylight on the 9th, having marched 90 miles in twenty-four hours.

(Brig. Genl. J. H. Morgan, C. S., R. R., Vol. 39, Part I, p. 68.)

Division marches 135 miles in 81 hours and fights much of the time.
Richmond Campaign, June, 1864.

Ext. No. 415.—During this interval of eighty-one hours the command rested from marching and fighting not to exceed six hours. During these eighty-one hours the division marched 135 miles.

(Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 40, Part I, p. 624.)

Grierson marches 600 miles in 16 days.
Grierson's raid, Apr., 1863.

Ext. No. 416.—During Grierson's raid, April, 1863, two regiments of Ill. Cav. marched 600 miles in less than 16 days. The last 76 miles was marched in 28 hours. This command was enabled to replace broken-down horses from the country passed through.

(R. R., Vol. 24, Part I, p. 528.)

ENDURANCE IN THE CHARGE.

Charge unsuccessful with blown horses.
Upperville, Va., June 21, 1863.

Ext. No. 417.—We charged up to the enemy over a long stretch of marshy ground, intersected by a difficult ditch and terminating in a hill of plowed ground. The charge was unsuccessful, the most of the horses being so blown that it was impossible to bring or keep them for such a distance at a charging pace.

(Capt. Cram, 6th U. S. Cav., R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 947.)

Regiment charges for 5 miles and breaks through enemy's line.
McMinnville, Tenn., Oct. 4, 1863.

Ext. No. 418.—The 2d Kentucky, with Colonel Long at their head, made a most gallant charge of some five miles, breaking through his lines, etc.

(Brig. Genl. George Crook, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 685.)

COMMENTS.

These extracts speak for themselves. There is little to be said on the subject of endurance of cavalry on the march, except that all recent marches, for the purpose of determining what can be done, serve no purpose other than breaking down, unnecessarily, horses which are very difficult to replace. The war of the Rebellion sufficiently

tried out the subject, and if anybody is not satisfied with the above reports, the Rebellion records furnish many more.

CARE.

Cavalry horses get no care or forage.

Ext. No. 419.—Here we drew five pounds of forage and removed our saddles for the first time in six days, during which period we had marched from the Rappahannock to Chancellorsville, doing duty both day and night, and had been under the command of nine different officers.

Night picket bad for cavalry, causes great loss of horses.

Rapidan to the James, May, 1864.

(Lieut. Col. G. A. Purington, 2d Ohio Cav., R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 893.)

Full forage cannot be expected during a campaign.

Ext. No. 420.—The thirteen days we lay at this place is the only time during the whole campaign that we had full forage for our horses.

Atlanta Campaign, 1864.

(Atlanta Campaign, Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 815.)

Veteran cavalry walk to save their horses.

Ext. No. 421.—The men have taken excellent care of their horses and have uncomplainingly marched on foot a considerable portion of each day's march in order to save them.

Wilson's Selma raid, Mar.-Apr., 1865.

(Lieut. Col. J. H. Peters, 4th Ia. Cav., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 499. Wilson's Selma raid.)

Use of green corn as forage.

Ext. No. 422.—The horses subsisted almost entirely upon green corn during our absence, but returned in fair condition.

Grierson's raid, Apr.-May, 1863.

(Brig. Genl. B. H. Grierson, R. R., Vol. 39, Part I, p. 388.)

Green corn proves to be bad forage.

Ext. No. 423.—My horses are much worn down, having been fed for the last ten days on green corn. Many of them are foundered by the injudicious manner in which they are fed.

Grierson's raid, Apr.-May, 1863.

(Col. Joseph Kargé, Comdg. Cav. Div., R. R., Vol. 39, Part I, p. 392.)

Green corn alone proves unsatisfactory.

Ext. No. 424.—The horses of the battery have suffered most, as the toil they have had to undergo has been greater than animals can stand with no other forage than green corn at this season.

Grierson's raid, Apr.-May, 1863.

(Col. J. W. Noble, R. R., Vol. 39, Part I, p. 396.)

The following is a summary of a report well worth reading:

Raw recruits mounted on unseasonable horses with no feed produce deplorable results.

Ext. No. 425.—The 7th Pa. Cav. started April 30, 1864, with 919 horses fresh from the corral at Nashville; they were unused to military duty and the majority were young.

Of the enlisted men 300 were raw recruits; some had never been on a horse before. The regiment traveled 48 consecutive hours and during that time the horses were without food. Then we received 23 pounds of corn for three days' feed, and carried it and five days' rations on the horses.

Out of 72 hours the horses were under the saddle 60 hours. May 22d the loss of 76 horses reported as died of starvation. May 26th to June 2d the horses were without feed and actually starved.

One battalion lost in action trying to procure forage, 33 horses, and 101 starved to death.

A detail traveled 30 miles after forage and returned without any. Another detail traveled 26 miles and returned with one quart per horse.

June 13th to 18th, received half forage.

June 19th to 22d, received no forage.

June 23d to July 17th, received half forage.

Sore backs caused by packing forage on the horse does as much harm as the forage does good.

July 27th to 30th, foraged on the country for twenty miles around Stone Mountain. All was packed upon the withers of the horses, doing as much harm as the feed did good, causing sore backs.

Cavalry in trenches means gross neglect of the horses.

August 1st to 15th the command was in the trenches and separated from the horses.

August 15th and 16th, received one quart per head.

August 17th and 18th, received one pint of feed.

August 19th to 24th, marched 120 miles, feeding but once upon green corn.

August 24th to September 9th, half rations.

September 9th to 11th, no feed and no grazing.

Stock received no salt or hay during the campaign.

Recapitulation:

	Horses
Started with	919
Captured	42
	961
Loss:	
Abandoned and died	230
Killed and captured	171
	— 401
Present September 13	560

Marched 902 miles, not including picket duty and company scouting.

March from Nashville, Tenn., to Blake's Mill, Ga., Apr. to Aug. 1864.

The horses were without food 26 days and scant food 27 days; they were 7 consecutive days without food of any kind.

The majority of horses that died and were abandoned were literally starved.

(Maj. Wm. Jennings, 7th Pa. Cav., R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 832.)

Nearly half of the Confederate cavalry is unserviceable for want of horse shoes. Gettysburg Campaign, July, 1863.

Ext. No. 426.—The men are in good health and spirits, but want clothing badly. I have sent back to endeavor to procure a supply of both, and also horse-shoes, for want of which nearly half our cavalry is unserviceable. As soon as these necessary articles are obtained, we shall be prepared to resume operations.

(General R. E. Lee, R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 302.)

COMMENTS.

The frequent change of commanders is highly detrimental to any organization. (Ext. 419.)

Constant night picket duty will soon render cavalry unserviceable. (Ext. 419.)

Full forage can seldom be expected during a campaign. (Ext. 420.)

Veteran cavalry will frequently walk on foot to save their horses. (Ext. 421.)

Green corn is a very unsatisfactory forage. (Exts. 423, 424.)

Deplorable results can be expected from recruits mounted on young, untrained and unseasoned horses which receive scant forage. (Ext. 425.)

Sore backs caused from packing forage on the horse does cavalry as much harm as the forage does good. (Ext. 425.)

The placing of cavalry in trenches means gross neglect of their horses. (Ext. 425.)

The want of horseshoes will render cavalry temporarily unserviceable. (Ext. 426.)

FIELD DISEASES.

Hoof-rot. Bristoe (Va.) Campaign, Oct. '63.

Ext. No. 427.—I have sent to the Quartermaster's Department in Washington City 471 disabled horses. There are at least 100 more in the command. The frightful loss among horses owing to a disease which resembles tetter (called in the army hoof rot) from the effects of which the finest appearing horses in the command become disabled in a few days' march. The disease seems to have been contracted in the quartermaster's corrals in Washington.

(Brig. Genl. Wesley Merritt, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 353.)

Hoof-rot.

Ext. No. 428.—My cavalry was much reduced by recent active operations, and particularly by the appearance with the last few days of hoof disease, which is now spreading rapidly.

(Genl. Meade, R. R., Vol. 29, Part II, p. 376.)

Hoof-rot.

Ext. No. 429.—His horses are not fit for hard service, and the disease called "rotten-hoof" has made its appearance in that division with great virulence.

(Genl. Pleasanton, R. R., Vol. 29, Part II, p. 382.)

Hoof-rot and swelled tongue.

Ext. No. 430.—Within the last three days I have been obliged to send into the dismounted camp 265 men and horses, the horses having been affected with hoof disease and swelled tongue.

(Genl. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 29, Part II, p. 401.)

Ext. No. 431.—The remedy used at the depot is chloride of antimony for sore feet, and a decoction of white oak bark for the mouth. Remedy for both diseases.

Another is borax and alum, half and half, pulverized and mixed with sweet oil and applied with a swab to the tongue; and still another, common salt crisped on a hot shovel and applied to the feet and mouth. Another remedy.

Prevention: Give the horses all the salt they can eat. Prevention.

(R. R., Vol. 29, Part II, p. 419.)

From February 27th to March 28th, 1865, Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, marched from Winchester to Petersburg. He says: "There perhaps never was a march where nature offered such impediments and shrouded herself in so much gloom as upon this; incessant rain, deep and almost impassable streams, swamps and mud were overcome.

"Our loss in horses was considerable—almost entirely from hoof-rot." Loss from hoof-rot.

Ext. No. 432.—A troublesome disease, known as "grease heel," had prevailed among the horses, and the number of men for duty in this brigade had been reduced to less than 1,000. Grease-heel.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 169.)

Ext. No. 433.—The hardships of the expedition had been so extreme and prolonged that it had perceptibly affected them, leaving them jaded and footsore. Many also were now taken with the "scours" and "cramp," which proved so fatal in a few moments that of the 550 with which the command reached Rome, not more than 250 remained. Scours. Cramps.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 279.)

Ext. No. 434.—A slip of old blanket made into a bandage, carefully and closely rolled around the legs, beginning at the pastern, will save every horse's heels from scratches. Four such strips, warmed and dried at How to keep horses from getting scratches.

the fire, will put such comfort into the animal as to enable him to go through a mud raid unharmed. The heels and pasterns should be hand rubbed after cleansing, and a little grease rubbed in now and then. Such a plan will save the whole force from scratches if the use of bandages is combined therewith. (P. 39.)

Dry quarters will save your horses from scratches. (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 54.)

COMMENTS.

The disease called hoof-rot amounted, at times, to an epidemic. It comes from constantly standing in the mud. It was common in the cavalry camp at Huntsville, Ala., in 1898. The prevention is to stand the horse in a dry place and bandage their pasterns with flannel bandages. (Ext. 434.) The cure is very difficult.

The scours and cramps which proved so fatal to Forrest's horses seemed to be very rare. (Ext. 433.)

LED HORSES.

Led horses causes confusion to troops in rear. Craig's Church, Va., May 5, 1864.

Ext. No. 435.—The confusion occasioned by getting a large number of led horses hastily back on one road was communicated to the men and caused the men to break badly.

(Col. G. H. Chapman, Comg. 2d Brig., R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 897.)

In an assault every possible man should be put into the firing line. Selma, Ala., Apr. 2, 1865.

Ext. No. 436.—Lieut. Col. Briggs deserves great credit for his efforts to bring every man possible into action, leaving only one man in eight with horses.

(Col. A. O. Miller, Comg. Brig., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 448.)

This extract refers to the assault of Selma, Ala., by dismounted cavalry.

Led horses guarded by a regiment. Selma, Ala., Apr. 2, 1865.

Ext. No. 437.—In the attack on Selma, Ala., April 2d, 1865, the led horses and pack mules of General Long's division were guarded by a regiment, the 3d Ohio. They were found necessary to keep off the Confederate cavalry, which was attacking them in rear.

(Col. Robt. Minty, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 461.)

(Brig. Genl. Eli Long, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 438.)

When dismounted cavalry breaks, press them closely.

Stoneman's raid July 27,–Aug. 6, 1864.

Ext. No. 438.—So closely did the enemy press my command many of the men were unable to mount their horses; the enemy, capturing and mounting the horses, repeatedly charged my rear as I continued to retreat.

(Col. H. Capron, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 927.)

In a retreat the led horses are sent ahead with the wounded.

All wounded capable of being moved should be carried away.

Mallory's Cross Roads, Va., June 12, 1864.

Ext. No. 439.—Gregg decided to retreat when he got all his led horses fairly on the way, and such of the wounded as could be transported, he retired by his right flank—in some confusion, it is true, but stubbornly resisting—to Hopewell Church, where Hampton ceased to press him.

(Sheridan's Memoirs, p. 435, Vol. I.)

When mounting under fire, a heavy fire is delivered and the command mounted under cover of the confusion caused.

One battalion at a time mounted, the others covering the withdrawal.

Campbellsville, Tenn., Nov. 24, '64.

Ext. 440.—The rebel brigade came at double quick up the hollow, colors in front, and in another instant was in line of battle. Three hundred Spencers from the 2d Iowa drove them back in confusion; but a moment, however, intervened when the rebels rallied. Major Horton in the meantime retired and mounted, by battalions, under fire, leaving one officer and five men wounded on the field.

(Col. D. E. Coon, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 588.)

A sudden dash into a battery enables Forrest to mount his command without serious loss.

Parker's Cross Roads, Tenn., Dec. 30, 1862.

Ext. No. 441.—Wheeling with his escort (about 75 men) and a detachment of some 50 strong, the Confederate commander now made one of his characteristic dashes at their pieces, dispersed their gunners and threw their infanty support into such confusion as to materially aid his command at the moment to regain and mount their horses.

(Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry, p. 214.)

COMMENTS.

If a large number of led horses go back on one road, much confusion will result. (Ext. 435.) It will often happen that there is no other road over which they can travel. If possible, led horses should be in rear of

the units to which they belong and maintain that relative position.

When horses do not need to be moved, they can be tied in a circle, and thus bring more men into the fight. (Ext. 436.)

A guard should always be left with the led horses. (Ext. 437.)

Extract 438 cites a case of led horses being captured, mounted and used to charge their former riders.

When a retreat is decided upon, the led horses may be sent to the rear with the wounded. (Ext. 439.)

Dismounted troops may regain their led horses under cover of a vigorous attack. (Exts. 440, 441.)

Value of being mounted on a jumping horse. Hanover, Pa., June 30, 1863.

Ext. No. 442.—* * * through which flows a little stream whose steep banks form a ditch from ten to fifteen feet wide and from three to four feet deep. Stuart, with his staff and couriers, occupied this field on the side next the enemy. The position soon became one of extreme peril to Stuart, whose retreat by the road was cut off. Nothing remained but to leap the ditch. Splendidly mounted on his favorite mare, Virginia, Stuart took the ditch at a running leap and landed safely on the other side with several feet to spare. Some of the party made the leap with equal success, but a few failed and landed their riders in the shallow water, whence by energetic scrambling they reached the safe side of the stream.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 328.)

Pack trains cannot keep up on a forced march therefore machine guns on packs cannot keep up with cavalry making a forced march. Wilson's Raid, Mar.-Apr., 1865.

Ext. No. 443.—I directed McCook to strengthen the battalion previously ordered to Centerville by a regiment and to follow at once with LaGrange's entire brigade, leaving all pack trains and wagons with the main column, so that he could march with the utmost celerity.

(Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 358.)

Mules as mounts. Jonesborough, Ga., Aug. 31, 1864.

Ext. No. 444.—I found it necessary to retreat. I immediately gave the command: "fours, right about, gallop, march." This movement, owing to the narrowness of the lane and the many obstinate mules on which one-fourth of the men were mounted, was executed with some confusion.

(Capt. M. Choumee, Comg. 5th Ia. Cav., R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 873.)

CHAPTER XI.

MISCELLANEOUS INTERESTING FACTS.

Artillery team disabled by shooting wheel horse.
McNutt's Bridge, Tenn., Jan. 27, '64.

Ext. No. 445.—Seeing our force so small, a battalion of the enemy formed and advanced to retake the guns. A horse in each wheel team was shot to hinder his moving them.

(Col. O. H. LaGrange, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 144.)

See also Ext. 119.

Killing of lead and swing horses does not prevent the gun from being moved.
Wilderness, Va., May 6, 1864.

Ext. No. 446.—Before the guns could be moved, the drivers and horses of the lead and swing teams were killed or wounded, and Ryan, the driver of the wheel team, had his arm shattered by a bullet. Breathed jumped from his horse, cut loose the teams that were struggling on the ground, mounted a wheel horse, and brought off the gun almost as by a miracle.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 408.)

COMMENTS.

The foregoing extracts go to show that the best way to stop an artillery team is to kill a wheel horse.

Model cantonment.
Wilson's Raid, Mar.-Apr., 1865.

Ext. No. 447.—The plan of that constructed by General Hammond and afterwards occupied by Upton's division I regard the best arrangement of a cavalry cantonment yet devised.

(Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 355.)


REFERENCES.
1 Camp 1st Div C.C.M.D.M
2 2d
4th
7th
C Headquarters.
Actual Survey
From Information
B.T.B Chicago Board of Trade Battery
Union
Waterloo
TENNESSEE
EASTPORT
Chickasaw
GRAVELLY SPRINGS
Irons
Watts
Boggs
Boggs
Connors Landing
RIVER
N
GOOD FARMS
Jordan
Lewis
Koger
Cheatham's Ferry
SKETCH
OF THE
CAMP OF THE CAV. CORPS, M.D.M.
EXTENDING FROM
EASTPORT, MISS.,
TO
GRAVELLY SPRINGS, ALA.
from FIELD NOTES by
H.S. HEYWOOD,
1st Lieut. 4th Mich. Cavy
Accompanying the report of
Bvt. Maj. Gen. J. H. Wilson, U.S. Army, dated June 29, 1865
SERIES 1. VOL. XLIX.



Plan of the Cantonment of the 1st Brigade, 7th Division, Cavalry Corps, Military Division of the Mississippi, at Gravelly Springs, Ala., in January and February, 1865. Accompanying report of Bvt. Maj. Gen. J. H. Wilson, U. S. A., June 29, 1865.

NOTE:

A. End Elevation of Stables.
B. Side Elevation of Stables.
C. Side Elevation of Cabins.
D. Front Elevation of Cabins.
E. Plan of Cabins.
F. Stables.
G. Men's Quarters.
H. Regimental Headquarters.
I. Brigade Headquarters.

NOTE:

a. Table.
b. Bunks.
c. Chimney and Fireplace.
d. Door.
e. Vacant place to sit.

Figures denote the dimensions in feet and inches.

Treatment of civilians when secrecy is desired.

Ext. No. 448.—The enemy made a forced march of 35 miles on the 3d instant, and picked up on their way all persons who might give information of their approach. An important scout was captured twelve miles from the post, and the enemy avoided my infantry pickets near the town and in advance of the bridge by dismounting and moving through the fields with negro guides. Their sudden and unexpected appearance at the bridge and overwhelming numbers dispersed the militia guard after but a faint show of resistance.

Poor outpost duty.

Capture of Tuscaloosa, Ala., Apr. 4, 1865.

(Capt. A. B. Hardcastle, C. S., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 505.)

COLORS.

Colors necessary to rally regiment on.
Cedar Creek, Va., Nov. 12, 1864.

Ext. No. 449.—We missed the colors, taken to the states by the men discharged, to rally the regiment on, more in this engagement than at any other time since on account of the small number of officers present.

(Maj. W. G. Cummings, 1st Vt. Cav., R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 549.)

(See also "A Summer Night's Dream.")

Use of lariats during the war.

Ext. No. 450.—In our own cavalry sets, at the commencement of the war lariat ropes were issued with iron picket pins. These were soon disused. Their intention was to confine the horse at night and permit him to graze while tethered. In practice it was found that the horses were certain to get entangled in the ropes and cut their hind pasterns very dangerously.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 66.)

AN EXPLOIT.

Lieut. McNeil captures two Federal generals without firing a shot or creating any alarm.
Cumberland, Md., Fed. 21, 1865.

Ext. No. 451.—At about 3:00 A. M. February 21, 1865, Lieutenant McNeill, Confederate cavalry, with thirty men, entered Cumberland, Maryland. They captured the picket and rode quietly to the headquarters of Generals Crook and Kelley, overpowered the guards, and without disturbing the occupants of the adjoining rooms, compelled the generals to dress and mount led horses waiting at the door and made off at a rapid rate, making good the capture and escape without firing a shot. The alarm was not given for ten minutes and it was an hour before a pursuing party could be started.

(R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, pp. 469 and 470.)

Treatment of flag of truce.
Wilson's Raid, Apr. 20, 1865.

Ext. No. 452.—About thirteen miles from Macon I was met by a flag of truce under the rebel general, Robertson. The force we were pursuing passed the flag of truce and thus saved themselves. The flag of truce detained us about half an hour. I then received orders to give them five minutes to get out of the way, and then to drive everything before me. After going about two miles he came in sight of the flag of truce party covering the rear of about 250 men. They were moving very

slowly and evidently trying to delay us. Seeing this, the adjutant charged them, causing the flag of truce to run into the woods, capturing three of the officers that were with it and driving the rebels pell-mell along the road.

(Lieut. Col. F. White, 17th Ind. Mtd. Inf., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 458.)

FORAGING—HOW DONE.

How to collect and distribute forage.

Ext. No. 453.—The only proper people to attend to foraging parties are officers of the quartermaster's department. They ought to be made to attend to it the same as regular issues, the corps quartermaster mapping out the ground for his division quartermasters, who, in turn, assign to each brigade its foraging ground. All forage should be collected and issued by the brigade and regimental quartermasters proportionately and justly. The best way is to impress wheeled vehicles of the country into the service and forbid the carriage of grain on the horses. The quartermasters can then keep the grain more easily under their own control, and six or seven times as much can be brought in for distribution without any distress to the horses.

(See also Forage under heading of "Supplies.")

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 65.)

Safeguards.

Ext. No. 454.—Safeguards should in all cases be left at houses that have supplied the troops to protect them from future pillage.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 65.)

Marching cavalry as infantry proves very exhausting.

Expedition to Tupelo, Miss., July 9–15, 1864.

Ext. No. 455.—Next morning I was ordered to move my division dismounted, and did so, marching the men about two miles, and as there was some change in the orders about our position after we came upon the field, there was consequently marching and countermarching, which proved very exhausting to men unaccustomed to marching on foot.

(Brig. Genl. J. R. Chalmers, C. S., of Forrest's cavalry, R. R., Vol. 39, Part I, p. 326.

Ext. No. 456.—And so at last our cavalry was gathered together from its places of contempt and banded together in one corps, as it should be. Its progress from that moment was positively marvelous. Not a disaster befel the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac from the day it was first drawn into the cavalry corps. It went on from victory to victory.

Advantages of having cavalry organized into a corps.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 24.)

Ext. No. 457.—Any scheme of military service which requires long drilling and costly preparation is eminently unfitted for the United States.

Cavalry should not be at a peace strength, but be kept on a war footing all the time.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 27.)

COMMENTS.

The extracts referring to organization are very few, but very important. The lessons illustrated should not be forgotten. At the time Sheridan took charge of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, it was picketing an infantry camp on a line of 60 miles and guarding wagon trains. Although the Confederate cavalry had been an object lesson for three years, not much was learned from the lesson till Sheridan, with Grant's support, was enabled to break away from the established custom of using cavalry as above described.

Extract 457 is very short, but Captain Whittaker might have written a book and not have said more. In substance it means that a peace organization which is to be increased in time of war is to be condemned. No system could be more vicious. It was tried out in the Spanish war, and conclusively demonstrated that cavalry in time of peace should be at its war strength. Any inflation except by trained men will operate as a complete block to its effectiveness. At the beginning cavalry will be needed badly or not at all. The principle is supported by such eminent authority as Von Bernhardi and others.

Ext. No. 458.—The transfer of Torbert to the position of Chief of Cavalry left Merritt in command of the First Cavalry Division. He had been tried in the

Cavalry needs young blood in its officers.

place before, and from the day he was selected as one of the young men to be appointed general officers, with the object of giving life to the cavalry corps, he filled the measure of expectation.

(Sheridan's Memoirs, p. 474, Vol. I.)

PRISONERS.

Strength of a guard of convoy of prisoners in a hostile country.

Shenandoah Valley, Mar. 3-8, 1865.

Ext. No. 459.—March 3d to 8th, 1865, Sheridan sent prisoners captured at Waynesborough, under convoy commanded by Col. John L. Thompson, N. H. Cav., to Winchester, number of prisoners 1,300. The escort consisted of dismounted men and those with poor horses from all the cavalry, about 600 men, together with seven small organizations numbering 600 men in all ranks.

The march was through a hostile country infested by Rosser's and Mosby's men.

The strength of the guard was about one soldier to one prisoner.

(Col. J. L. Thompson, R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, p. 528.)

Advance troops leave prisoners to be gathered up by other troops in rear.

Selma, Ala., Apr. 2, 1865.

Ext. No. 460.—We had no men to spare to guard prisoners, and they were ordered to the rear as fast as captured, and were gathered up by parties of our own and other commands.

(Col. J. G. Vail, 17th Ind., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 450.)

Command not depleted to guard prisoners.

Selma, Ala., Apr. 2, 1865.

Ext. No. 461.—I moved forward as fast as possible toward the city, passing squads of the enemy who had thrown away their arms, and whom I ordered to the rear, but on account of the paucity of my command I could not spare men to guard them.

(Lieut. Col. E. Kitchell, 98th Ill., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 452.)

Victorious troops pay no attention to prisoners.

Columbus, Ga., Apr. 16, 1865.

Ext. No. 462.—Here the column turned to the right and at the double-quick moved down the line of entrenchments on the principal fort, running over scores of the enemy and paying no attention to prisoners. (Lieut. Col. J. H. Peters, 4th Ia. Cav., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 498.)

Ext. No. 463.—The capture of prisoners was completely ignored in the eagerness of the men to press forward so long as there was an enemy still showing resistance.

Prisoners ignored so long as enemy still shows resistance.
Ebeneezer Church, Ala., Apr. 1, 1865.

(Col. J. Morris Young, 5th Ia. Cav., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 503.)

COMMENTS.

Where there is little danger of prisoners becoming organized to offer effective resistance, no attention should be paid to them by advanced troops.

It is true that troops in rear will gather them up and claim the honors, but advanced troops will have to suffer the injustice rather than fail to administer a decisive defeat to the enemy. To deplete the advanced victorious troops of men to guard prisoners would be to relinquish the fruits of victory. (Exts. 460, 461, 462.) The advanced troops should press forward as long as there is an enemy still to show resistance. (Ext. 463.)

Ext. No. 464.—I attempted to fall back upon the support above referred to, but finding this in full retreat, the regiment was swept to the lines of the First Brigade, nearly two miles, without being able to offer any effectual resistance. It will be borne in mind that I had 150 recruits in ranks that never before had drilled a day or heard a shot in earnest.

Recruits are not to be depended on.
Columbia Furnace, Va., Oct. 7, 1864.

(Lieut. Col. J. W. Bennett, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 545.)

COMMENTS.

The commander who depends on recruits will lean on a broken reed. They are useful only at their own fireside, which they will fight to defend. Even then they are useful only on the defensive.

Ext. No. 465.—In sending re-enforcements into the field Heaven grant that they may not be organized into fresh regiments, as they were at ruinous and suicidal costs in 1864. Sent as recruits to fill up gaps of the veterans, such men pick up their duty in a very short time under the teachings of their comrades.

It is better to keep old regiments full than to organize new ones.

(Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 32.)

Recall gives notice to the enemy of a retreat.

Varnell's Station, Ga., May 9, 1864.

Ext. No. 466.—Col. La Grange, finding the enemy massing heavily upon him, ordered the recall sounded. The enemy becoming aware of our situation, rushed forward in overwhelming numbers, capturing many of the dismounted skirmishers and driving the remainder in confusion to the woods.

(Lieut. Col. H. P. Lamson, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 781.)

COMMENTS.

Trumpet calls in the presence of the enemy only serve to give them notice of intended movements. The value of trumpet calls may well be questioned. If they cannot be used in the presence of the enemy, of what good are they in time of peace? There are a few that it will make no difference whether the enemy knows or does not know, such as the charge. The enemy can see the charge, and it will make no difference if he does hear the call. Such calls, however, as the recall, to the rear, assemble, by the flank, etc., might as well be dispensed with.

RUSE OR STRATAGEM.

A ruse.

Rapidan to the James, July 28, '64.

Ext. No. 467.—In order to deceive the enemy still more, I sent during the night one of my divisions to the opposite side of the James, first covering the bridge with moss and grass to prevent the tramp of the horses being heard, and at daylight marched it back again on foot in full view of the enemy, creating the impression that a large and continuous movement to the north side was still going on.

(Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 800.)

A ruse.

Grierson's Raid, Apr. 17,-May 2, '63.

Ext. No. 468.—During Grierson's raid, Captain Forbes with Co. C, 1st Ill. Cav., was detached. He later reached Enterprise in an effort to rejoin Grierson's command. Here he found 2,000 rebels just getting off the cars. He promptly raised a flag of truce and rode boldly forward and demanded the surrender of the place

to Colonel Grierson. The rebel officer, Colonel Goodwin, asked one hour to consider the proposition, which was granted. Captain Forbes then moved out of sight and then moved off after Colonel Grierson with all possible speed.

(History of U. S. Cavalry, Brackett, p. 296.)

A ruse. Bristoe Campaign, Oct. 1863.

Ext. No. 469.—Fortunately Young had with him a regimental band; this he moved rapidly from point to point in rear, and by its music tended to exaggerate in the enemy's estimation the force at his disposition.

(Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 384.)

ROUT—PANIC.

Rout. Panic. Artillery does great execution on retreating troops. Trevilian Station, Va., June 11, 1864.

Ext. No. 470.—The enemy's retreat finally became a rout; led horses, mounted men and artillery all fled together in the wildest confusion. Williston, with his battery, took position near by and did elegant practice with his guns, planting shells in the midst of the confused mass of the retreating enemy.

(Brig. Genl. Wesley Merritt, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 850.)

Cavalry when defeated in front of infantry, communicates its confusion to the infantry. Opequon Creek, Va., Sept. 19, 1864.

Ext. No. 471.—In this attack the enemy was driven in confusion from his position and simultaneous with it, Merritt and Averill, under Torbert, could be distinctly seen sweeping up the Martinsburg pike, driving the enemy's cavalry before them in a confused mass through the broken infantry.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 47.)

Defeated troops seized with a gerat terror of the enemy's cavalry. Cedar Creek, Va., Oct. 19, 1864.

Ext. No. 472.—I found it impossible to rally the troops. They would not listen to entreaties, threats or appeals of any kind. A terror of the enemy's cavalry had seized them and there was no holding them. They fled in the greatest confusion.

(Lieut. Genl. J. A. Early, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 562.)

COMMENTS.

The psychology of the battle field is a subject which is receiving much consideration. The commander who can utilize it to its fullest extent will have a great advantage over one who cannot.

In time of panic cavalry will certainly fill a defeated enemy with terror. (Ext. 472.) Then will be the time to reap the reward in trophies and prisoners. (Ext. 471.)

Macademized roads badly do up cavalry without shoes.

Shenandoah Valley Campaign, May-June, 1862.

Ext. No. 473.—The roads macadamized and the cavalry unprovided with horseshoes, and being compelled to subsist mostly on young grass without salt, I found my command in a most deplorable condition. Our work had been eternal, day and night. We were under fire twenty-six days out of thirty.

(Col. T. T. Munford, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, Part I, p. 733.)

Soldiers sleep on the ground holding bridles.

Bristoe (Va.) Campaign, Oct. 9-22, 1863.

Ext. No. 474.—I allowed the men to sleep on their arms, which for our arm of the service means to lie upon the ground, holding the bridle, and keeping in readiness to leap into the saddle at a moment's notice.

(Col. E. B. Sawyer, 1st Vt. Cav., R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 393.)

Stragglers get lost.

Expedition to Oxford, Miss., Aug. 6, 1864.

Ext. No. 475.—A party of foragers sent out from the 1st Miss. lost two of their men who straggled from the column.

(Lieut. Col. J. C. Hess, R. R., Vol. 39, Part I, p. 393.)

Guerillas prevent straggling and keep trains well closed up.

Ext. No. 476.—During this campaign I was at times annoyed by guerrilla bands; the most formidable was under a partisan chief named Mosby, who made his headquarters east of the Blue Ridge, in the section of the country about Upperville. I had constantly refused to operate against these bands, believing them to be, substantially, a benefit to me, as they prevented straggling and kept my trains well closed up, and discharged such other duties as would have required a provost guard of at least two regiments of cavalry.

(Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 55.)

Gettysburg Campaign, July, 1863.

Ext. No. 477.—July 9, Colonel N. P. Richmond was relieved of the command of the brigade, and the regiment, by order, went to Frederick City, Md., for the purpose of doing provost duty and arresting all stragglers, and to form a stragglers' camp.

(Maj. C. E. Capehart, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 1020, After the Battle of Gettysburg.)

COMMENTS.

Some patriotic Americans think that we are so brave that straggling as an item can be ignored. The records show just the contrary. After the battle of Gettysburg a stragglers' camp had to be established to collect the skulkers. (Ext. 477.)

MORALE.

Permanent superiority of Federal over Confederate cavalry gained at Yellow Tavern.

Ext. No. 478.—I was ordered to support Custer's brigade. * * * As soon as the enemy opened his guns upon General Custer, the latter charged with his brigade, mostly mounted. In pursuance to my instructions, Chapman with his brigade charged at the same time. * * * The charge was entirely successful. * * * It was in this charge and the mêlée which followed that the rebel cavalry leader, J. E. B. Stuart, was killed, and from it may be dated the permanent superiority of the national cavalry over that of the rebels.

Mêlée.

Yellow Tavern, Va., May 11, 1864.

(Brig. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 879. Yellow Tavern, May 11, 1864.)

Federal cavalry makes good. Good leaders needed.

Ext. No. 479.—Under gallant leaders your cavalry has become the efficient arm in this war that it has proved in other countries, and is winning by its exploits the admiration of the government and the country.

Shenandoah Valley Campaign, 1864.

(Stanton to Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 62.)

Military spirit exemplified.

Ext. No. 480.—Officers and men, as they saw the sun appear bright and glorious above the horizon, felt a consciousness of renewed strength, a presentiment of fresh glory to be added that day to their already unfad-

Opequon Creek, Va., Sept. 19, 1864.

ing laurels. They felt like men who were willing to do and die; that they were not deceived the history of the day proves.

(Brig. Genl. Wesley Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 443.)

Superiority in cavalry in battle turns the scale.

Opequon Creek, Va., Sept. 19, 1864

Ext. No. 481.—In this fight I had already defeated the enemy's infantry, and could have continued to do so, but the enemy's great superiority in cavalry and the comparative inefficiency of ours turned the scale against us.

(Lieut. Genl. Jubal A. Early, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 555.)

COMMENTS.

Morale plays a very important part in the winning or losing of a battle. Troops that feel conscious of their superiority are difficult to defeat, while those that feel their inferiority are half defeated at the beginning. This feeling of inferiority may be in the arms, morale, artillery, leadership or cavalry. (Ext. 481.) The effect of leadership is shown in extracts 478 and 479. Troops conscious of their superiority are mentioned in Extract 480.

UNMOUNTED CAVALRY.

How to use unmounted cavalry.

Campaign of the Carolinas, Jan. '65.

Ext. No. 482.—In obedience to orders, I took command of the dismounted (unmounted) men of this division, designated as the Fourth Brigade Cavalry. I organized the command into three regiments, the men of each brigade forming a regiment, and numbered after their respective brigades as the First, Second and Third Regiments. Each regiment was formed into companies of fifty men each, with one commissioned officer and the proper number of non-commissioned officers to each company.

(Lieut. Col. Wm. B. Way, 9th Mich. Cav., R. R., Vol. 47, Part I, p. 902.)

Wilson's Raid, Mar. 1865.

(See also Vol. 49, Part I, p. 356.)

Ext. No. 483.—All dismounted cavalry belonging to the army of the Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry belonging to the Middle Military Division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of the service will report to Brigadier General Benham to be used in the defenses of City Point.

Unmounted cavalry collected and put in defense of City Point.

(Sheridan's Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 128.)

COMMENTS.

Unmounted cavalry may be used to guard wagon trains, convoy prisoners (Ext. 459), to defend important points, as infantry, to guard property belonging to their arm of the service (Ext. 483), or, better yet, as Forrest used them, namely, take them along and capture mounts for them.

FRUITS OF VICTORY.

Ext. No. 484.—We sent to the War Department from May 5, 1864, to April 9, 1865, 205 battle flags captured in the open field, and captured between 160 and 170 pieces of artillery.

Fruits of victory, Trophies.

In all the operations the percentage of cavalry casualties was as great as that of infantry, and the question which had existed, "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" was set at rest.

Percentage of cavalry losses.

(Genl. P. H. Sheridan, Report of Cavalry Operations of the Army of the Potomac.)

Ext. No. 485.—The part that I expected the cavalry to accomplish at Fisher's Hill was a complete failure. I have relieved Averill from his command. Instead of following the enemy when he was broken at Fisher's Hill so that there was not a cavalry organization left, he went into camp and left me to pursue the enemy for a distance of fifteen miles with infantry during the night.

Cavalry fails to secure the fruits of victory.

Shenandoah Valley Campaign, 1864.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 29.)

Ext. No. 486.—When I attacked the enemy, Merritt and Custer, under the direction of Torbert, fiercely attacked the enemy's flanks and when he broke, closed

Pursuit well kept up. Fruits of victory gathered.

Cedar Creek, Va., Oct. 19, 1864.

in after dark and secured the artillery, trains, etc.

The cavalry pursuit was kept up to a point between Edenburg and Mount Jackson. We captured fourteen battle flags, 50 pieces of artillery, 1,600 prisoners, ambulances, wagons in large numbers, etc.

(Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 33. Battle of Cedar Creek or Winchester.)

Trophies of victory. Nashville, Tenn. Dec. 1864.

Ext. No. 487.—During and after the Battle of Nashville. Summary: Captured by Hatch's Division, 2 redoubts, 17 guns, 2 battle flags, 2 droves of beef cattle, 35 wagons (including the headquarters train of Chalmers' Division), one brigadier general and 701 prisoners; Knipe's Division—5 battle flags, 350 prisoners, 1 piece of artillery and 2 caissons; Johnston's Division—56 prisoners; Croxton brigade, 184 prisoners; 4th U. S. cavalry—1 gun and 25 prisoners. In addition, Johnston's and Knipe's Divisions should be credited with the wounded taken in hospitals at Franklin, 2,000 men.

Total, 2 redoubts, 19 guns, 7 battle flags and 3,316 prisoners.

(Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 554.)

Results of a successful raid. Wilson's Selma Raid, Mar. 22,-Apr. 24, 1865.

Ext. No. 488.—Results of Wilson's Selma raid:

Twenty-two colors, 210 pieces of artillery, 34,500 stand of small arms, 18 locomotives, 563 coal, flat and box cars, 6,820 prisoners, 255,000 bales of cotton destroyed, military uniforms and supplies too numerous to mention.

(Provost Marshal C. L. Greeno, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 413.)

COMMENTS.

The possibility of cavalry at the time of a general victory is here well illustrated. *A dead cavalryman was at last discovered,* and the percentage of cavalry losses was as great as that of infantry. (Ext. 484.)

The cavalry commander who puts his cavalry in camp at time of a general victory should be given another job, as was Averill. (Ext. 485.)

There will be times when cavalry will secure a great number of trophies as a result of their own prowess. In many cases, however, they reap the reward of a victory brought about by other troops. (Ext. 487.)

WOUNDED.

Wounded should not be abandoned to the enemy.

Ext. No. 489.—Morgan always made it a point to carry off every wounded man who could be safely moved. In this way he prevented much of the demoralization attending the men felt of falling, when wounded, into the hands of the enemy.

(Morgan's Cavalry, by Duke.)

Wounded should always be removed if possible.

St. Mary's Church, Va., June 24, 1864.

Ext. No. 490.—It was very soon evident that the force of the enemy was superior to ours, and that they were supported by infantry. * * * It became evident that the contest was too unequal to maintain it longer. The led horses, and wounded for whom there was transportation, and caissons were started on the road leading to Charles City Court House, 8 miles distance. These fairly under way, our division began to retire by the right. Our men continued fighting on foot, but were mounted from time to time. The movement was made without confusion or disorder.

(Brig. Genl. D. McM. Gregg, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 856.)

COMMENTS.

Wounded should not be abandoned to the enemy when it is possible to remove them. Not only does the abandonment seriously affect the morale, but such of the wounded as get well are subject to exchange as prisoners of war. In the end, then, it amounts to surrendering fighting troops. It is usually the case that wounded cannot be removed from the firing line, but, as the line passes on, the wounded should be removed by a special organization as soon as it is safe to do so. The fighting men should, under no circumstances, be allowed to leave the firing line to assist or carry wounded to the rear.

Qualities needed in a cavalry commander.
Gettysburg, Pa., July 2, 1863.

Ext. No. 491.—It was in one of these brilliant engagements that the noble and gallant Farnsworth fell, heroically leading a charge of his brigade against the rebel infantry. Gifted in a high degree with a quick perception and correct judgment, and remarkable for his daring and coolness, his comprehensive grasp of the situation on the field of battle and the rapidity of his actions had already distinguished General Farnsworth among his comrades in arms. In his death was closed a career that must have won the highest honors of his profession.

(Genl. A. Pleasonton, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 916.)

What to do when no orders are received.
Gettysburg, Pa., July 3, 1863.

Ext. No. 492.—During the night of July 3, the commanding general withdrew the main body to the ridges west of Gettysburg and sent word to me to that effect, but the messenger missed me. I repaired to his headquarters during the latter part of the night and received instructions as to the new line.

(Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 699.)

Sleeping in the saddle.
Gettysburg Campaign, June, 1873.

Ext. No. 493.—After a series of exciting combats and night marches, it was a severe tax on their endurance; whole regiments slept in the saddle; their faithful animals keeping the road unguided. In some instances they fell from their horses, overcome with physical fatigue and sleepiness.

(Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 696.)

Men sleep in saddle and fall from horses.
Atlanta Campaign, July, 1864.

Ext. No. 494.—Five days and nights of constant duty in the saddle, added to fourteen days' rapid marching, would shake even the most robust constitution. Men fell from their horses, and the most persistent efforts of their officers could not keep them awake.

(Lieut. Col. F. A. Jones, 8th Ind. Cav., R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 875.)

Men who ride for three consecutive days without food sleep in the saddle.

Shenandoah Valley Campaign, 1862.

Ext. No. 495.—The 6th Regiment was in the rear and our men were completely worn down and most of them sleeping on their horses. * * * Many of the men were nearly exhausted from hunger and loss of sleep. We had been in the saddle and had no regular rations for three days.

(Col. T. T. Munford, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, Part I, p. 730.)

COMMENTS.

It is evident from the foregoing that cavalry, under exceptional conditions, is going to sleep in the saddle. A saddle for this purpose must have a high cantle. In the combat the trooper will have to jump ditches, fences and other obstacles. The saddle with a high cantle is not adapted to this use. The McClellan tree is adapted to the former rather than to the latter purpose. It should be modified so as to fulfill all the conditions of combat, rather than those of sleep, which are to be regarded as exceptional.

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